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Abstract
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is widely used to study economic systems under
a complex paradigm framework. Within this research stream, ﬁnancial mar-
kets have received a lot of interest from academics and practitioners these last
years, notably in oﬀering an alternative to mathematical ﬁnance and ﬁnancial
econometrics. The traditional approach to analyzing such systems uses ana-
lytical models. The latter make simplifying assumptions, for example about
perfect rationality homogeneity of market participants. These limitations mo-
tivate the use of alternative tools. Thus, disciplines such as Computational
Economics and Computational Finance have gained attention and earned their
place in the scientiﬁc arena.
In this thesis we present an artiﬁcial stock market, called ATOM, and
contribute to the understanding of some important issues regarding the con-
struction of an abstract model of stock markets as well as a series of technical
issues. In ATOM, we model a wide variety of trading strategies and mar-
ket rules, that allows us to reexamine several traditional questions in ﬁnance
within a totally diﬀerent framework.
Firstly, we investigate diﬀerent conditions under which the statistical prop-
erties of an artiﬁcial stock market resemble those of real ﬁnancial markets. To
the best of our knowledge, this research is the ﬁrst to clearly reproduce set of
price dynamics at diﬀerent granularities (intraday and extraday over several
simulated years). We argue that generating realistic ﬁnancial dynamics that
reproduce quantitative ﬁnancial distribution is out-of-reach within the pure
zero-intelligent traders framework.
Secondly, we increase agents' intelligence to address the problem of portfo-
lio optimization at the level of individual strategies. We show that the higher
relative risk aversion helps the agents earn higher Sharpe ratio and ﬁnal wealth
in the long-range. We also investigate the relation between rebalancing fre-
quency and portfolio performance in low- and high-volatility market regimes
with diﬀerent transaction costs.
Thirdly, we renew the analysis of classical questions in ﬁnance, namely,
the relative performance of various investment strategies. For that purpose we
compare rational mean-variance portfolio optimization versus "naive diversiﬁ-
cation". We test the investors' performance, each of them following a speciﬁc
strategy, scrutinizing their behavior in ecological competitions where popu-
lations of artiﬁcial investors coevolve. Some investment strategies, followed
by artiﬁcial traders, are based on diﬀerent variations of canonical modern
Markowitz portfolio theory, others on the "Naive" diversiﬁcation principles,
and others on combinations of sophisticated rational and naive strategies.
Finally, we develop a new method for the determination of the upper-
bound in terms of maximum proﬁt for any investment strategy applied in a
given time window. We ﬁrst describe this problem using a linear programming
framework. Thereafter, we propose to embed this question in a graph theory
framework as an optimal path problem in an oriented, weighted, bipartite
network or in a weighted directed acyclic graph.
Résumé
La modélisation multi-agent est à l'heure actuelle largement utilisée pour
étudier les systèmes économiques complexes. Au sein de ce courant de
recherche, les marchés ﬁnanciers ont été étudiés avec intérêt ces dernières
années aussi bien par les universitaires que les professionnels, principalement
en apportant une alternative aux approches classiques: mathématique ﬁnan-
cière et économétrie. La méthode traditionnelle pour analyser un tel sys-
tème se base sur l'utilisation de modèles analytiques. Cette dernière part
d'hypothèses simpliﬁées du type comportement rationnel des traders ou ho-
mogénéité des investisseurs. Ces hypothèses peuvent maintenant être appro-
fondies, ce quimotive l'intérêt pour des solutions alternatives. Ainsi, des dis-
ciplines telles que l'économie computationnelle et la ﬁnance computationnelle
ont attiré l'attention des chercheurs et acquis leur légitimité auprès du milieu
scientiﬁque.
Les économistes constatent aujourd'hui une réelle mutation dans la simu-
lation, passant des théories néo-classiques basées sur la résolution d'équations
à des modèles alternatifs, approchant la ﬁnance par l'expérience, les facteurs
comportementaux, ou le calcul. Les hypothèses traditionnelles néo-classiques
sont basées sur des investisseurs rationnels et sur des marchés eﬃcients in-
troduites par Fama (1965), Fama et Blume (1966), Fama (1970). Fama a
notamment démontré que si un marché est peuplé de nombreux investisseurs
rationnels alors les investissements seront au juste prix et reﬂèteront les in-
formations disponibles. Une hypothèse-clef de ce travail réside dans le fait
que l'information est à la disposition de tous les acteurs du marché. Dans les
modèles traditionnels, les investisseurs sont rationnels et font usage eﬃcace-
ment des informations; leurs prises de décision sont basées sur des fonctions
d'utilité avec espérances, calculées via des procédures statistiques optimales.
Ainsi, un tel investisseur représentatif détient toutes les connaissances les plus
exactes et les exploite au maximum. Ces hypothèses ont inspiré des milliers
d'études visant à déterminer si des marchés spéciﬁques sont eﬃcients et si les
acteurs du marché sont parfaitement rationnels. Pompian (2006) soutient que
les économistes apprécient utiliser le concept d'acteurs boursiers rationnels,
puisque cela leur permet aisément de réaliser une analyse économique et de
présenter des résultats de façon élégante.
La théorie traditionnelle se fonde sur la rationalité, qui est un des postu-
lats majeurs de l'Hypothèse d'Eﬃcience des Marchés ﬁnanciers (HEM). Selon
le courant traditionnel, les investisseurs sont tous eﬃcaces, et par conséquent,
quand une nouvelle information devient disponible, ils ont la capacité cognitive
de l'interpréter correctement et d'y réagir avec justesse. Cependant, quelques-
uns considèrent que ces théories classiques ne correspondent pas à la réalité.
Certains chercheurs argumentent sur le fait que les investisseurs ne sont pas
vraiment homogènes et pleinement informés. Ainsi, un large nombre d'écarts
par rapport à cette rationalité espérée a été reconnu dans la littérature. Par
exemple, des investisseurs irrationnels créent des écarts dans le prix des actifs
par rapport à la valeur fondamentale, et les investisseurs rationnels devraient
être capables de corriger ces mauvaises évaluations des prix à travers un pro-
cessus d'arbitrage. Néanmoins, les stratégies d'arbitrage dans de véritables
marchés ﬁnanciers peuvent entraîner des coûts, des risques, ou des contraintes
diverses, si bien que l'ineﬃcience peut persister pendant une longue période de
temps (Barberis et Thaler, 2003). La ﬁnance comportementale soutient que
les traders sont hétérogènes et ont une rationalité limitée. La psychologie de
l'investisseur y joue un rôle clé. Par exemple, un investisseur imparfaitement
rationnel n'a pas une aversion uniforme au risque. Dans certaines circon-
stances, il peut vouloir rechercher volontairement davantage de risque. La
littérature identiﬁe plusieurs caractéristiques du trading psychologique tels
que la rétroaction positive ou momentum trading, l'extrapolation de la ten-
dance, noise trading, l'excès de conﬁance, la réaction excessive, la stratégie
contradictoire (Cutler, Poterba et Summers, 1989; DeLong, Shleifer, Summers
et Waldmann, 1990; Shleifer 2000; Barberis et Thaler, 2003).
Les discussions sur les hypothèses irréalistes utilisées par la recherche
classique, telles que la capacité cognitive parfaite d'un investisseur rationnel
amènent au souhait d'individualiser les décisions et donc, d'utiliser l'outil
informatique pour étudier plus ﬁnement ces problèmes de ﬁnance. Il est
aujourd'hui possible d'utiliser diﬀérentes techniques et outils comme la vie
artiﬁcielle, l'informatique moléculaire, l'intelligence collaborative, les réseaux
de neurones, la modélisation par agents, ou autres domaines de l'intelligence
artiﬁcielle. L'approche multi-agents, et, subsidiairement, la microsimulation,
se placent dans le cadre de la ﬁnance quantitative et mettent l'accent sur
le besoin de représenter les traders non pas en tant que groupes, mais en
tant qu'agents individuels hétérogènes. Ces approches visent à modéliser les
marchés ﬁnanciers dans un système évolutif concurrentieldans lequel les agents
autonomes interagissent et développent des dynamiques d'apprentissage. Les
applications de la modélisation multi-agents permettent le développement de
meilleures explications des faits économiques observés. Les modèles multi-
agents oﬀrent ainsi l'opportunité de réaliser des expériences donnant la possi-
bilité de produire un nombre important de simulations à partir d'un point de
départ. Ils oﬀrent aussi la possibilité d'incorporer des aspects comportemen-
taux du trading pour par exemple étudier les diﬀérents types de comporte-
ments possibles, leur inﬂuence sur les dynamiques de marché, les conséquences
sur la mécanique des prix ou l'inﬂuence de la microstructure du marché sur
les propriétés statistiques de rendement.
Dans cette thèse, nous présentons un marché ﬁnancier artiﬁciel développé
à Lille1, nommé ATOM, oﬀrant une grande souplesse dans l'individualisation
des procédures, aussi bien au niveau de la microstructure qu'au niveau des
comportements. Celui-ci contribue à la compréhension de certaines prob-
lématiques importantes concernant la construction d'un modèle abstrait de
marchés boursiers ainsi que d'une série de questions techniques. Dans ATOM,
il est possible de modéliser une large variété de stratégies de trading et de règles
du marché, ce qui permet alors de réexaminer ﬁnement diﬀérentes questions
traditionnelles en ﬁnance.
C'est le cas notamment des faits stylisés, les propriétés statistiques des
dynamiques de prix, partagées par tous les titres quel que soit le marché où
ils sont échangés. Ces faits stylisés sont généralement formulés en termes de
propriétés qualitatives des rendements des titres et ne peuvent pas être assez
précisément expliqués par des modèles analytiques. Aucune théorie n'explique
de manière satisfaisante l'origine de ces phénomènes: il existe seulement des
modèles capables de les reproduire ou de les identiﬁer. Les principaux faits
stylisés sont les suivants: l'absence d'autocorrélations sur les rendements sauf
sur de très petites échelles intra-journalières, la distribution non-gaussienne
mais leptokurtique des rendements des prix, la tendance vers la normalité avec
une échelle de temps croissante, le clustering de volatilités des rendements, la
corrélation entre volume et volatilité (Levy, Levy et Solomon 2000; Cont,
2001).
Savoir identiﬁer l'origine de ces propriétés statistiques est donc un enjeu
majeur, tant pour les théoriciens que pour les praticiens. L'étude des faits
stylisés peut permettre l'élaboration de modèles mathématiques plus ﬁables
sur la ﬂuctuation des cours de prix, ce qui pourrait permettre de maximiser
l'espérance des gains à long terme d'un portefeuille d'actions, et donc con-
tribuer à une meilleure gestion de portefeuille.
L'existence de faits stylisés remet d'ailleurs en cause certaines théories fon-
datrices de la ﬁnance moderne. Par exemple, le fait que les valeurs absolues
des rendements soient auto-corrélées remet en cause la théorie de la stochas-
ticité des prix développée par Osborne (1959) et Samuelson (1965). Cette
théorie proclame que si l'on considère un intervalle de temps large, les cours
produits pendant ce temps par le marché sont indépendamment et identique-
ment distribués et que leurs distributions limites convergent vers celle d'une
variable aléatoire gaussienne ce qui implique que les cours de bourse suiv-
ent une marche aléatoire. Mais s'il existe des régularités dans les séries de
prix (comme le montre l'analyse empirique), il est théoriquement possible de
pouvoir obtenir des performances supérieures à la moyenne sans tenir compte
de la valeur fondamentale d'un titre, sous réserve que les coûts de transac-
tion n'annulent pas ce proﬁt. Les marchés ne seraient donc pas totalement
eﬃcients.
Nous proposons dans cette thèse un modèle de marché adapté à la simula-
tion des dynamiques de prix à l'intérieur d'une journée de cotation. Ce modèle
est basé sur un carnet d'ordres à travers lequel les agents échangent des ac-
tions de manière asynchrone. Nous montrons que, sans émettre d'hypothèses
particulières sur le comportement des agents, ce modèle exhibe de nombreuses
propriétés statistiques qualitatives des marchés réels, mais par contre il génère
des propriétés quantitatives éloignées de celles observées sur les marchés réels.
Notre approche multi-agents essaye de mettre en lumière cette question en
interrogeant les eﬀets des comportements des investisseurs sur le prix des
marchés. ATOM, par sa puissance et sa souplesse, nous autorise à anal-
yser diﬀérentes dynamiques de prix émergents de diﬀérentes calibrations de
microstructure du marché à l'aide de plusieurs comportements d'agents dif-
férents. Nous proposons ici une calibration minimale permettant de faire
apparaitre les faits stylisés qualitatifs et quantitatifs. Cette calibration se
base sur le ﬂux des ordres de marché réel et le prix ﬁxé: la distribution de
prix, l'écart de prix des ordres envoyés par des acheteurs et des vendeurs, la
distribution de volume des ordres et la part des ordres de type market, limit,
cancel.
A l'aide du même outil, nous avons exploré les questions de la Théorie
Moderne du Portefeuille (TMP). Nous contribuons à ces progrès à travers
deux axes de recherche: i) nous proposons un modèle multi-agent capable
d'aborder les questions d'optimisation du portefeuille ii) nous vériﬁons que
les résultats théoriques sont conﬁrmés dans le cadre des agents hétérogènes
avec un mode de raisonnement dégradé. Nous abordons également des ques-
tions diﬃcilement résolvables par l'analyse théorique ou empirique comme par
exemple l'identiﬁcation de la stratégie dominante.
Notre recherche se concentre ensuite sur la rationalité dans le corpus de
la théorie moderne du portefeuille. Dans ce cadre, l'hypothèse de rational-
ité des investisseurs signiﬁe que ceux-ci reçoivent et interprètent correctement
toutes les informations pertinentes et qu'ils les utilisent pour faire les meilleurs
choix. Les violations de cette hypothèse sont assez communes et découlent
des éléments comportementaux. Elles donnent lieu à la rationalité limitée
et à de l'hétérogénéité dans la modélisation de la prise de décision des in-
vestisseurs. Souvent, les investisseurs, ayant des connaissances limitées sur les
rendements espérés et les covariances ont tendance à tout simplement partager
leur richesse uniformément sur l'univers des investissements, par exemple en
répartissant des montants égaux aux N actifs ﬁnanciers disponibles sur le
marché. Par ailleurs, une étude récente menée par DeMiguel, Garlappi et
Uppal (2009) montre qu'une telle stratégie naïve peut surpasser les modèles
les plus complexes. Cela soulève donc clairement le débat de l'utilité pra-
tique des modèles sophistiqués théoriques et d'étudier ﬁnement les travaux
de chercheurs comme Kritzman, Page et Turkington (2010) ou Tu et Zhou
(2011) qui proposent une série d'études empiriques en matière de défense de
l'optimisation.
A notre avis, le principal problème avec toutes ces études précédentes
réside dans leurs méthodologies de backtesting. Cette approche permet
d'évaluer une stratégie d'investissement avec les données historiques, comme
si leur mise en øeuvre n'aurait pas modiﬁé ces prix. Cette hypothèse est en
contraste avec l'analyse de Levy, Levy et Solomon (1995), Hommes (2006) qui
montrent clairement que les prix peuvent bien être inﬂuencés par plusieurs
paramètres (stratégies d'investissement, les compétences cognitives des in-
vestisseurs ou la microstructure du marché) qui sont négligés dans le cadre de
la technique de backtesting. En outre, les coûts de transaction de pondération
du portefeuille ne sont pas inclus dans les résultats. A l'aide de notre ap-
proche à base d'agents, nous testons la performance des investisseurs en scru-
tant leurs comportements dans les compétitions écologiques où les populations
des investisseurs artiﬁciels co-évoluent. Certaines stratégies d'investissement
sont basées sur diﬀérentes variantes de la théorie moderne du portefeuille
de Markowitz, d'autres sur les principes de diversiﬁcation naïve, et d'autres
encore sur des combinaisons de stratégies sophistiquées rationnels et naïves
proposées dans Tu et al. (2011). Par ailleurs, nous réalisons un examen de
l'inﬂuence de la fréquence de trading et de l'attitude des investisseurs à l'égard
des risques sur la performance du portefeuille.
Dans ce travail nous abordons la question du rapport entre les préférences
des agents au risque et leurs performances. Nous comparons la performance
relative des stratégies d'investissement en fonction de leurs préférences pour
le risque en utilisant une forme de compétition écologique entre les agents.
L'autre facteur important qui inﬂue sur la performance est la fréquence de
réajustement du portefeuille. En raison des coûts de transaction, un ajuste-
ment fréquent réduit la performance du portefeuille. Une faible fréquence
d'ajustement cache un risque de ne pas réagir à temps aux changements im-
portants du marché. Une fréquence optimale permet non seulement de con-
trôler le risque, mais aussi d'améliorer le rendement du portefeuille. Nous
proposons ici un modèle multi-agent permettant de mettre en évidence une
fréquence d'ajustement optimale dans des conditions de marché diﬀérentes en
présence de coûts de transaction.
La question de la performance en ﬁnance de marché est une question
complexe qui encadre une série de questions méthodologiques. La démarche
d'évaluation ex-post ne considère que les résultats statistiques d'une stratégie
d'investissement au ﬁl du temps, une fois les mouvements de prix parfaitement
connus. Cette approche est largement utilisée dans la gestion des portefeuilles.
La méthode dite de backtesting consiste à utiliser une stratégie sur la base des
données historiques pour voir/étudier/simuler ce qu'aurait donnée une telle
stratégie. Les résultats ne signiﬁent pas que n'importe qui aurait pu attein-
dre les résultats indiqués. Fondamentalement, ces méthodes de backtesting
sont utilisées pour tester la validité d'une stratégie spéciﬁque sur une base
théorique. La performance est généralement évaluée à l'aide d'une comparai-
son relative entre les fonds, car il est impossible de savoir ce qu'aurait été le
meilleur comportement pendant la période pertinente. Nous proposons donc
une nouvelle méthode pour la construction d'une stratégie capable d'apporter
le gain maximum. Nous décrivons d'abord ce problème en utilisant un cadre
de programmation linéaire. Ensuite, nous proposons d'intégrer cette question
dans le cadre de la théorie des graphes en codant ce problème sous forme d'une
recherche de de chemin optimal dans un graphe acyclique, orienté et pondéré.
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Financial economists are in the midst of a debate about a paradigm shift,
from the neoclassical equation-based one to alternative paradigms, such as
the experimental, the behavioral, or the computational.
Many standard economic models are based on rational investors and on market
eﬃciency assumptions. The Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is introduced
by Fama (1965). Fama demonstrates that if a securities market is populated
by many well-informed rational investors, investments will be appropriately
priced and will reﬂect all available information. A key assumption is that
the information is publicly available to all market participants. In traditional
models, rational investors make eﬃcient use of this information; their deci-
sion making is based on utility functions with beliefs, calculated via optimal
statistical procedures. Thus, such representative investor holds correct beliefs
and is an expected utility maximizer. These assumptions inspire thousands
of studies attempting to determine whether speciﬁc markets are in fact "eﬃ-
cient" and market participants are perfectly rational. Pompian (2006) argues
that economists like to use the concept of perfect rational market participants,
as it allows to make economic analysis relatively simple and to present results
in more elegant way.
Rationality of market participants is one of the major assumptions be-
hind the EMH. According to traditional stream investors are all rational, and
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therefore, when new information becomes available, they all come to the same
conclusion on what the fair price should be to reﬂect new information.
However, Levy, Levy and Solomon (2000), Farmer (2002), Hommes (2006)
claim that several assumptions made by theories do not correspond to reality.
Some question whether investors are homogeneous and fully informed. How
does the market eﬃciency emerge through the interaction of investors? Thus,
a large number of possible deviations from rationality is recognized in the lit-
erature. For example, irrational investors create deviation in asset prices from
fundamental value, and rational investors should be able to correct this mis-
pricing through the process of arbitrage. Nevertheless, arbitrage strategies in
real ﬁnancial markets can involve cost, risk, or various constraints, so that the
ineﬃciencies may persist for a long period of time Barberis and Thaler (2003).
Behavioral ﬁnance claims that traders are heterogeneous and bounded ratio-
nal. Investor psychology plays a key role in behavioral ﬁnance. For example,
imperfectly rational investors are not uniformly averse to risk. In some cir-
cumstances, they act as risk seekers. The literature identiﬁes several features
of psychology-based trading such as positive feedback or momentum trading,
trend extrapolation, noise trading, overconﬁdence, overreaction, optimistic or
pessimistic traders, overshooting, contrarian strategies (Cutler, Poterba and
Summers, 1989; DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990; Shleifer,
2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
The desire to build ﬁnancial theories based on more realistic assumptions lead
to the application of computational approaches1, that allow traders' hetero-
geneity, bounded-rationality and market non-equilibrium dynamics, to ﬁnan-
cial problems. New so-called computational paradigm bridges the gap between
a human and computer systems. These disciplines use diﬀerent computational
techniques, such as artiﬁcial life, fuzzy logic, molecular computing, collabora-
tive intelligence, neural networks, instant-based techniques, agent-based mod-
1It gives rise to new research ﬁeld, Computational Finance
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eling Chen, Wang and Kuo (2007), Llacay and Peﬀer (2010) and other areas
of artiﬁcial intelligence to solve complex ﬁnancial problems.
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) Tefatsion and Judd (2006),
and, alternatively, Microscopic Simulation (MS) Levy et al. (2000) as the
branches of Computational Finance emphasize the need to represent traders
as heterogeneous individuals. These approaches attempt to model ﬁnancial
markets as evolving systems of competing, autonomous interacting agents
and emphasize their learning dynamics. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) ap-
plications are focused on the development of better explanations of observed
economic facts. Agent-based models oﬀer the opportunity to perform exper-
iments which would not be possible in any other way since they provide the
possibility to produce a large number of simulations from the same starting
point. Agent-based models also oﬀer the possibility to incorporate behavioral
aspects of trading and to learn the behavioral eﬀects on market dynamics.
These models are usually built for the purpose of studying agent's behav-
ior, price discovery mechanism, the inﬂuence of market microstructure on
statistical properties of returns. Agent-based approach is strongly related
to behavioral ﬁnance since the agents are bounded rational and can follow
simple rules of thumb. This is a key characteristic of any behavioral model,
and agent-based models have this characteristic. It is important to note that
agent-based technologies are well suited for testing behavioral theories. The
connections between agent-based approaches and behavioral approaches will
probably become more intertwined as both ﬁelds progress.
Background
This section is devoted to the deﬁnition of the following terms that are actively
used for this research: microscopic simulations, agent-based modeling, multi-
agent systems, artiﬁcial stock markets. We discuss what they actually cover
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and propose a brief overview of the central ideas behind these wordings.
Microsimulation (MS)is a category of computerized analytical tools that
perform highly detailed analysis of system dynamics. This approach has been
developed in the physical sciences as a tool for studying complex systems with
many elements, which are generally intractable by analytical methods. The
idea of microsimulations is to study complex systems by representing each of
the microscopic elements individually and by simulating the behavior of the
entire system, keeping track of all the individual elements and their interac-
tions over time. With MS, complex dynamics are studied from the bottom-up.
MS models are free of some modeling constrains and they allow to explore the
eﬀect of various parameters on the system. Agent-based simulations apply
exactly the same paradigm as microsimulations.
Agent-based models contain multiple interacting agents within an environ-
ment (that may be a topological one or simply a framework allowing them to
interact, like a market). An agent is a microscopic element of the model. A
representation of an agent varies from a simple equation to complex software
components with human-like artiﬁcial-intelligence, or even humans. An agent
is capable of showing some degree of autonomy, communication with other
agents, goal-directed learning, and adaptation to environmental changes.
Agent-based models in ﬁnance often refer to Artiﬁcial Stock Markets
(ASM). Artiﬁcial stock markets (or stock market simulations) represent a
program or application geared at reproducing or duplicating some or all the
features characterizing a real stock market (price formation mechanism, rep-
resentation of market participants). The key property is that in ASM prices
emerge internally as a result of trading interactions of market participants,
i.e., the agents themselves.
Contrary to neoclassical models using a representative agent, agent-based
artiﬁcial stock markets normally encompass a large variety of agents. There-
fore, artiﬁcial stock markets are viewed as multi-agent systems. These models
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allow for heterogeneous agents (with diﬀerent attitudes towards risk, and dif-
ferent expectations about the future evolution of prices) to interact. Such
heterogeneity can produce diﬀerent aggregate behaviors for the system. It
can result in equilibria, it can produce patterns and cycles, or bubble and
crashes as well. As such, macro-level phenomena emerge from the micro-level,
e.g. the interaction among agents. All technical issues of agent-based artiﬁcial
market modeling are introduced in details in chapter 2.
The number of authors in mainstream ﬁnance applying microscopic sim-
ulations in their studies has signiﬁcantly increased during the last decades.
One of the earliest and prominent use of agent-based artiﬁcial stock markets
is introduced by Kim and Markowitz (1989). Kim and Markowitz (1989) were
interested in explaining the sudden crash of the U.S. stock market on Octo-
ber, 17th, 1987, when the stock market crashed for more than 20%. Since this
market event could not be explained by the emergence of signiﬁcant infor-
mation, hedging strategies and portfolio insurance have been blamed as the
main factors at play. Kim and Markowitz decided to test the destabilizing
potential of computer-based dynamic hedging strategies, such as portfolio in-
surance, via Monte Carlo simulations in a particular artiﬁcial ﬁnancial market
(Markowitz, 1988). Namely, Kim and Markowitz tried to simulate a market
populated by traders holding strategies found in real-life markets, and there-
fore, gave quite a detailed description of the real activity at the microscopic
level.
This work has inﬂuenced scientists (Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and
Tyaler, 1997b; LeBaron, 2001a, 2006; Jacobs, Levy and Markowitz, 2004) use
agent-based simulations so to include in their works more realistic assump-
tions. As a result, agent-based models became more complex, integrating
more sophisticated behaviors, more complex information structures and net-
works in order to enrich artiﬁcial markets ontologies regarding their real life
counterpart.
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Research Objectives
Agent-based models can highlight the key role of several elements impacting
market dynamics that are most diﬃcult to incorporate in traditional models.
However, this research does not claim that the representative agent approach,
nor the analytical models are useless. In contrast, we use such models as the
foundation on which multi-agent models are developed. We examine classi-
cal questions in ﬁnance within totally diﬀerent frameworks. The main point
of this thesis is to show that agent-based modeling is a good complement
to traditional approaches developed in ﬁnance (for example econometric or
statistical models).
We focus in this thesis on various market dynamics, decision-making pro-
cesses of agent and the performance of their strategies in artiﬁcial stock mar-
kets. This approach delivers new and rich ﬁnancial models, notably by intro-
ducing properties that would make analytical models intractable (or hardly
tractable; e.g. a mix of agent heterogeneity, bounded rationality).
An artiﬁcial market can help in understanding the conditions under which
the traditional ﬁnance approach remains valid, notably when additional com-
plications such as bounded rationality and heterogeneous preferences are in-
cluded in the landscape. What happens when the majority of investors are
rational, but a minority of them make decisions rather randomly? Do the
results of analytical models still hold? All these questions are addressed in
this thesis.
First, we propose a discussion on how agent-based models have overcome
some of the limitations of market microstructure and statistical models (Chap-
ter 1). Based on the literature survey and the presentation of the diﬀerent
questions investigated with existing platforms, we compose our own artiﬁcial
market framework, ATOM. The latter allows us to achieve the development of
a new market model, and to investigate dynamics arising from diﬀerent cali-
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brations. We study the design of agent's minimal intelligence that is necessary
to generate adequate ﬁnancial stylized facts (Chapter 3). For that purpose,
we propose a very simple model of trading only depending on very limited
set of factors. As such, this model establishes the (absence of) relationship
between agents' behavior and stylized facts (at a quantitative granularity).
We then make this model more constrained by gradually including additional
sophisticated mechanisms to make appear quantitative stylized facts.
Using the same kind of tools, we explore (relatively) classical questions in
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). The latter, introduced decades ago, form the
basis for most investment models, even if they constantly evolve to incorporate
new advances, notably in portfolio optimization. We try to contribute to
these advances along two lines: i) we develop an agent-based model geared
at tackling portfolio optimization questions ii) we check whether theoretical
results are conﬁrmed in the framework of heterogeneous, bounded-rational,
evolving agents; we also investigate the questions that are diﬃcult to tackle
through direct theoretical or empirical analysis, e.g. identifying of dominant
strategy.
Next, this research focuses on rationality in the corpus of modern portfolio
theory. Investor's rationality means that they receive and interpret all rele-
vant information correctly and use them to make optimal choices. Notably,
rational investors use unbiased expectations in forming and selecting mean-
variance eﬃcient portfolios. Violations of this assumption are quite common
and stem from behavioral characteristics. It gives rise to bounded rationality
and heterogeneity in modeling investors' decision making processes. Often-
times, investors, having limited knowledge about expected returns and co-
variances tend to simply share their endowments evenly over the investment
universe, e.g. allocate equal amounts to the n available ﬁnancial assets. More-
over, a recent study by DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2009) shows that such
a naive strategy can outperform more complex models. This raises the debate
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on whether the sophisticated theoretical models are valuable in practice, and
if they are of any use for practical portfolio construction as well. However,
the debate is still open, and researchers like Kritzman, Page and Turkington
(2010) or Tu and Zhou (2011) propose series of empirical studies in defense of
optimization.
We use agent-based tools to shed some light on this debate. In our opin-
ion, the main problem with all these studies, is the unrealistic "atomistic"
assumption that underlies the backtesting methodology. Said simply, this as-
sumption allows to gauge an investment strategy with historical data as if its
true implementation would have not modiﬁed these prices. These assumptions
are in sharp contrast to analysis of Levy, Levy and Solomon (1995), Hommes
(2006) who clearly show that prices may well be inﬂuenced by several pa-
rameters (investment strategies, the cognitive skills of investors or the market
microstructure itself) that are neglected in the backtesting approach. More-
over, transaction costs incurred by portfolio rebalancing are traditionally not
included in the performance results but reported separately. We rely on eco-
logical competition, where populations of artiﬁcial investors co-evolve, to test
the strategies' performance. Some investment strategies are based on diﬀer-
ent variations of canonical modern Markowitz portfolio theory, others on the
Naive diversiﬁcation principles, and others on combinations of sophisticated
rational and naive strategies proposed in Tu and Zhou (2011). Furthermore, a
closer re-examination of the rebalancing eﬀects and investor's attitude toward
risk on portfolio performance is needed so to identify clearly what matters the
most.
We address the question whether investors' survivability in a long run de-
pends on their risk preferences. Agent-based tools help us take into account all
these assumptions and to shed some new light on the relationship between the
investors' individual risk preferences and their portfolios' ﬁnal performance.
Computational simulation tools allow us to demonstrate not only a single
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value of measures of portfolio performance, but also to trace their evolution
in the long-run. We compare the relative performance of investment strategies
diﬀer in their risk preferences using Ecological Competition.
The other important factor aﬀecting strategy performance is rebalancing fre-
quency. While a high rebalancing frequency reduces the portfolio performance
due to transaction costs, a low rebalancing frequency hides a risk not to react
in time to important market changes. Optimal rebalancing frequency helps
not only to control the risk, but also to enhance the portfolio return. We
construct the agent-based model to study an optimal portfolio rebalancing
frequency in diﬀerent market conditions in the presence of transaction costs.
Performance gauging in ﬁnance is a complex issue which unfolds a series
of methodological questions. The ex-post evaluation approach considers only
the statistical results of a given investment strategy over time, once price
dynamics are perfectly known. This approach is widely used in professional
asset management. For instance, backtesting involves using a strategy with
historical data to determine how trading rules would have performed in the
past. The results do not mean that anyone could have achieved the shown
results. Basically, backtesting is used to test the validity of speciﬁc strategy
on a theoretical basis. If the results were valid over long time frames, then
they may work as well in the future.
Performance is usually evaluated using a relative comparison among funds,
as it is impossible to know what would have been the best behavior during the
relevant period, or how the best output compares with the performance upper
bound. We develop a new method for the determination of the upper-bound in
terms of maximum proﬁt for any investment strategy applied in a given time
window. We ﬁrst describe this problem using a linear programming frame-
work. Next, we propose to embed this question in a graph theory framework
as an optimal path problem in an oriented, weighted, bipartite network or in
a weighted directed acyclic graph.
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The main goal of this research is to understand how the stock market
operates and behaves, how to invest in the stock market, and to determine
the best techniques to use in order to maximize earnings.
Organization of the thesis
The work presented in this thesis does not easily ﬁt into a single research
area. It addresses concerns in ﬁnance extensively using computer science tools.
Being an inter-disciplinary research area, computational ﬁnance involves hard
work by its very nature. This is because on the one hand researchers must gain
suﬃcient knowledge in computing to know what their potential and limitations
are. On the other hand, they also have to know enough about ﬁnance to know
where computing techniques can be applied. This thesis is organized into two
parts, and includes ﬁve chapters in total that cover a variety of ﬁnancial topics
investigated by computational tools.
Part I  Context and State of the art
The ﬁrst part of this thesis introduces the context and the related litera-
ture, methodology and approaches used for this research, the important issues
of ﬁnancial market that we address in this thesis. This part is intended for
those who are interested in modeling and application of agent-based artiﬁcial
stock market architecture.
Chapter 1 is devoted to the introduction of agent-based approach as a
bottom-up representation of stock markets. This introduction provides the
why, what, and whence: some motivation for the uses of agent-based tools for
ﬁnancial market questions; an overview of the diﬀerent problems in ﬁnance and
methods for meeting them; and an indication of how the approach of multi-
agent artiﬁcial markets ﬁts into survey methods and into the general quest
for scientiﬁc knowledge. We review the main advantages of this approach and
compare it to the neoclassical framework. Obviously, this chapter also covers
General Introduction of the Thesis xi
some weaknesses of the agent-based research framework. Chapter 1 deals with
fundamentals, while Chapter 2 with techniques.
In Chapter 2 we review the literature on Artiﬁcial Stock Markets, what
we consider to be the state-of-the-art in the development of agent-based mod-
els, but rather from the point of view of computer scientists. We introduce
the important questions of market modeling and technical design in software
engineering terms. We answer some questions of system calibration and vali-
dation. Later, we introduce ATOM, the agent-based computational platform,
constructed to perform the experiments proposed afterwards. We detail the
potential of our system for modeling a wide variety of trading strategies and
market rules, which are crucial for research questions on ﬁnancial stock mar-
ket.
Part II  Results and Research Contributions
In this part of the thesis we report our results and contributions in the
investigation of important issues for ﬁnancial markets. This part contains ﬁve
essays that address diﬀerent problems in ﬁnance, from statistical properties
of ﬁnancial time series to relative performance of investment strategies, but
these works all share the agent-based modeling research approach. Each es-
say is related to a paper that has been published (or will appear) in referred
proceedings and collections, and that has been publicly presented at interna-
tional workshops and conferences in economics and ﬁnance. The current state
of work is summarized in table 1.
Chapter 3 presents our contributions in the understanding of qualitative
and quantitative statistical properties of asset returns, also known as "styl-
ized facts". We propose a minimal agent's intelligence calibration in order to
generate realistic market dynamics.
Chapter 4 puts forward the investigation of a portfolio diversiﬁcation prob-
lem within an agent-based computational ﬁnance framework. The discussion
begins from the mathematical basis of the mean-variance optimization model.
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Important facilities of ATOM, previously described in Chapter 4, are explored
to implement this classical model within the agent-based framework. We
model the agents that maximize their expected utility functions, however,
there exists some degree of irrationality. For instance, the investor may devi-
ate to some extent from the optimal rules, or he has limited memory capacities.
We also introduce in our model the heterogeneity in expectations, risk prefer-
ences, holding periods. All these changes taken separately or simultaneously
are impossible to solve analytically, but they can be integrated into agent-
based models. We implement the extensive experiment based on the ATOM
platform to shed some new light on the relationship between the investors'
individual preferences, such as risk aversion and rebalancing frequency, and
their portfolios ﬁnal performance.
In this chapter we also renew the analysis of the relative performance
of investment strategies, rational mean-variance portfolio optimization versus
naive diversiﬁcation. We show that the best possible strategy over the long
run relies on a mix of Mean-Variance sophisticated optimization and a Naive
diversiﬁcation. These results reinforce the practical interests of the Markowitz
framework.
Chapter 5 puts forward a new method for the determination of the upper-
bound in terms of maximum proﬁt for any investment strategy applied in
a given time window. We show that, even in the "ex-post" framework, it
is extremely complex to establish this upper bound when transaction costs
are implemented. We ﬁrst describe this problem using a linear program-
ming framework. Next, we propose to embed this question in a graph theory
framework and show that the determination of the best investment behavior
is equivalent to the identiﬁcation of an optimal path in an oriented, weighted,
bipartite network or in a weighted directed acyclic graph. We illustrate this
method using various real world data and make a new point on the notion of
absolute optimal behavior in the ﬁnancial world.
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Finally, we summarize the major results and contributions of this work
and give an outlook on future directions of research. Additionally, we describe
some promising areas of research along the line of our artiﬁcial stock market.
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This chapter focuses on agent-based modeling, a computational intensive
method for developing and exploring new kinds of economic and ﬁnance mod-
els. The discussion begins with the representation of ﬁnancial stock market
as the complex evolving system. Then, we introduce an agent-based modeling
approach to study complex systems. This chapter also covers the on-going
debates and criticisms of agent-based markets. We also suggest some research
directions, where agent-based models can be a useful complement to main-
stream approaches.
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Chapter 1. From Traditional to Agent-based Modeling 
Justiﬁcation
1.1 Financial Stock Market as Complex Evolv-
ing System
I think the next century will be the century of complexity
Stephen Hawking (Complexity digest 2001/10, 5 March 2001)
This section is devoted to investigating stock markets as complex systems.
There is no single precise deﬁnition of complex systems. Most authors, how-
ever, agree on the essential properties a system has to possess to be called
complex. According to Weaver (1948), Simon (1962) the key features of com-
plex system typically include the following aspects: i) the system is composed
of interacting agents ii) their emergent behavior does not result from the
existence of a central controller iii) the system's properties emerge from the
interaction of its components iv) the system may show unpredictable behavior
or lead to uncontrolled explosion (e.g. earthquake or stock market crashes)
v) small change in the causes implies dramatic eﬀects. Generally speaking,
a complex system of connected agents exhibits an emergent global dynamic,
resulting from the interactions between the agents.
Complex systems usually refer to those in the natural sciences, however,
Rosser (2004), Arthur (2006) argue that economy can also be viewed as a
complex evolving system. Particularly, ﬁnancial markets exhibit properties
that characterize complex systems. Traders (banks, brokers, mutual funds,
individual investors) and assets (equities, bonds, futures, options, swaps, etc.)
can be regarded as the interacting agents, the price and volume market dy-
namics are emergent phenomena. Thus, ﬁnancial market might be understood
much better as complex adaptive system than optimizing rational entity. The
complexity of ﬁnancial stock market also comes from the personal exchanges
where perhaps there are few agents, but they are bounded rational, adaptive,
purposeful, and strategic; additionally, they learn from other agents behavior.
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Pellizzari (2005) identiﬁes diﬀerent levels of complexities in the stock mar-
ket Molecular, Organizational and Environmental. The ﬁrst refers to the com-
plexity of agents: their decision making rules, evolutionary rules, memory
span, optimizing and predictive capabilities.
Organizational complexity refers to agents interactions and their organiza-
tion in groups. Some agents are insensitive to the action of others, the other
ones are completely inﬂuenced by decisions made by their neighbors. In this
case, it might be reasonable to create groups, to share knowledge, information
and strategies.
Environmental complexity describes the market organization, a policy-
making issue. Bottazzi, Dosi and Rebesco (2005) show the important impact
of market organization on return distribution. Such eﬀect can be explained
by environmental and molecular level features.
According to McCauley (2004) the complexity of ﬁnancial stock markets
is hidden in the missing theory of the expected return. The author states
that it is an easy task to describe return dynamics by stochastic equation,
but there is a big chance that this model is wrong empirically because such
models cannot reﬂect the common sentiment of market participants which can
be aﬀected by political announcements and economical changes. The other
part of complexity of ﬁnancial markets is the unﬁxed empirical distribution.
This distribution is inﬂuenced by agents' collective behavior. This sort of
change cannot be anticipated or described by a simple stochastic theory.
Complex systems can be modeled using a pure mathematical approach.
This is for example the case with the Lotka-Volterra prey-predator system
(Lotka, 1910; Goel, Maitra and Montroll, 1971). However, the models should
be as simple as possible for tractability reason. Thus, some of the system
properties should be ignored, and only the relevant features that play an
essential role in the emerging phenomena explanation, should be retained.
With this simpliﬁcation, a model is a simpliﬁed mathematical representation
6
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of a system. Another diﬃculty of equation-based representation of complex
systems is that most equations cannot be solved analytically.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a good alternative to equation-based mod-
els for studying complex systems, including ﬁnancial stock markets. Érdi
(2008) emphasizes that even if there exists mathematical tools to model
and simulate spatiotemporal phenomena, agent-based computational mod-
eling proposes a completely diﬀerent philosophy and practice compared to
equation-based modeling.
Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2005) describes simulation, and ABM in particu-
lar, as a third way of doing science, in addition to deduction and induction.
Deduction is used to derive theorems from assumptions. Induction is used to
ﬁnd patterns are empirical data. The simulation also starts with assumptions,
but does not prove the theorems with generality; at the same time simulation
generates data suitable for analysis by induction. The simulation allows inves-
tigation of economical processes under controlled computational experiments
and Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2005) points out four speciﬁc goals pursued by
ABM:
1. Agent-based models can provide empirical understanding of macroscopic
features nature without top-down control.
2. Agent-based models can provide normative investigation, testing the
qualities of diﬀerent designs, looking for one that gives desirable system
performance.
3. Agent-based models can provide heuristic investigation of market phe-
nomena, understanding of economic system behaviors under alterna-
tively speciﬁed initial conditions. ABM sheds some new light on causal
mechanisms in social systems.
4. Agent-based modeling can help researchers to get advance in method-
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ological issues, as it provides the methods and tools needed to undertake
the rigorous study of social systems through controlled computational
experiments. This axis covers the necessity in testing of experimentally-
generated theories against real-world data.
1.1.1 Weaknesses of standard approaches: how ABM
can help?
Agent-based approach is an answer to highly centralized, top-down, deduc-
tive approach that is characteristics of mainstream, neoclassic economic the-
ory. Most of the time, the neoclassic approach favors models where agents do
not vary much in their strategies, beliefs or goals, and where a great eﬀort
is devoted to analytic solutions. By contrast, agent-based modeling considers
decentralized, dynamic environments with populations of evolving, heteroge-
neous, bounded rational agents who interact with one another.
Moreover, assumptions made for reasons of tractability in theoretical mod-
els may miss many interesting phenomena. The ignored factor may have an
important impact on investigated question. Computational modeling allows
more complex and realistic assumptions (see table 1.1). Levy et al. (1995) il-
lustrate with Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Treynor,
1962) some unrealistic assumptions made for model tractability in order to
obtain analytic results. The CAPM deals with rational investors with homo-
geneous expectations regarding future distribution of returns, they maximize
expected utility and have the same holding period. Taxes and transaction
costs are not incorporated in this model. Many of the assumptions made in
the CAPM, as well as in most other models in ﬁnance, have been actively
criticized. For instance, the assumption of no taxes and no transaction costs
does not correspond to real market conditions. It is also clear that, in con-
trast to the homogeneous expectation assumption, investors diﬀer in their
8
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expectations, holding periods, decision-making processes, and so on. Stigler
(1966) argues that a model with unrealistic assumptions is better than no
model at all, and one should not reject a model unless a better one is found.
According to Friedman (1953b) the model quality is measured by its explana-
tory power, and not by its assumptions. Nevertheless, Levy et al. (1995)
report that several empirical tests, as well as several anomalies of ﬁnancial
stock market, contradict the theoretical results. In agent-based models the
unrealistic assumptions can be relaxed one by one by one, this expands the
realm of investigations. Epstein and Axtell (1996), Epstein (1999) introduce
the key features of agent-based models allowing to relax some assumptions of
theoretical models.
 Heterogeneity. Agents are not regarded as homogeneous pool of repre-
sentative agents, every individual is explicitly represented.
 Autonomy. There is no central or top-down control that deﬁnes agents
behavior. There exists the strong relation between agents' individual
behavior and emergent macro phenomena.
 Explicit space. Agents act on the common environment under common
restrictions and rules.
 Local interactions. Agents are able to interact, communicate, and form
the groups with others.
 Bounded rationality. Agents have neither complete information nor in-
ﬁnite computational capacity. Agents are not absolute optimizers and
they use local information.
 Non-equilibrium dynamics. ABM describes models' behavior without
assumption about existence of equilibrium. ABM provides not only the
information about the existence of equilibrium, but they also allow to
access the entire solution trajectories, or how equilibrium was reached.
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Neoclassical economics ABM
Fully-informed Limited access to information
Market participant are rational Participant has bounded rationality
Participant interact only Participant interact directly
indirectly through markets with one another
Focus on equilibrium outcomes Focus on dynamics
The ability to learn about one's environ-
ment from
gathered information, past experiences,
social mimicry...
Table 1.1: The comparison of mainstream (neoclassical economical theory)
and ABM approaches
Some comparison of agent-based models and equation-based or neoclassical
models is summarized in the table 1.1 and is detailed in the next subsections.
1.1.1.1 Rationality
Jevons (1871), Menger (1871), Walras (1874) deﬁne economics as a problem of
allocation of resources between competing forces. Regularities in economies
derived from the uniform, simultaneous behavior of individuals optimizing
their gains. Such individual, named Homo economicus, can be viewed as
mathematically represented absolutely rational economic actor. From a neo-
classical point of view, an individual tries to maximize his economic well-being
and minimizing economic costs, selecting strategies maximizing the utility.
Most criticisms of the Homo economicus are based on three underlying
assumptions: 1) Perfect Rationality. Rationality is not always the ﬁrst driver
of human decision making. As many psychologists believe, the human intellect
is subservient to human emotions. 2) Perfect Self-Interest. This assumption
is strongly connected with the previous one. Sometimes people is subject of
impulses and emotions, hence they perform volunteering, helping the needy,
even if it contradicts the wealth maximization objectives. However that might
well ﬁt with utility function integrating this altruistic dimension. Agents are
10
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then no longer selﬁsh as they are usually described. 3) Perfect Information.
In the world of investment, there is nearly an inﬁnite amount to know and
learn, and even the most successful investors do not master all disciplines. Si-
mon (1957), Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
emphasize that the individuals are limited in their knowledge about their en-
vironment and in their computational abilities. They face costs to obtain
sophisticated information that can be processed for rational decision making.
Consequently, it is reasonable to describe the market participants as bounded
rational, instead of perfectly rational entities with fully optimal decision rules.
Bounded rational traders have been introduced to replace the standard ex-
pected utility theory and to represent human economic decision making in a
more realistic manner. Bounded rationality assumes that individual is ratio-
nal, but limited by general knowledge and cognitive capacity.
In contrast, Friedman (1953a) is one of the strongest defenders of the ra-
tional agent approach. He argues that non-rational agents will not survive in
evolutionary competition and will therefore run out of the market. Alchian
(1950) assumes that biological evolution and natural selection driven by real-
ized proﬁts may eliminate non-rational participants and leads to the situation
where rational, proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms dominate, and if price contain any
predictable components the remaining rational investors will reduce this to
zero.
The debates in ﬁnance about market eﬃciency and rationality are still
unresolved. Hommes (2006) states that the perfect knowledge about the en-
vironment in a heterogeneous world implies that a rational agent has to know
the beliefs of all other, non-rational agents. This assumption is highly unreal-
istic (Hommes, 2001). A bounded rational agent forms expectations based on
available information and adapts them to new emergent information. Rational
expectations hypothesis states that expectational model adopted by all par-
ticipants leads to behaviors that produce patterns close to the expected ones.
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It means that the expectational model produces the outputs consistent with
the expectations. But the forecasts that are on average consistent with the
outcome they predict do not exist and cannot be statistically deduced. This
statement can be illustrated with the El Farol bar problem (Arthur, 1994b,a).
The El Farol bar problem
100 people should decide whether to go to a bar (El Farol bar) or to stay home.
If person predicts that there will be more than 60 people in the bar, she will stay
home; otherwise she will go there. All agents use the same rational expectations
common rules that use available history to produce some prediction. If this weekend
the rules predict the attendance higher than 60, everybody will stay home and will
negate that forecasts. If rules predict the attendance lower than 60, everybody will
show up the bar, and one more time will negate such rules. There is a self reference
in such game. In the real world market, this game can be transformed into investor
behavior. If there exists the rumors that the price will rise by 2%, it will attract the
potential buyers, as a result the price will go down and expectations will fall away. In
this case the theory of rational expectations fails. To resolve the anomaly, we should
allow agents to start with a variety of rules and expectations, thus some of agents
are no longer rational. Perfect rationality is related to heterogeneity issue. The
problem of decision making of one single agent can be solved analytically. The same
is true if all agents are identical, but when many heterogeneous agents are competing,
the decision making process cannot be fully rational due to the complexity of this
problem.
1.1.1.2 Heterogeneity and Investors Interactions
In neoclassical economics, market participants are independent decision mak-
ers, driven by observed prices and fundamental information. This assumption
might appear unrealistic because market traders are not solely inﬂuenced by
these factors. For instance, the intensive research around market volatility
shows that high market volatility does not correspond to the period of high
12
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changes in fundamental information and vice versa (Frankel and Froot, 1986;
Cutler et al., 1989). These empirical observations have played an impor-
tant role in the increasing popularity of bounded rational, heterogeneous and
interacting agents explanations of asset price movements. This means that
agents are also inﬂuenced by other market participants. The statement is
supported by Schelling (1978), who studies the variety of social phenomena,
where the individual decision was determined by the behavior of the others
in the group. The author reports that there exists a macrobehavior emerging
from the micromotivations of individuals in the group. One of the mecha-
nisms of decision-makers is based on the mimicking others behavior go with
winner. Hence, agents suppose to show some level of intelligence, ability to
learn and adapt to environmental changes, to have decision making rules, be
able to adjust these rules as a result of interaction and communication with
others.
The conﬁrmation of heterogeneity on the stock market can be found in
empirical research of Vissing-Jorgensen (2003). The author reports that there
exists heterogeneity in forecasting future asset prices on the stock market:
50% of individual investors consider the stock market to be overvalued, 25%
believe that it is fairly valued, about 15% are unsure, and less than 10%
believe that it is undervalued.
Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) reinforce the
necessity of heterogeneous expectations, diﬀerent opinion and trading rules
on the market by introducing the no trade theorems. But the development of
analytical models with heterogeneous agents is quite diﬃcult1, while agent-
based models are more suitable for this purpose, as they easily incorporate
a large number of interacting individuals with diﬀerent rules, access to infor-
mation and sources of information. Their choices are not deterministic and
1For example, Jouini and Napp (2012) conciliate heterogeneous agents level and repre-
sentative agent in the corpus of mainstream ﬁnance.
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predictable. Thus, agent-based modeling propose the powerful tool to test al-
ternative models of decision-making which are more in line with the empirical
record.
1.1.1.3 Equilibrium
According to Arthur (2006) agent-based computational tools allow to study
wider questions compared with standard neoclassical economics methods. For
instance, how the economy behaves out of equilibrium or how equilibrium is
formed. Rational expectations economics focus on what forecasts are con-
sistent with the outputs created by these expectations. Partial-equilibrium
economics focuses on what local behaviors would produce larger patterns that
would support those local behaviors. A behavior creates patterns and pattern
in turn inﬂuences behavior. Neoclassical economics tends to describe the pat-
terns in equation form. Consideration of economic patterns out of equilibrium
introduces algorithmic updating and heterogeneity of agents.
In many stochastic, dynamic models, it is possible to characterize the
equilibria and stability asymptotically, but little can be said about their out-
of-equilibrium behavior. It is important to understand the behavior of out-
of-equilibria system since such system may evolve a very long time to reach
the asymptotic equilibrium (Axtell, 1999). ABM provides not only the in-
formation about the existence of equilibria, but they also allow to access the
entire solution trajectories, or how equilibrium was reached. Epstein (2006a)
aﬃrms that the purpose of ABM is to provide new evidence on equilibriums
and when they exist to generate them, without assuming the existence of these
equilibriums.
Moreover, the participant should update their expectations in out-of-
equilibrium system that can provoke the expectation changes among other
agents. As the results we observe the cascades of changes in the system that
14
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shows as low and high volatility market regimes. This phenomenon shows up
in real market price series, but not in equilibrium models.
Market crashes is a good example when equilibrium models, which assume
that all forces in the market balance, are ill-suited, and agent-based models
can help gain deeper understanding of this phenomenon.
1.1.1.4 Model simplicity
The modeling of a system consists in the description of its elements, their
behavior under diﬀerent settings and conditions. The ﬁrst goal of modeling
is to shed some light on the impact of diﬀerent factors on the behavior of the
system. The second goal is to predict the behavior of system under diﬀerent
conditions. Mandelbrot (2006) suggests that the choice and implementation
of modeling methodology (linear regression, artiﬁcial neural networks, etc.)
can play an important role in the quality of the ﬁnal model.
The modeling in the mainstream framework mandates that solutions of
problems be based on theoretically defendable foundations with strong math-
ematical proofs that imply the series of underlying unrealistic assumptions.
Assumptions made for reasons of tractability may miss many interesting phe-
nomena. Epstein (2006b) says that any agent-based computational model can
be expressed as an explicit set of mathematical formulas or recursive func-
tions. Many agent-based models have been mathematized, for example as
stochastic dynamical system (Dorofeenko and Shorish, 2002). But even those
formulas exist, they are intractable. Hence, the important question which of
approaches equation-based or agent-based is most illuminating. So the opin-
ion that agent-based modeling is just simulations for which no equation exist,
is actually incorrect. The advantage of agent-based models is that they can
be ran thousand times with diﬀerent parameter values and easily produce the
targeted outputs, while it is diﬃcult to do in equation-based models.
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1.1.1.5 Controlled replications
In econometrics framework each empirical observation contains some propor-
tion of variation due to some proportion of noise assigned to chance or imper-
fect observations. In contrast, in agent-based framework researchers have per-
fect control over stochastic sources of variation. Thus, they have the capability
to produce the eﬀects of stochastic variation and simulate exact replicates of
empirical samples. Gode and Sunder (1993) argue that agent-based modeling
permits greater control over the preferences and information-processing capa-
bilities. It is possible to specify a multi-agent complex adaptive system that
generates the empirical phenomenon. These phenomena that emerge from
simulations should be the result of multi-agent interactions and adaptation,
and not the results of complex assumptions about individual behavior and/or
the presence of too many free parameters. Thus, the ability to generate
a particular empirical phenomenon facilitates understanding of the empirical
phenomenon.
1.1.1.6 A mix of approaches
Agent-based modeling that generates a large variety of simulation outputs
can be used in conjunction with econometric and statistic tools, which can be
useful for risk analysis. Hence, these two streams can be mixed. Computation
does not replace theory, but it allows to develop a theory.
Wooldridge (2002) reports the factors indicating the appropriateness of
agent-based models. When the considered system is open, highly dynamic,
uncertain, or complex, a model of ﬂexible autonomous actors is often the only
solution. In some systems, the distribution of data or control, the centralized
solution is diﬃcult or even impossible.
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1.1.2 Critics of Agent-Based Modeling
Many economists recognize the problems of classical methods in ﬁnance, but at
the same time they have serious doubts about taking agent-based approaches
to address the fundamental issues. The criticisms of computational approaches
in ﬁnance are summarized in (Tefatsion and Judd, 2006). Next subsections
introduce the critics of ABM in ﬁnance and some possible methods to avoid
these limitations.
1.1.2.1 Examples Vs. Theorems
One of the ﬁrst criticism of computational methods applied to ﬁnancial prob-
lems is that they produce only examples, while mainstream methods produce
theorems. One single example shows only one element in an inﬁnite set of
possible outputs, but one single example cannot shed light in explanation of
parameters importance in the model. Each run of simulations is a suﬃciency
theorem, but a single run does not provide any information on the robustness
of such theorems. In mathematical economics the model sensitivity can be
realized via inspection, simple diﬀerentiation, the implicit function theorem.
The only way to deal with this problem in agent-based computing is through
multiple runs of simulation with diﬀerent initial conditions and parameters
(Axtell, 1999). Hence, a few thousand well chosen examples generated in
agent-based framework can be more convincing.
If a theorem is proved in a mathematical framework under the assumption
that all agents have the same cognitive abilities or memory span, one can
simply introduce the agent population in an agent-based model with some
distribution of initial parameters, run the simulation and check whether the
simulation still holds. If it does not, then the agent-based model represents
a counter-example to the generalization of the theorem with respect to the
assumption about agents heterogeneity.
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1.1.2.2 Errors of Computations Vs. Errors of Speciﬁcation
Critics point out that numerical results have errors. But these errors can be
anticipated by the application of sophisticated algorithms and powerful hard-
ware. Careful simulation methods can reduce simulation error by increasing
the sample size and by exploiting variance reduction methods. More gen-
erally, careful numerical work can reduce numerical errors. The problem of
numerical errors in agent-based computational models are no more diﬃcult to
handle (and more often much easier) than the analogous numerical problems
that arise in maximum likelihood estimation and other econometric methods.
Researchers face a trade-oﬀ between the numerical errors in computational
work and the speciﬁcation errors of analytically tractable models. Therefore,
it is often argued that it is better to ﬁnd a solution with some inaccuracy of
correctly deﬁned question, than to ﬁnd exact solution to the wrongly deﬁned
question.
1.1.2.3 Parameters settings
A problem with computational economics and bounded rationality is that
it leaves many degrees of freedom. Agent-based model should allow agents
to evolve, to act and to interact with others overall experiment time without
intervention from the modeler. The modeler cannot intervene to adjust system
evolution. All initial speciﬁcations should be completely predeﬁned, small
changes in these speciﬁcations can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the output. The model
should have the right parameters for the simulation to make sense. Therefore,
sometimes it is diﬃcult to justify the value taken for some parameters.
Another drawback of multi-agent models is that the decision making rules
of the agents do not contain semantic speciﬁcations, modeler rather adapt
ad-hoc functions of the decision making process without underlying cognitive
processes (Grothmann, 2002). However, these limitations can be removed by
18
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using feedforward neural networks (Beltratti, Margarita and Terna, 1996) or
recurrent neural networks (Yang, 1999).
1.1.2.4 Agent-based models are hard sell
Axelrod (2006) describes his collaboration with Bill Hamilton on agent-based
models in biological systems and how their paper had a hard time getting
published. He indicates that the absence of standards for testing the robust-
ness of an agent-based model can make agent-based modeling a hard sell. It
is diﬃcult to validate outputs of agent-based models against empirical data.
While ABM is useful in producing aggregate-level patterns from individual-
level rules, the main issue in ﬁnancial markets in the agent-based framework is
calibration and validation: how can one evaluate the quality of a model from
an econometric point of view. In many situations the ﬁtness function of data
ﬁt cannot be practically formulated mathematically. Thus, simulations, due
to the lack of rigorousness, are still not regarded as a science by many scien-
tists. Robert Axelrod suggests that agent-based community should converge
on standard tools for research, on a set of fundamental concepts and results.
Without support from theory, the contribution of agent-based modeling can
be rather limited. Hence, it is important to consolidate the ABM study with
theoretical fundamentals. There exit actually some research tools, like game
theory or econophysics, able to bridge a gap between theory and simulations.
Ashburn, Bonabeau and Ecemis (2004) argue that in order to overcome
the problem of agent-based model validation, one can allow more subjective
factors to guide the search for good models, by enabling ABM users to
integrate ﬁnancial economics expertise into their models. Such techniques,
used in other ﬁelds (such as in the geosciences Boschetti and Moresi (2001)),
rely on directed search evolutionary algorithm which requires human input to
evaluate the ﬁtness of how well the model reproduces the data qualitative and
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uses common evolutionary operators to breed the individual-level rules that
produce macro level patterns.
1.2 Survey of agent-based modeling research
contributions
This section discusses simple models from an alternative approach in which
ﬁnancial markets are viewed as complex evolutionary systems, it also surveys
the main areas in which agent-based models have been used. A range of im-
portant economical topics relevant to agent-based modeling is considered by
Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2005): price distributions (Bak, Chen, Scheinkman
and Woodford, 1993), price equilibrium in decentralized markets (Albin and
Foley, 1990; Epstein and Axtell, 1996), trade networks (Tesfatsion, 1995; Ep-
stein and Axtell, 1996), excess volatility in returns to capital (Bullard and
Duﬀy, 1998), organizational behaviors (Prietula, Carley and Gasser, 1998),
stock market price time series (Arthur et al., 1997b), shape of the distribution
of assets return (Cont, Potters and Bouchaud, 1997; Mantegna, 1991), higher-
order statistical properties (Arnéodo, Muzy and Sornette, 1998; Cizeau, Liu,
Meyer, Peng and Stanley, 1997). We compare the classical econometric ap-
proaches and agent-based modeling applied to ﬁnancial issues in detail. First,
we review the literature on stylized facts explanations. Second, we brieﬂy
describe the research on the agent-based explanation of market anomalies.
Finally, we present the mainstream models of investment decision making,
especially, the series of unrealistic assumptions is stressed. We contrast these
models with computational models that help researchers overcome the draw-
backs of traditional models.
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1.2.1 Stock Market Volatility
Volatility is one of the most important characteristics of ﬁnancial stock mar-
ket. It is also an important parameter for portfolio optimization, asset pricing
and risk management. Risk is the key problem in ﬁnance. Even if there exists
diﬀerent measure of risk, the deﬁnition of risk as the variance of logarith-
mic price series is still more popular. Nevertheless, volatility is not an easily
observable parameter, and should be evaluated using diﬀerent approaches pre-
sented in ﬁnancial literature. Financial literature deﬁnes a series of stylized
facts characterizing volatility.
The result of more than half a century of empirical studies on ﬁnancial
time series indicates the fact that all these series have common properties
from a statistical point of view. Such statistical properties are known as
stylized facts and have been reported for several types of ﬁnancial data and
for diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial markets (Cont, 2001).
There are several approaches to study and understand market dynam-
ics and price series properties. Theoretical studies try to ﬁnd explanations
through analytically tractable models. Empirical studies analyze historical
data. Experimental studies focus on analyzing trading behavior and its con-
sequences on the market dynamics. Experimental studies are usually related
to behavioral ﬁnance. We focus on the power of agent-based models to repro-
duce stylized facts. Important observed stylized facts in ﬁnancial time series
are as follows:
 Excess volatility. The fact that large (positive or negative) returns occur
cannot always be explained by the arrival of new information on the
market.
 No autocorrelation in raw asset returns
 Volatility clustering (slow decay of autocorrelations of squared returns
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and absolute returns). This fact is often interpreted as a sign of long-
range dependence
 Fat tails in the returns distribution. The distributions are approximately
bell-shaped but assign more than normal probability with more peaked
center (excess kurtosis) and at the extremes (heavy tails).
 Volume/volatility correlation: trading volume is correlated with all mea-
sures of volatility.
One of the main stylized facts observed in many ﬁnancial time series is
so called, "volatility clustering", where periods of high volatility are followed
periods of low volatility, and so on. Mandelbrot (1963) was one of the ﬁrst to
observe this phenomenon. Applied researchers in ﬁnance use Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models and its various extensions as
an econometric tool, actively used to describe volatility clustering introduced
by Engle (1982).
εt denotes the discrete time stochastic process εt = ztσt, where E(zt) = 0,
var(zt) = 1. In most applications εt corresponds to the innovation in the mean
for some other stochastic process yt = g(xt−1; b) + εt and g(xt−1; b) denotes a
function of xt−1 and the parameter vector b, with xt−1 information set at the
moment t−1. Engle (1982) suggests to express σ2t as a linear function of past
squared values of the process,
σ2t = ω +
q∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−1 (1.1)
The equation 1.1 expresses ARCH(q) model, the ﬁrst attempt to cap-
ture volatility clustering (Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992). An alterna-
tive and more ﬂexible structure is provided by Bollerslev (1986) with the
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GARCH(p, q).
σ2t = ω +
q∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i +
p∑
i=1
βiσ
2
t−1 (1.2)
It is necessary to note that the small numbers of parameters needed in these
models seem suﬃcient to capture the variance dynamics over very long sample
periods. For that reason, GARCH(1, 1), GARCH(1, 2) or GARCH(2, 1) are
typically used. In the GARCH(1,1) model the squared volatility depends on
last periods volatility.
It is also widely recognized that the return distributions tend to have fatter
tails that the normal distribution (Mandelbrot, 1963). The unconditional
distribution for εt in the GARCH(p, q) have fatter tails than the normal
distribution for many ﬁnancial time series.
Stock returns tend to exhibit nonnormal unconditional sampling distribu-
tions, if one considers their skewness and excess kurtosis (Fama, 1965). The
conditional normality assumption in ARCH generates some degree of uncondi-
tional excess kurtosis, but typically less than adequate to fully account for the
fat-tailed properties of the data. Attempts to model the excess conditional
kurtosis in stock return indices include the estimates of EGARCH model
with a generalized exponential distribution Nelson (1989, 1991). Skewness
and kurtosis are important in characterizing the conditional density function
of returns.
The ﬂexibility of ARCH-GARCH models allow them to succeed in styl-
ized facts replications. Nevertheless, there are still problems concerning these
models. Empirical studies highlight the presence of fat tails and remaining
asymmetry in the normalized residuals. Moreover, empirical results also show
that variance measured by GARCH models is so large that it can induce explo-
sive conditional variance. To capture this important characteristic Engle and
Bollerslev (1986) introduce the Integrated Generalized Autoregressive Condi-
tional Heteroskedasticity model (IGARCH) that tries to specify the second
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moment of a time series.
In addition, the time-varying investors behavior may cause the structure
of volatility. One of the critics of GARCH models is its impossibility to take
into account structural changes or inﬂexibility of these models (see Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1990)). There are several attempts to overcome these critics.
Some attempts to improve GARCH models are inspired by heterogeneous
agents literature. For example, Frijns, Lehnert and Zwinkles (2008) present
the time variation in the coeﬃcients of standard GARCH(1, 1) modeling with
switching mechanism, often used in the agent-based modeling, where agents
maximize a certain objective function and switch between diﬀerent trading
rules to achieve this (Brock and Hommes, 1998; Franke and Westerhoﬀ, 2009).
Such improved models can better capture the kurtosis and skewness observed
in stock returns.
While GARCH models can mimic volatility clustering market properties,
they provide only theoretical explanation of such phenomenon. Cutler et al.
(1989) have shown that a substantial fraction of stock market ﬂuctuations
cannot be explained by macroeconomic news and a large part of price series
properties are not due to major economic news or other events. Thus, a ratio-
nal representative agent model has diﬃculty in explaining volatility clustering.
Therefore, multi-agent artiﬁcial stock markets, allowing agent's heterogeneity,
bounded rationality, and realistic microstructure, are actively applied to deal
with these phenomena.
Next subsection discusses possible mechanisms proposed in the literature
as the possible sources of volatility clustering:
1. Heterogeneous arrival rates of information (Andersen and Bollerslev,
1997b)
2. Evolutionary models. The Santa Fe market model replicates qualita-
tively some of the stylized facts (LeBaron, Arthur and Parlmer, 1999).
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3. Behavioral switching. Lux (2000) constructs the behavioral switching
model between fundamentalist and chartist. This model makes arising
of the fat-tails and volatility clustering. Kirman and Teyssiere (2002)
propose that the proportion of fundamentalist in the market follows a
Markov chain. This modiﬁed model performs autocorrelation patterns
in absolute returns.
An agent-based approach to stylized facts explanation
There is already a large literature on heterogeneous agent models replicating
many of the important stylized facts of ﬁnancial time series on short time
scales, such as fat tails or volatility clustering (Brock and LeBaron, 1996;
Arthur, Durlauf and Lane, 1997a; LeBaron et al., 1999; Cont and Bouchaud,
2000; Farmer, 2002; Kirman and Teyssiere, 2002; Ladley and Schenk-Hoppe,
2009; Veryzhenko, Brandouy and Mathieu, 2010). Heterogeneity in agent's
time scale has been regarded as a possible origin for various stylized facts
in Guillaume, Dacorogna, Davé, Muller, Olsen and Pictet (1997), Andersen
and Bollerslev (1997a). LeBaron (2001c) reports that the heterogeneity in
horizons may lead to volume-volatility relationships similar to those of real
market. The recent survey by Lux (2009) contains an extensive survey of
behavioral interacting agent models mimicking the stylized facts of asset re-
turns, in particular heavy tails of high-frequency data with convergence to
the Normal distribution occurring only at relatively low frequencies. Such
models with interacting agents appear to be quite robust generators of the
stylized fact. Lux (2009) argues that this power of agent-based models to ex-
plain previously unexplained characteristics of ﬁnancial market provides some
credibility to this new approach. We provide a detailed description of the Lux
model, as it has been successful in explaining of the series of stylized facts
described in the previous subsection.
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Lux model
Lux (2000) describes ﬁnancial a market with a ﬁxed number of fundamentalist
and chartists. Fundamentalists' trading is based on fundamental (true) value.
They buy (sell) when the current market price is below (above) the funda-
mental value. Chartists or technical traders pursue a combination of imitative
and trend following strategy. The author presents a possible explanation for
volatility clustering in multi-agent framework using a switching principle in
strategy choice.
The model contains three key elements: i) switching between pessimistic
and optimistic chartists ii) switching between fundamentalists and chartists
iii) a price adjustment process based upon aggregate excess demand.
i) The total number of traders is N = Nc + Nf , where Nc  number of
chartists, Nf  number of fundamentalists. There exists an intergroup
separation of chartists: pessimistic and optimistic. Chartists can switch
from the pessimistic to the optimistic type. Agents are allowed to switch
between a chartist and a fundamentalist strategy after proﬁts comparing;
in addition, they can switch from pessimistic to optimistic strategy and
vice versa. Interpersonal communications are also allowed.
The chartists calculate the opinion index, representing the average opin-
ion among non-fundamentalists, as φ = No−Np
Nc
, where No is number of
optimistic and Np is the number of pessimistic chartists. This opinion
index φ and price trend P ′ = dP
dt
deﬁne the probability of switching from
the optimist to the pessimist depends on opinion index φ and price trend
P ′ = dP
dt
. The probability of switching from pessimistic to optimistic is
deﬁned as follows pp→o = ν1NcN e
−U1 , and from optimistic to pessimistic
respectively, po→p = ν1NcN e
U1 , where ν1 is the switching frequency, NcN is
the part of chartist in the total population of agents, U1 = α1φ+ α2 P
′
ν1
,
α1 is the sensitivity parameter to the opinion index, α2  sensitivity to
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price changes.
ii) Switching between the chartist and the fundamentalist is driven by price
changes and current strategy proﬁtability
(y+ dP
dt
)
P−r where y are constant
nominal dividends of the asset, r denotes return from other investments.
Fundamentalists believe that price will revert back around the funda-
mental value f , hence they buy (sell) when current market price lower
(higher) the fundamental value. Hence fundamentalists' proﬁt can be
calculated as s|P−f
P
|, where s is discounted factor, which reﬂects that
the excess proﬁts are realized only when current price reverts back to
its' fundamental value.
po→f = ν2NoN e
U
2,1 pf→o = ν2
Nf
N
e−U2,1
pp→f = ν2
Np
N
eU2,2 pf→p = ν2
Nf
N
e−U2,2
U2,1 = α3(
y+P
′
ν2
P
−R− s|P−f
P
|) U2,2 = α3(R−
y+P
′
ν2
P
− s|P−f
P
|)
α3 is the sensitivity of traders to diﬀerences in proﬁts, ν2 
chartist/fundamentalist switching frequency, Nf
N
is the part of funda-
mentalist in the total population and the probability for a fundamental-
ist to meet a chartist.
iii) Price changes are controlled by a market maker according to the aggre-
gate excess demand of chartists and fundamentalists.
A chartist buys (sells) a ﬁxed amount qc of assets per period. Excess
demand of chartist is EDc = (No − Np)qc = φNcqc ≡ φNcN Tc and Tc ≡
Nqc, where Tc  maximum trading volume of chartists.
Fundamentalists buy (sell) when P < f (P > f), their excess demand
is EDf = Nfγ(f − P ) = (1 − NcN )Nγ(f − P ) = (1 −
Nc
N
)Tf (f − P ),
Tf ≡ Nγ, where γ > 0 measures the reaction speed of fundamental-
ists to price deviation from fundamental value, Tf  trading volume of
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fundamentalists.
Market makers estimate the price according to aggregate excess demand
by dP
dt
= β[EDc+EDf ] = β[φ
Nc
N
Tc+(1−
Nc
N
)Tf (f −P )], where β is the
speed of adjustments.
There are also some noise traders or liquidity traders in the market with
the noise term µ ∼ N(1, σµ). The probabilities of increasing (p↑P ) or
decreasing (p↓P ) are deﬁned by
p↑P = min(max(0, β(ED + µ)), 1)
p↓P = min(−min(0, β(ED + µ)), 1)
This model is visualized in ﬁgure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Lux-Marchesi model
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To summarize, Lux's model generates all of the mentioned stylized facts
of ﬁnancial markets endogenously through the interaction of the agents. The
author argues that the source of volatility clustering and leptokurtotic return
distributions is the switching between chartist and fundamentalist strategies.
Statistical investigation of the simulated time series showed that the main
stylized facts can be found in the artiﬁcial market modeled by Lux (2000).
Other insights into the phenomena of stock returns are given by other
agent-based model of Cont (2007). The author argues that many agent-based
models are too complex to establish a simple relationship between the model's
parameters and observed stylized facts. He questions whether all the ingre-
dients of the model are indeed required for explaining empirical observations.
Therefore, Cont (2007) proposes a simple enough agent-based model capable
of generating time series returns with properties close to real data, so the
origin of volatility clustering can be traced back to agents behavior. We now
discuss a simple model (Cont, 2007) reproducing several stylized empirical
facts, where the origin of volatility clustering can be explained by threshold
response of investors to news arrivals.
Cont model
Cont (2007) proposes a model, able to explain some statistical properties of
ﬁnancial time series. N agents trade one single asset whose current price is
denoted by Pt. Trading takes place at discrete periods t = 1, 2...n, where
these periods are interpreted as trading days. In each period, agents have the
possibility to buy or sell the asset, ϕt is the demand of the agent.
ϕ(x) =


0 stay unchanged
1 buy
−1 sell
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At each time period, agents receive a common signal of public information
εt ∼ N(0, D
2). Each agent i compares this signal to her threshold θit and
generates an order ϕ(x) according to following rules:
ϕ(x) =


0 if εt > θit
1 if εt < θit
−1 if |εt| ≤ θit
where θit is considered as the individual agent's subjective view on volatility
(θit = |rt−1|). Excess demand is given by Zt =
∑N
i=1 ϕ
i
t. It produces a change
in the price rt = ln StSt−1 = g
(
Zt
N
)
, where g is the price impact function. λ is
the market depth g′(0) = 1
λ
. Any agent i has a probability s of updating her
threshold θit. q  the fraction of agents updating their views at any period.
θit =

 |rt| if u
i
t < s
θit−1 if u
i
t > s
where uit is the uniformly distributed variable in [0, 1], that determines whether
agent i updates her threshold or not.
Compared to Lux (2000) model, in Cont (2007) model there is no ex-
ogenous fundamental value; fundamentalists and chartists are not considered
in these simulations; additionally, the communications and interactions be-
tween agents are not allowed. The same public information is available to
all agents, but they process this information in diﬀerent ways, this provides
the heterogeneity of the model. This simple model with very few parame-
ters generates a time series of returns with properties similar to empirically
observed properties of asset returns. The simulation results perform excess
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volatility, leptokurtic distribution of returns with heavy tails, excess kurto-
sis ≃ 7, positive autocorrelation function of absolute returns. Cont (2007)
argues that investor inertia provides an explanation of switching mechanism
proposed in the econometrics literature as an origin of volatility clustering. In
case of low volatility, agents become more sensitive to new arrivals, thus, gen-
erating higher excess demand and thus, increasing the amplitude of returns,
as a result, increasing the volatility. Contrarily, in case of the high volatility
agents become less reactive to news arrival, and such increasing agents' inertia
provokes the decreasing of return volatility.
In this section we demonstrate that agent-based models, relying on be-
havioral aspects, can provide a useful complement to econometric analysis.
Stylized facts, viewed as puzzles within the standard equilibrium modeling,
emerge quite naturally in agent-based models. The behavior of heterogeneous
agents, interaction and switching between them may lie at the heart of stylized
facts explanation.
1.2.2 Market Anomalies
In this subsection we introduce a contribution of agent-based modeling on
technical anomalies explanation. One of the market phenomenon is the prof-
itability of technical trading that reveals inconsistencies with respect to the
eﬃcient market hypothesis. This is technical anomalies. Common techni-
cal analysis strategies are based on the relevant strength of the trend and
moving averages. As technical trading techniques are mechanical, whether
they can generate signiﬁcant proﬁt has been a long-debated issue since Fama
and Blume (1966). Recent empirical studies ﬁnd more and more supporting
evidences for the proﬁtability of technical analysis, including, among others,
Sweeney (1986), Sweeney (1988), Brock, J.Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992),
Blume, D.Easley and O'Hara (1994). These results suggest that technical
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analysis is popular because it can "beat the market". Others argue that prices
adjust rapidly in response to new stock market information and that technical
analysis techniques are not likely to provide any advantage to investors who
use them.
A wide variety of theoretical and empirical models have been developed
to explain why technical trading is widespread in ﬁnancial markets. Agent-
based models provide new explanations of observed market anomalies and
deeper insights into the dynamic of real-world ﬁnancial markets. Joshi and
Bedau (2000) propose an agent-based artiﬁcial model of a stock market to
explore an explanation of this phenomenon. Agent expectations do not follow
the ﬁxed rules such as rational expectation rule. They choose the expecta-
tions among the evolving set of expectation rules to be the most successful
predictors of recent stock-price changes. The authors use Santa Fe Artiﬁcial
Stock Market LeBaron et al. (1999) to show that if the market is populated by
fundamentalist agents, some individual using technical analysis for price pre-
diction can take some advantages. As far as the majority of agents undertakes
the technical trading rules (because the singular agent's decision is mirrored
by other traders), the prediction becomes less accurate due to additional noise
in the market provoked by technical traders. It drives the market to a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium in which the average ﬁnal wealth of the agents in the
market is lower than in the market in which only fundamentalists are trading.
Obviously, it makes technical analysis not proﬁtable anymore.
Chen and Yeh (2001a) study an artiﬁcial stock market with an evolv-
ing agent population. Agents use the learning mechanism, so-called business
school, based on genetic programming. The authors show that the price se-
ries follows a random walk process in the long run. This ﬁnding is rather a
conﬁrmation of market eﬃciency (Fama and Blume, 1966). Additionally, the
authors ﬁnd that some agents can outperform the market in the short-term
time scale, which is the evidence of short-term market anomalies.
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1.2.3 Investment Decision Making
This subsection examines and confronts traditional models with agent-based
modeling in investment topics. We present a brief review of mathematical
basis as well as limits of classical models in investment decision making. The
portfolio optimization theory provides a way to measure investor's preferences
for risk they are willing to undertake in the hope of attaining greater wealth.
Utility functions give a way to measure such wealth-risk relationships. The
utility theory lies at the heart of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Thus, we
begin the discussion by Expected Utility Theory (EUT) von Neuman and
Morgenstern (1947) overview. While utility functions are too simple to be
directly relevant for real-life applications, they create the foundation for the
development of the more complex theories. We introduce here Mean-Variance
Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952), Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe,
1964), and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976).
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). The modern economic theory of de-
cision making under uncertainty is based on the expected utility framework
developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947). The authors provide
a rational foundation for decision-making under risk according to expected
utility properties. This theory was further developed by Samuelson (1950),
Marschak (1950), Herstein and Milhor (1953) and others. Utility refers to the
consumer's satisfaction from the consumption of goods and services. Utility
can be applied to wealth as well as goods and services. Marginal utility func-
tion, decreasing with wealth, is actively used. This function reﬂects the fact
that the every individual beneﬁts from an additional unit of wealth, but the
utility of this gain is less for someone who already has large wealth. Thus, it is
common to maximize the expected utility of wealth rather than the expected
wealth. Economic and ﬁnancial literature introduce quadratic, logarithmic,
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power, and negative exponential utility.
The expected utility assumption for modeling choice under risk and un-
certainty has been discussed and disputed in (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961). It
gave rise to alternative theories of investment decision making: weighted ex-
pected utility (Allais, 1979), rank-dependent expected utility Quiggin (1982),
the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), non-linear
expected utility (Machina, 1982), regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982),
non-additive expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989), and state-dependent prefer-
ences (Karni, 1985).
Microscopic simulations (MS) (Levy et al., 1995, 2000), alternatively
agent-based modeling (ABM) (Tefatsion and Judd, 2006), provide the pos-
sibility to implement any form of utility functions. But the traditional utility
function framework can be improved by heterogeneous risk preferences or be-
liefs about expected values.
Mean-Variance Portfolio Optimization Theory. The mean-variance
formulation proposed by Markowitz (1952),Markowitz (1959) relies on Ex-
pected Utility Theory and provides a fundamental basis for portfolio selection.
Signiﬁcant visibility this theory gets after papers of Tobin (1958), Sharpe
(1963), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and its analytic solution by Merton
(1972). The fundamental lesson of the Markowitz analysis is to show that
investors must care not only of the realized return, but also of the risk of their
positions. Markowitz proposes to measure the risk of return by its standard
deviation. Denote by ̟ the vector of weights of the n risky assets, R the
vector of returns, Rf  the risk-free rate of return. The percentage of wealth
invested inn this riskless asset is w0. The optimization program is:
min ̟′V ̟ (1.3)
̟′R + (1−̟′e)Rf = E(RP ) (1.4)
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The budget constraint is:
̟′e+̟0 = 1⇐⇒ ̟0 = 1−̟′e
where the variance-covariance matrix V is invertible.
There exist following assumptions in Markowitz Portfolio Theory:
 An investor seeks to maximize his ﬁnal expected utility of wealth
 A single-period investment horizon
 An investor is risk-averse
 The investor chooses optimal portfolio on the basis of means and vari-
ance of assets
 Market are perfect: there are no transaction costs or taxes
 The model does not suit speculative traders
 Expected returns, variances, and covariances are known for all assets.
Investors know the future values of these parameters
 Investors create optimal portfolios by relying solely on expected returns,
variances, and covariances. No other distributional parameter is used.
The interesting insights provided by Markowitz (1952) arise from the inter-
play between the mathematics of return and risk. These simple and intuitive
issues are at the heart of modern portfolio theory. Nevertheless, the large
proportion of investment is not allocated on the basis of mean-variance op-
timization. What is the problem with "pure application" of mean-variance
optimization, and what it makes it diﬃcult to apply in practice?
The ﬁrst complication is perhaps obvious. It is hard to quantify expected
returns and covariances. These parameters can be estimated using historical
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data, analytic models, analysts' forecasts, or other methods. When historical
data is used to estimate model parameters, there are at least two main areas
of concern: estimation errors and nonstationarity of the model parameters.
When security prices are determined within an eﬃcient market structure,
a probability distribution can be used to describe them. Normal probability
distribution is assumed as an appropriate description of the return function.
If returns are normally, identically and independently distributed (niid), with
a constant population mean µ and variance σ2, then estimates of the mean
and standard deviation are given by
R =
∑n
i=1Ri
n
σˆ =
√∑n
i=1(Ri −R)
2
n− 1
For example, using monthly returns data, we might ﬁnd that R = 1% and
σˆ = 4%. It can be shown that the standard deviation of the estimate of R is
stdv(R) = σ√
n
. Suppose we wanted to obtain an estimate of the population
mean return of 1% that was accurate to ±0.1% with given σ = 4%. This
would require n = 4
2
0.12
= 1600 monthly observations, that is, 133 years of
monthly data. Obviously, that 60 monthly observations (5 years) will be
very poor. The standard deviation (for normally distributed returns) of σˆ is
given by stdv(σˆ) =
√
2σ2√
n−1 . We use the same 5 years sample (n = 60 monthly
observations) of data to estimate σˆ = 4%. Using the above equation, we get
stdv(σˆ) =
√
242√
60−1 = 0.38%. That is why, accuracy of σˆ = 4% is relatively good
at 0.38%. Hence, estimation of variance (covariance) using historical data is
subject to much less error than estimates of the expected return. The problem
with mean-variance approach aggravates, because the optimization algorithm
is simply too sensitive to an inaccuracy of return estimation. Chan, LeBaron,
Lo and Poggio (1999), Ledoit and Wolf (2004) propose methods that focus on
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reducing the error in estimating the covariance matrix.
Beside estimation error, change in model parameters over time is another
problem that estimation models face. On the one hand, when estimating the
parameters from a long return series, the returns of an asset recorded several
decades ago do not provide real insight into today's return properties. In other
words, a long estimation window increases the possibility of nonstationarity in
the parameters. On the other hand, only very recent historical data increase
estimation error, because estimates of the unknown parameters will diﬀer from
their true values. Broadie (1993) proposes a trade-oﬀ between estimation error
and stationarity when choosing the length of the estimation error.
The other drawback of modern portfolio theory is that this model deals
with risk as measured by the variance-covariance matrix and not other forms
of risk (political risk, business risk). It is the single factor risky model. This
makes the theory inappropriate for use with multi-factor risk models. Fur-
thermore, the variance is a squared term, thus it treats any deviation above
the mean return as being as risky as any deviation below the mean return.
The ﬁnal issue, which makes application of modern portfolio theory diﬃ-
cult, is that it is not easy to treat analytically. Implicitly assumed in MPT
is that individuals act in an objective almost mechanical fashion in making
decisions. Market participants are completely rational in use unbiased ex-
pectations in forming and then selecting mean-variance portfolios. However,
investors often exhibit behavioral traits such as limited knowledge, bounded
rationality, bounded self-control, and bounded self-interest. Rather than base
investment decisions on sound mean-variance analysis, individuals use heuris-
tic rules (rules of thumb). This process of making decisions with a combination
of mean-variance analysis and heuristics is called bounded rationality. Such
combination is easily realized in multi agent-based models. This is exactly
the focus of this research. Using an artiﬁcial market can help us understand
whether traditional ﬁnance approaches are still successful in a completely dif-
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ferent framework of bounded rational and heterogeneous agents.
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The Capital Asset Pricing
Model2 of Sharpe (Sharpe, 1964) implies that all investors should hold a
broadly diversiﬁed market portfolio, combined with risk free asset accord-
ing to their risk preferences. If there exists a risk-free asset with return Rf ,
any eﬃcient portfolio P is a combination of the risk-free asset and the mar-
ket portfolio M , that corresponds to the point of tangency between the two
eﬃcient frontiers (with and without the risk-free asset).
RP = xRf + (1− x)RM ⇐⇒ RP −Rf = (1− x)(RM −Rf )
The choice of x depends on the risk aversion. The portfolio variance is σP =
(1− x)σM , consequently
RP = Rf + σP
RM −Rf
σM
σP = [x
2 + σ2i + (1− x)
2σ2M + 2x(1− x)σiM ]
1
2
Ri −Rf = βi(RM −Rf ) with βi =
σiM
σ2M
where β represents the systematic risk which is due to exposition to the mar-
ket variations. CAPM demonstrates that the prices of assets are such that the
market portfolio is made up of all assets in proportion to their market capi-
talization. CAPM highlights the relationship between the excess mean return
and the exposure coeﬃcient beta. Additionally, at equilibrium the market
portfolio is optimal.
The fact that CAPM relies to variance as the risk measure provokes the ac-
tive discussion and gives rise to models in which exposure to more than a single
market risk factor determines expected returns. Merton (1973), Long (1974)
2relies on Expected Utility Theory
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introduce models where investors should not simply hold a broad market in-
dex and cash, but should also invest in hedge portfolios for other economically
relevant risks, like interest rate changes and commodity price inﬂation.
According to Roll (1977) it is very diﬃcult to determine the true market
portfolio, because market portfolio should contain all risky assets, even those
that are not traded. Using a portfolio, which is not the true market portfolio,
may lead to estimation errors in the betas. Roll demonstrates that even if two
potential proxies for M are correlated greater than 0.9, the beta estimates
obtained using each may be very diﬀerent. This suggests that the empirical
implications of the model are very sensitive to the choice of proxy.
According to Levy et al. (2000), there are several unrealistic assumptions
made in CAPM framework:
 All investors are risk averse expected utility maximizers
 There is no transaction costs nor taxes
 Investors are rational (they try to maximize their expected utility) and
they are eﬃcient (they know how to reach the goals)
 Investors never make errors and choose their portfolios from the eﬃcient
set on the capital line.
 Homogeneous beliefs about expected values are required
 Investors have the same holding period
Under these assumptions all investors hold the portfolios with an identical
structure, a fraction of initial wealth is invested in the risk-free asset the rest
in the tangency portfolio T called market portfolio. Because all investors
acquire shares in the same risky tangency portfolio, and make no other risky
investments, all existing risky assets must belong to T . All agents would be
willing to buy or sell the same positions, thus, there would be no trade. Since
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all investors hold all risky assets in the same proportion this implies that
short sales cannot exist in equilibrium. Otherwise, an investor could make
arbitrarily large proﬁts by short selling large quantities of the more expensive
of the securities and buying the cheaper in equivalent amounts. Such an
arbitrage would have zero cost and be riskless.
What eﬀects will have the relaxation of one of these assumptions? How
are equilibrium asset prices determined when the majority of investors are in-
deed eﬃcient and rational, but a minority of them are irrational or ineﬃcient?
To address these issues in mainstream framework, Cvitanic, Jouini, Mala-
mud and Napp (2011) introduce an equilibrium model where investors have
three possible sources of heterogeneity. They may diﬀer in their beliefs, their
degrees of risk aversion, and their time preference rate. The aim of this work
is to study the impact of heterogeneity on the equilibrium properties. The
authors analyze agent interactions and heterogeneity impact at the individual
(individual portfolio holdings and risk sharing rules) and aggregate levels (the
market price of risk, the risk free rate, the bond prices, the stock price and
volatility). Cvitanic et al. (2011) conclude that i) for very high level of ag-
gregate endowment, the equilibrium Arrow-Debreu price is determined by the
agent with the highest individual market price of risk ii) if there is heterogene-
ity in beliefs (risk aversion levels) only, the equilibrium Arrow-Debreu price
for very low levels of aggregate consumption is given by the Arrow-Debreu
price of the most pessimistic (most risk averse agent) iii) the agent with the
lowest survival index3 survives and dominates the market asymptotically.
However, agent-based modeling is more appropriate for relaxation of ho-
mogeneity and perfect rationality assumptions, it is a good complement
3The survival index of agent i is deﬁned by ki ≡ ρi+γi
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
+ 12δ
2
i , where ρi, γi, δi,
µ, and σ respectively denote the individual level of time preference, risk aversion, optimism
and the drift and volatility of aggregate endowment.
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to theoretical models. ABM provides a deeper understanding of the im-
pact of the agent heterogeneity on market equilibrium (the Arrow-Debreu
prices). Whereas theoretical models describe price dynamics and uncertainty
by stochastic processes, in ABM framework price dynamic is a direct result
of agents interactions. Levy et al. (2000) test the eﬀect of heterogeneous ex-
pectations on equilibrium prices, and the eﬀect of the number of assets held
in the portfolio on the CAPM's results. This experiment is considered below
in this section.
Arbitrage Pricing Models. In the context of general equilibrium theory
considered in the previous models, there exist several hypothesis. The ﬁrst
one is the rationality hypothesis leading to the speciﬁcation of maximization
problems under constraints. The other hypothesis relies on equilibrium price
formation, meaning that demands equal oﬀers in all markets under consid-
eration. In equilibrium framework, there can be no arbitrage opportunities,
in other words, there is no possibility to earn abnormal proﬁts risklessly at
zero cost. An arbitrage opportunity indeed implies that at least one agent can
reach a higher level of utility without violating his budget constraint. The Ar-
bitrage Pricing Theory (APT)(Ross, 1976) relaxes some of strong assumptions
of the CAPM. The beauty of the APT is that it does not require any assump-
tion about utility theory or that the mean and variance of a portfolio are
the only two elements in the investor's objective function (Cuthbertson and
Nitzsche, 2004). It does not assume normality of returns and supposes only
that investors are risk-averse, without specifying a particular utility function.
More precisely, the APT abandons the analytically powerful, but empirically
complicated assumption on returns distribution. It replaces this assumption
with the hypothesis that there exists a set of factors determining asset returns.
Thus, the main building block of the APT is a factor model, also known as a
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return-generating process:
Ri,t = E[Ri] +
K∑
k=1
bi,kFk,t + εi,t
where bi,k denotes the sensitivity of asset i to factor k, Fk,t denotes the return
of factor k with E[Fk,t] = 0, and εi,t denotes the residual return of asset i.
The APT model assumes:
 The markets are perfectly eﬃcient
 The factor model is the same for all investors
 The number n of assets is assumed to be very large
Arbitrage conditions lead to the existence of factor risk premia λk such that
E[Ri] − Rf =
∑K
k=1 λkbi,k APT allows for several risk factors to determine
assets expected returns. Denote δk, the expected return of a portfolio with a
sensitivity to factor k equal to 1, and null sensitivity to other factors. Then:
λk = δk −Rf and E[Ri]−Rf =
K∑
k=1
(δk −Rf )bi,k
where bi,k =
Cov(Ri,δk)
V ar(δk)
are the sensitivities to the factor loadings. The simplest
one-factor market model, usually labeled the Market Model, equals to the
CAPM. If it were empirically veriﬁed that a single factor model is suﬃcient,
the CAPM would be the undisputed end point of asset pricing. But it is quite
unlikely at an empirical level.
It is clear that the APT overcomes some weaknesses of the CAPM, never-
theless to derive Ross's APT one needs to assume a speciﬁc return generating
process but it does not provide any information about how to select the factors
for return generating process, no transactions costs, unlimited short sales are
allowed, a borrowing interest rate is equal to the lending rate. A relaxation
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of each of these unrealistic assumptions may either change the model results
only slightly or change them very drastically. It is diﬃcult to ﬁgure out ana-
lytically the eﬀect of the relaxation of each of these assumptions on the model
equilibrium results.
Heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium theory. All models re-
viewed above ignore many important options and consider only ideal vari-
ants. For instance, they assume that all traders are rational, they always
make the most optimal choice in a given situation. The mechanism of trading
(order execution, price formation, clearing mechanism) is ignored. Thus in
theoretical market models equilibrium, reached when demands equal oﬀers,
is central. The currently observed asset prices are equilibrium ones. There
is no attempt, however, to compute asset demand and oﬀers functions ex-
plicitly. Theoretical models also rely on market eﬃciency. Proponents of
eﬃciency claim that in ﬁnancial markets it is not possible to earn abnormal
proﬁts (other than by chance) by exploring some set of information. The
majority of standard models focus on risk management and portfolio opti-
mization for individual investors. They are not interested in the eﬀects of a
large number of investors on the market overall when they use similar risk
management methods. Many researchers question however, whether markets
operate as described by modern ﬁnance theory. A number of approaches have
been proposed to test this issue. These approaches include empirical studies,
experimental economics, the market microstructure approach, micro simula-
tions or agent-based modeling. For example, Kahneman, Solvic and Tversky
(1982), Kahneman and Tversky (2000) argue that even if a majority of the
models created in traditional ﬁnance contains the assumption about the con-
stant degree of risk, people change their risk preferences according to current
circumstances, hence decision making rules vary depending on conditions. To
incorporate this fact in the modeling, Takahashi and Terano (2004) introduces
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the agent-based model, where agents' decision making rules are aﬀected by
trading circumstances, and the degree of risk aversion varies depending on the
amount of assets held.
One of the earliest analysis that confront classical models of investment
decision making with (micro-)simulations approach can be found in Levy et al.
(2000). In order to achieve analytic results, it is necessary to assume a decision
framework and to make many speciﬁc assumptions, some of which are very
unrealistic. What will be the eﬀect if one of these assumptions is relaxed? It
is possible that even a small deviation from the assumptions may completely
reverse the theoretical results.
There is no analytic tools to measure the eﬀect of deviation from expected
utility theory assumption. There exist some attempts to explain the eﬀect
of assumption relaxation, for example, Lintner (1965) relaxes the homogene-
ity of expectations assumption, but results become diﬃcult tractable . Levy
(1978), Merton (1987), Markowitz (1990), and Sharpe (1991) relax the perfect
market assumption. If some of the unrealistic assumptions are relaxed, the
analytical results become complicated. Levy et al. (2000) conclude that the
more the model is relaxed, the less the results are tractable. Since it is diﬃcult
to investigate analytically the eﬀects of deviation from some assumptions in
theoretical models, Levy et al. use microscopic simulation (MS) methodology
to run such investigations. In MS models heterogeneous expectations, diﬀer-
ent holding periods can be introduced. With MS one can model investors as
bounded rational entities, who maximize some expected utility but who also
make some errors. For instance, they act on wrong signals, incorrect informa-
tion, or use technical signals that are not related to fundamental information,
they consider changes in wealth rather than the total wealth. Investment de-
cision process can have two regimes: i) all investors maximize utility function
and act exactly as implied by expected utility theory ii) all investors buy and
sell randomly ignoring assets fundamental values. Bounded-rationality is be-
44
Chapter 1. From Traditional to Agent-based Modeling 
Justiﬁcation
tween these two extremes scenarios, it best describes how individuals act on
stock markets.
Levy et al. (2000) investigate the application of MS to price determination
in the heterogeneous CAPM model. The authors assume that all investors
agree on the estimation of correlation matrix V but disagree on R. The kth
investor's estimate of the mean return of the ith asset is Rik = Ri(1 + εik),
where εik ∼ N(0, σ) is a disagreement (heterogeneity) factor, which provides
the model heterogeneity. E(εik = 0), implying that on average the market is
in agreement with the CAPM parameters. Thus, the investment proportions
in the ith stock varies across investors, xik is the proportion of the wealth of
agent k invested in stock i. Then, the clearing process is deﬁned by the ex-
pression P ∗i0 =
∑K
k=1
Wkxik
Ni
, where Ni the number of outstanding shares of the
ithe ﬁrm, Wk the wealth of the kth investor, K the number of investors. Levy
et al. using microsimulation model show that lower expected return stocks
tend to be overpriced in the heterogeneous expectations, and higher expected
return stocks tend to be underpriced with the small heterogeneity factor. The
explanation of this eﬀect is due to the nonlinear eﬀect of the heterogeneity
factor εik on wealth invested in risky assets. But the magnitude of this eﬀect
decreases as the number of assets in the market grows. The authors also con-
clude that a large number of asset or investors increases the robustness of the
CAPM vis-á-vis the relaxation of the homogeneous-expectations assumption.
Thus, the heterogeneous beliefs are not crucial to CAPM results.
In the CAPM framework theoretically each investor holds all available
risky assets, while in practice investors commonly hold a relatively small num-
ber of assets in their portfolios. How does the relaxation of this assumption
aﬀect the results? Levy (1978), Merton (1987), and Sharpe (1991) analyze
this question theoretically. The equilibrium model in which investors hold lim-
ited number of assets is called General CAPM (GCAPM). Levy et al. (2000)
examine this model in MS framework, they compare the classic CAPM and
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GCAPM. They assume that agent k keeps in his portfolio nk number of as-
sets, where n is the total number of available assets. The investor constructs
the eﬃcient set of nk stocks with a given risk free interest rate rf . Thus, the
investor should test all n!
(n−nk)!nk! portfolios. Levy et al. consider two cases
of asset selection: i) each asset has an equal chance to be included in each
portfolio ii) some stocks have a lower chance to be selected, they are known in
ﬁnancial literature as small stocks. All investors share the same beliefs about
expected values of stocks. As the CAPM and GCAPM market portfolio diﬀer,
beta is also not the same in these two equilibrium frameworks. The authors
examine the small ﬁrm or neglected stock eﬀect on equilibrium prices and the
risk-return relationship.
The authors report a higher intercept that the riskless interest rate, which
conforms with empirical data. They get a strong small ﬁrm eﬀect.
1.3 Conclusion
The point of this chapter was to present the main principles of ABM and the
relationship of the ABM methodology to more standard economic modeling.
We have stressed that ﬁnancial markets, as complex systems, are particularly
well suited for agent-based explorations. Following the critiques of theoretical
models, we have reviewed a large variety of articles reporting a power of
agent-based methods to revive the theory. There is a long list of features
that traditional approaches are not able to match. ABM proves an intriguing
possibility for solving some of these puzzles. Then, we have focused on research
directions, where ABM is regarded as a promising research tool. However, the
list of topics, viewed in this thesis, is far from being exhaustive; such choice
of covered topics has been made according to relevance to this research.
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2.1 State-of-the-art
In this chapter we give an overview of recent developments in agent-based
artiﬁcial stock markets. The organization of this chapter is as follows: ﬁrst,
we introduce issues faced by modelers when designing an agent-based artiﬁcial
stock markets. We provide an overview of design issues using the framework
proposed in LeBaron (2001a), Martinez-Jaramillo (2007). The main design
issues identiﬁed in LeBaron (2001a) are:
 Market Mechanism & Time Scheduling
 Traded Assets
 Agents & Learning
 Calibration and Validation
The next subsection describes existing platforms based on the same axes
as those proposed in (LeBaron, 2001a). Then, we introduce our software
platform ArTiﬁcial Open Market (ATOM) under the axes described above
that allows us to show the common and outstanding features of our artiﬁcial
market.
2.1.1 Market Mechanism & Time Scheduling
Martinez-Jaramillo (2007) indicates three ways to design market a environ-
ment. A ﬁrst solution consists in creating a simple price response to the
excess demand with a simple clearing mechanism (market impact function
2.1. State-of-the-art 49
as response to the observed market excess), like in the models of Cont and
Bouchaud (2000), Chen and Yeh (2001b), Farmer (2002), Martinez-Jaramillo
(2007). The market price level is adjusted as a response to the observed
market imbalance between supply and demand.
pt+1 − pt = α(Dt − St) (2.1)
where Dt and St are the demand and supply of the agents at time t, α  a
positive constant, pt  the actual market price level, and pt+1 − pt  the price
adjustment. Farmer and Joshi (2000) proposes a price response on demand
function of the form pt+1 = pt + 1λ
∑N
i=1 di, where di is the number of shares
bought by agent i, and λ is a constant.
The advantage of a market impact function is that it is computationally
fast and it gives reasonable results. But this function is very sensitive to
the value of the parameter α. Another disadvantage of this price formation
mechanism is that the market is assumed to be symmetric.
The second solution consists in creating a simple market clearing mecha-
nism (analytically or computationally) where local equilibrium price can eas-
ily be found Levy et al. (1995), Arthur et al. (1997b). The calculation of the
temporary equilibrium price is either performed analytically, or in case of a
complex nonlinear demand function, computationally (LeBaron, 2001a).
The third solution consists in explicitly implementing an auction mecha-
nism that allows to issue real market orders, like in the models of Marchesi,
Cincotti, Focardi and Roberto (2000), Maslov (2000), Yang (2002), Jacobs
et al. (2004), Gordillo, Pardo-Guerra and Stephens (2004), Ponta, Raberto
and Cincotti (2011). One of the most common example within this category
of price formation mechanisms is a double-auction market. Agents may ei-
ther submit bids or ask for the traded asset to the market. For example,
Chakrabarti and Roll (1999), Chakrabarti (2000) applies the double-auction
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concept to artiﬁcial inter-bank foreign exchange market. The current best bid-
ask spread and transaction prices are known to all market participants. The
result is the convergence to the competitive equilibrium price and quantity.
According to execution systems the market can be divided between quote
and order driven. On quote-driven markets, the market makers post quotes
(prices and volumes at which they are willing to conduct a transaction) and
the investors may decide to accept those quotes. By posting those quotes,
market makers provide liquidity to the market by allowing investors to exe-
cute transactions. For example, in Farmer (2002), the market maker trades
based on his positions, all orders are market orders, and price is centrally
set according to an automated mechanism. In Chan and Shelton (2001) the
positions of the market maker inﬂuence his decision as well. In Lux (2000)
the market maker determines changes in price by reacting on imbalances be-
tween demand and supply. Other examples of quote-driven markets can be
found in Daniels, Farmer, Iori and Smith (2003), Darley and Outkin (2007),
Boer-Sorban (2008).
On order-driven markets buyers and sellers directly trade together. Order
driven markets often take the form of an auction. Trading orders are sent to
a central order book, where they are matched. Most of real markets do not
rely on a single execution system, but they combine quote and order driven
markets. For example, the NASDAQ Stock Market is a quote-driven market,
but sometimes traders can can trade directly. Such mixed executions systems
is introduced in Boer-Sorban (2008).
According to time the market models can be divided between discrete and
continuous. In discrete models, time advances in discrete increments, while in
continuous models the system changes continuously over time.
Most agent-based artiﬁcial stock markets are organized as discrete-time
(or call) models (Brock and Hommes, 1997; Raberto, Cincotti, Focardi and
Marchesi, 2001; Challet, Marsili and Zhang, 2005). The discrete-time market
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has a discrete time grid with t = 1, ..., T time rounds. At each round an agent
is asked to submit his orders. The speciﬁc characteristics of the simulation
models determine how the players take turns and how they arrive at the
decisions. In other words, a modeler can coordinate the actions of traders,
parameterising waiting time for trade actions. In most platforms this round
is considered to be a day, or even one year. So, at the beginning of each
period t, new information arrives to the market. The agents process the
information and convert this into trading decisions. At the end of trading
period t, agents simultaneously submit their orders to the market maker.
Before the next time period begins, the market maker computes the market
price. The synchronous, discrete representation of time is suitable for the
models containing just simple clearing rules for price formation, when all
agents are inactive until the equilibrium price is determined. Levy et al. (2000)
use a discrete synchronous model for their microscopic simulations model. In
each period, a market equilibrium price is computed from the demand and
supply curves of all investors.
However, most modern ﬁnancial markets operate continuously. Contin-
uous trading is introduced in several artiﬁcial market models of Shatner,
Mushnik and Solomon (2000), Farmer, Patelli and Zovko (2005), Boer-Sorban
(2008). In such models, agents issue the orders at any moment, producing an
order ﬂow, that result in new trades and a market price is continuously up-
dated.
Boer, Kayamak and Spiering (2007) study a market dynamics with prices
set by a learning market-maker. The authors report that the results are
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the choice of model updating dynamics, discrete
or continuous. They conclude that the continuous nature of trading should
be explicitly introduced in the artiﬁcial stock market models for reproducing
realistic price dynamics.
Two diﬀerent trading schemes must also be distinguished: synchronous and
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asynchronous (Farmer, 2002; LeBaron, 2001a). In synchronous time models,
the time increases with a ﬁxed increment like minute, day or month. In
asynchronous models, time step advances by irregular increments, to the next
scheduled event (Jacobs et al., 2004). In synchronous dynamic model, traders
are centrally selected for acting at speciﬁc moment. While, in asynchronous
trading scheme investors may leave the market, or ﬁnd a counterpart for
transaction in any moment. The agent decide not only the price and volume
of orders, but also exact timing. For instance, in the model of Shatner et al.
(2000), a trader is sleeping between the events that make him to wake up.
The trader deﬁnes the nature of such events: he can ask to be waken up after
K time steps since he placed the last order, or after new information arrival, or
after price changes by 5%. Once awake, the trader decides whether he wishes
to change his positions.
Generally speaking, continuous asynchronous model, allowing action at
any time by any participant, represents the markets in a more realistic way,
than discrete synchronous model, which typically has to make special as-
sumptions about the eﬀect of everyone acting at the same time at assumed
discrete times. The examples of synchronous trading are introduced in Levy
et al. (1995), Arthur et al. (1997b), Zimmermann, Neuneier and Grothmann
(2001), Farmer (2002), Markose, Tsang and Martinez-Jaramillo (2003), while,
asynchronous trading is implemented in Shatner et al. (2000), Jacobs et al.
(2004), Raberto and Cincotti (2005), Jacobs, Levy and Markowitz (2010)
2.1.2 Assets
There exists a large number of diﬀerent ﬁnancial securities traded in the money
market and capital market. Examples of money market securities are treasury
bills (T-bills), commercial papers, and Eurodollars. Capital market instru-
ments may be subdivided into two categories, debt (Treasury Notes, Bonds,
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Federal Agency Securities, and bonds) and equity. The ﬁst category is referred
to as the Fixed Income Market. Currencies are regarded as capital market
instruments traded on foreign exchange market (FX-market). Derivative in-
struments are ﬁnancial securities whose price is derived from the price of an
underlying ﬁnancial asset.
Agent-based models may incorporate all types of ﬁnancial instruments.
However, the majority of agent-based models is limited to simple ﬁnancial
securities, for instance, one risk-free asset (bond or cash) and several risky
stocks. We are unaware of artiﬁcial stock markets allowing to trade deriva-
tives. In the model of LeBaron (2001c) the agents allocate their wealth among
a risk free asset and a risky security (equity). The risk free asset pays a ﬁxed
interest r. Equity pays a dividend at each time step, that follows a random
walk:
log(dt+1) = log(dt) + εt (2.2)
where εt is normally distributed. The presence of a dividend can provide a
benchmark for actual share price by allowing to calculate rational expectations
price.
Gordillo et al. (2004) uses a single risky asset and a risk free asset (cash). In
the model of Cincotti, Ponta and Raberto (2005) there are 100 diﬀerent stocks,
each related to a particular ﬁrm, in total there are 10 sectors each constituted
by 10 ﬁrms. Initially, all agents have an equal number of stocks 1000 and
10 millions EU of cash. In Loistl and Vetter (2000), Loistl, Schossmann and
Vetter (2001), Loistl and Veverka (2004) the number of assets is limited to 50
units.
2.1.3 Agents
The aim of this section is to give an overview of economic agents and some
issues associated with their development. One of the most important design
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issues is the modeling of agents. This issue covers heterogeneity, decision
making, utility function, and learning of agent(Grothmann, 2002).
Since there is no universally accepted deﬁnition of the term "agent", we
propose a deﬁnition by Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) as "computer system
that is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous in this
environment in order to meet its design objectives". The agent also has a set
of actions, with which he aﬀects the environment. Wooldridge and Jennings
(1995) also provides a mathematical formalization of the agent. Assume that
the agent's environment can be characterized as a set of environment states
S = {s1, s2, ...} that the agent can inﬂuence only partially. The inﬂuence of
agents is a set A = {a1, a2, ...} through which agent can aﬀect the environment
action : S −→ A
Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) provides the important notions related to
agent that we can interpret in the ﬁnancial market context: The ﬁrst one is
autonomy, it means that an agent is not a passive subject to a global, external
ﬂow of control in its actions. An agent has his own objectives, abilities to
accept information, then to analyze it and based on these results to make
decisions about further actions. The second one is situatedness, it means
that the agents act in a particular environment. In our case, the market is
the environment, where the agents perform their trading. This environment
presents set of constraints, rules, regulations. Finally, proactivity means that
the agents act in order to achieve their objectives or goals.
To summarize, an agent uses a set of rules for making decisions to achieve
his trading goals. This set of rules can be regarded as a trading strategy. Gen-
erally, the trading strategy styles vary from zero-intelligent agents to complex
evolving strategies using neural networks, genetic algorithms and genetic pro-
gramming.
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Decision making rules. The principal role of agents in the stock market
is to analyze information and to use own decision making rules to convert
this knowledge into buy and sell actions. Agents collect information and act
fairly sensibly on the basis of that information. Their choices may not be the
entirely deterministic and predictable. Hence, the most typical classiﬁcation
of agents is based on their input information. Generally, we distinguish i)
random, ii) technical and iii) fundamental traders.
Random traders ignore any information and send orders randomly. Gode
and Sunder (1993) initially introduced this kind of trader and labeled them
"Zero intelligence trader" (ZIT). Gode and Sundders use these agents to in-
vestigate the source of rapid convergence to competitive equilibrium in double
auction markets. They argue that this equilibrium is due to the double auc-
tion rules alone. The authors report that zero-intelligence agents, under a
simple constraint not to make unproﬁtable trades, produce the price paths
close to those produced by a human subject. The prices remain close to
the competitive equilibrium price, the volatility declines. At the same time,
unconstrained zero-intelligent agents produce extremely volatile prices, and
there is no evidence of convergence to the competitive equilibrium.
The model of Gode and Sunder (1993) provoked an active reaction and
their original work has been extended by other authors to investigate re-
lated market mechanism questions. Thus, the ZIT methodology is actively
applied to explain economic phenomena in various environments. For exam-
ple, Bolleslev and Domowitz (1993) employs the ZIT to analyze the eﬀect of
varying or restricting the size of the order book.
Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997a), Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997b) examine the sensi-
tivity of Gode and Sunder's ﬁndings to the elasticity of supply and demand.
They propose an alternative algorithm, which they call "zero-intelligence plus"
(ZIP). ZIP agents aim for a particular proﬁt margin on each unit bought or
sold, and this proﬁt margin dictates the bid or ask they submit.
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Jamal and Sunder (2001) examine the case of markets with imperfect
information and uncertainty of state using three variants of the ZIT. The ZIT
has also been employed in analyzing bubbles and crashes in asset markets.
Wu and Bhattacharyya (2003) introduce speculators into standard double-
auction markets. They ﬁnd that ZIP traders can no longer guarantee market
eﬃciency when there is a large number of speculators comparing to normal
traders.
Strategies that rely on historical price series as the main source of infor-
mation are called technical trading rules. This is the most common type of
trading strategy in some markets like the foreign exchange markets (Neely,
1997; Neely, Weller and Dittmar, 1997). Technical traders use charts and
graphs to make decisions, in other words, they analyze price movements and
chart patterns from the past to draw conclusions about future buying and
selling. Technical analysts focus on generating trading signals that provide
a higher investment return. A large variety of trading rules are proposed
by the tenants of technical analysis: ﬁlter rules, moving average, support-
and-resistance, channel break-outs, on-balance volume averages, momentum
strategies, head-and-shoulders, broadening tops and bottoms, triangle, rect-
angle, and double tops and bottoms. By using charts and graphs to determine
whether or not to be in or out of the market at any given time, agents are
actually practicing market timing.
This type of trading strategy is largely represented in the artiﬁcial stock
markets, like in Shatner et al. (2000), Daniels, Farmer, Iori and Smith (2002),
Daniels et al. (2003), Boer-Sorban (2008), Brandouy and Mathieu (2007),
Veryzhenko et al. (2010). These agents use N last prices to extrapolate the
next market dynamics, e.g. future price Ppredicted. Then, they compare the
current market price Pcurrent with the predicted one Ppredicted. If the Pcurrent >
Ppredicted, the agent sells stocks. If Pcurrent < Ppredicted, the agent buys stocks.
The main advantage of these simple trading rules is a clear tractability of
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results produced by such behaviors.
Fundamental traders are driven by the "true" value of assets. The true
value is estimated based on fundamental information like ﬁnancial reports, in-
formation about the management of the company, earning per share, revenue,
cash ﬂow, earning announcements, dividends, analyst upgrades. This informa-
tion allows to identify returns, hence the fundamental value when discounted
rates are available. So it is an important task to model the fundamental value
in agent-based models. Once this value has been obtained, the investor is able
to compare the "true" value with the current security price. If the latter is
higher its true value, the fundamental traders sell the stocks, and vice versa.
Some examples of fundamental information deﬁnitions in agent-based
models of ﬁnancial stock market can be found in Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
Palmer, Arthur, Holland and LeBaron (1998), Shatner et al. (2000), LeBaron
(2001a).
In Santa Fe stock market (Palmer et al., 1998), the risky stock pays a
stochastic dividends that follows the autoregressive AR(1) process:
dt = dˆ+ o(dt−1 − dˆ) + µt (2.3)
where dˆ = 10, p = 0.10 and µt ∼ N(0, σ2µ).
In the Baron's Model (LeBaron, 2001a,c,b) the dividends follow a random
walk
log(dt+1) = log(dt) + εt (2.4)
where dt and εt are normally distributed.
The model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) introduces the traded asset with
true value toward which the trading price converges. The fundamental value
of the stock evolves according to a jump process
Vt = Vt−1 +△ (2.5)
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where △ ∼ N(0, σ).
The fundamental value can reach its low V with a probability σ or its
high level V with a probability 1− σ. Additionally, authors introduce noisily
informed traders that observe a slightly modiﬁed fundamental value Wt =
Vt + ε, where ε ∼ N(0, σ2W ). Noisily informed traders buy if the fundamental
value is higher than the market maker's ask price (Wt > Pa), they sell if the
observed fundamental value is below the bid price (Wt < Pb). They do not
issue the order in case if Pb ≤ Wt ≤ Pa.
Objective functions. Concerning the objective function, there are two
ways to design this important element of decision making. As mentioned
in Grothmann (2002), it can be designed implicitly or explicitly. In case of
an implicit objective function, the decision making process incorporates indi-
rectly the agents' objectives. For example, proﬁt maximization agents take
advantages of the price ﬂuctuations in order to maximize their gains. Such
type of a function is introduced in Farmer (2002).
An other example of proﬁt maximizers is given in Zimmermann et al.
(2001). rˆt+1 = E[ln
pt+1
pt
] denotes the expected price shifts with t = 1, ..., T .
The objective proﬁt maximization function of agent is described as follow:
1
t
T∑
t=1
rˆt+1a
i
t 7−→ maxait (2.6)
where ait is the trading decision of agent i at the moment of time t. If the price
is declining rˆt+1 < 0, the agent sells the stocks. On the other hand, the agent
keeps long positions (buy assets) if he predicts a price increasing rˆt+1 > 0.
Kaizoji (2000) introduces an interesting approach to maximize the proﬁts.
The agent tries to predict the trading decisions of a majority of market partic-
ipants. This approach is motivated by the idea that the price is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by majority. If a majority of agents sells stocks the price declines.
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If the majority buys, the price increases. So some agents can make extra proﬁt
by anticipating the behavior of the crowd.
The explicit representation of objective function is the utility maximization
function.
Utility function. Utility refers to the consumers' satisfaction from the con-
sumption of goods and services. Utility can be applied to wealth as well as
goods and services. The marginal utility function is actively used in the liter-
ature. This function reﬂects the fact that the every individual beneﬁts from
an additional unit of wealth, but the utility of this gain is less for someone
who already has large wealth. Thus, it is common to maximize the utility
of wealth rather than the expected wealth. The utility function provides a
relative measure of investor's preferences for wealth and the amount of risk
they are willing to undertake in order to maximize their wealth. There are
diﬀerent types of investors: risk averters, risk lovers or risk neutral that diﬀer
by the shape of their utility functions.
Usually, in agent-based models, the utility function is expressed in terms
of wealth or risk management. One of the most frequent utility functions is
the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) function
U(Wt+1) = −e
−AWt+1 (2.7)
where A is the absolute risk-aversion degree and Wt+1 is the agent's expected
wealth level for the next period. CARA is used in the models of Arthur et al.
(1997a), Palmer et al. (1998), Yang (1999), Chen and Yeh (2001b), Hommes
(2001), Yang (2002). In the Santa Fe stock market agents use a classiﬁer
system to make predictions on the ﬁrst and second moments of stock returns.
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Agents maximize their utility function with respect to their budget constraint:
Wi,t+1 = xi,t(pt+1 + dt+1) + (1 + rf )(Wi,t − ptxi,t) (2.8)
where xi,t is the number of risky assets held by agent i in t, dt+1 is the dividend
attributed to risky assets, and rf is a risk free interest rate.
Thus, the objective of the agent is to maximize the expected utility
E(Ui(Wi,t+1)):
E(Ui(Wi,t+1)) = E(−e
−AWi,t+1 |ui,t) (2.9)
Given a set of external inﬂuences ui,t the agent's conditional utility expectation
E(Ui(Wi,t+1)) depends on his future wealthWi,t+1. One of the most important
design issues of the CARA utility function concept is the construction of the
price and dividend expectations E(pt+1 + dt+1). Several solutions exist for
doing so, for instance, Yang (1999) use recurrent neural networks for this
task.
There is a large variety of agents-based models implementing the utility
maximization trading rules (Levy et al., 1995; Arifovic, 1996; LeBaron, 2001c;
Chiarella and He, 2001). For example, Levy et al. (1995) introduce logarithmic
utility function in their Levy Levy Solomon Model, this function is expressed
as follows U(W ) = ln(W ).
In the Baron's Model (LeBaron, 2001c) agents use Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) utility function to maximize their wealth at each time step.
CRRA is expressed as follows U(W ) = W
1−γ
1−γ , where γ > 0, γ 6= 1.
In the Business school agent-based multi-asset model (Chen and Yeh,
2001b; Chen, Yen and Liao, 2002) agents use Quadratic utility U(Wt+1 =
Wt+1 −
b
2
W 2t+1) for their decision making.
Mean-variance portfolio optimization rules are implemented in the models
of Chen et al. (2002) Cincotti et al. (2005).
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2.1.4 Learning
Learning is an important element of the design of an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial mar-
ket. Agents should be able to update their trading strategies in response to
changing market conditions. Brenner (2006) provides an explicit overview
of the learning techniques used in economic models. He proposes to clas-
sify the learning models according to their origin: psychology-based models,
rationality-based models, adaptive models, belief learning models, and models
inspired by artiﬁcial intelligence and biology. The second classiﬁcation relies
on the main economic ﬁelds in which the models are applied. Bayesian learning
and least-squares learning is used in macro-economic; reinforcement learning,
ﬁctitious play and direction theory are applied in experimental economics;
evolutionary programming and genetic programming are frequently used in
agent-based computational economics. Artiﬁcial Intelligence techniques are
the main tool to design agent's learning: the examples including genetic algo-
rithm are implemented in the agent-based models of Palmer, Arthur, Holland,
LeBaron and Tayler (1994), Arifovic (2001), LeBaron (2001c); learning classi-
ﬁer systems in Arthur et al. (1997a), LeBaron et al. (1999), Schulenburg and
Ross (2002); artiﬁcial neural networks in Yang (2002), Zimmermann et al.
(2001); genetic programming in Chen and Yeh (2001a), Chen and Yen (2002),
Edmonds (1999), Martinez-Jaramillo (2007); reinforcement learning Chan and
Shelton (2001).
In this thesis we propose an overview of genetic algorithms principles (Hol-
land, 1975), as they are regarded as a key component in many agent-based
ﬁnancial market for modeling of learning and adaptation (Palmer et al., 1994;
Arifovic, 2001; LeBaron, 2001c). While there is a large variation in the speciﬁc
details of genetic algorithms, there are some general principles and procedures
that are regarded as relatively standard:
 The objective function of genetic algorithm should be speciﬁed. The
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parameter that is going to maximize (or minimize) the objective should
also be indicated.
 The vector of parameters, representing candidate solutions are encoded
as string of ﬁnite length.
 The performance of each string in the population is evaluated using the
objective criterion  the string's ﬁtness.
 A new generation ofN strings is determined using operations that mimic
natural selection that occurs in biological processes.
For instance in the Santa Fe model (Arthur et al., 1997b; LeBaron et al.,
1999) agents predict the future return and dividend of the traded asset. The
sets of trading rules evolves on the basis of genetic algorithms. The GA is
invoked everyK period for each agent and replaces the 20 worst rules of the set
of 100. GA uses the genetic operators of mutation and crossovers to generate
new rules that allow to adapt the set of strategies to the changing market
conditions. Mutation is an important part of any evolutionary algorithm,
which helps maintain a diverse population. It could be interpreted as learning
by experiment. The performance of the rules is used as a ﬁtness criteria. Thus,
ineﬃcient trading rules are replaced by the best ones. Initially, the agents are
limited in their rationality and their knowledge about the market. During
the trading, the agents learn and thus, become reasonable experts in their
domains. The probability of GA activation by each agent is an important
parameter that determines the "speed of learning" of the agents.
2.1.5 Interactions
The next key aspect of agent-based models are the agent interactions that are
at the heart of the explanation of many statistical properties of stock markets.
There are two important points of interaction in the ﬁnancial market:
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 Who is interacting with whom: market-market, agent-market, agent-
agent, agent-external world, etc.
 What is the result of the interactions: monetary payoﬀs, the commodity,
money, etc. For example, agent A interacts with agent B, provides
information to agent C and pays money to agent B.
Many existing empirical studies put forward the market-market relation.
For instance, there exist long-run linkages and co-movements between the
markets, such as Canadian, Mexican and United States. But usually this
type of interaction is ignored in agent-based models.
Market organization is an important factor aﬀecting the strategies of par-
ticipants and their proﬁtability that is agent-market interaction. Often, the
outcome of a strategy is not uniquely associated with any particular feature
of the model or behavior, it's up to a set of market rules and market partic-
ipants. An example of such relation is the inﬂuence of tick size on strategies
proﬁtability.
This sort of inﬂuence ﬁts Interaction Movement Computation MIC∗ model
(Gouachin, Michel and Guiraud, 2004). This model is actively used for multi-
agent systems engineering. In this model the environment deﬁnes a set of
actions for autonomous agents to achieve their goals. The environment plays
a fundamental role in order to guarantee the autonomy property of agents.
The agents interact with one another in order to achieve either a common or
an individual objective. Moreover, existing models of advance traders inter-
actions ﬁt well the MIC∗ architecture.
The simplest agent-agent interactions can be "communication" through
the environment, via market microstructure. In such interactions, agents have
a diﬀerent access to external information and a diﬀerent interpretation of it.
They estimate their own positions, make decisions about perspective bid-ask
prices, and do not share the trading strategy. To demonstrate the interactions
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through order book, we consider the following simple example: agent i sends
bid order βi or ask orders αi, with bid-ask spread αi−βi. A trade is concluded
between agent i and agent j, if βi > αj. In such a way, the traders' decisions
are inﬂuenced by decisions of other market participants.
To keep simulations fairness and to avoid the biases in the internal information
access, agents should be simultaneously informed about changes in the order
book. All orders, as inﬂuences, are collected in the order book, once, all
agents have sent their orders, the price is ﬁxed as a reaction. This model ﬁts
the Inﬂuence Reaction Model for Simulation (IRM4S) concept (Ferber and
Muller, 1996; Michel, 2007). Trading strategies inﬂuence general system state
(price formation) through "collection of inﬂuences" (order book), at the same
time, they use current environment information (historical price) for further
decisions. In other words, the agents can also interact through the common
variable of the past price history, but they are not directly aﬀected by the
actions of others.
More complex communication model is introduced by Bouchaud and Potter
(2000). Agents have three choices of market actions: buy, sell, or remain
positions. Traders can form coalitions with others who share some choices
of actions. N agents are assumed to be located at the vertexes of a random
graph, and agent i is linked to agent j with a probability pij. A coalition is
simply the set of connected agents (a cluster) with a given action△Θ. Agents
in a cluster share the same actions and do not trade among themselves.
In the MIC∗ model (Gouachin et al., 2004) two agents are regarded as
interacting when the perceptions of an agent are inﬂuenced by the emissions of
another. This type of interaction is realized in the adaptive population model
of Lux and Marchsi (1999), where the agents are divided into two groups:
fundamentalists and noise (chartist) traders. Noise traders are divided into
an optimistic and a pessimistic group. The important feature of this model
is possibility to switch strategy between optimistic and pessimistic patterns,
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moreover between the noise and the fundamentalist agents groups, based on
the proﬁt diﬀerence in such groups.
Generally speaking, cross-group movements change the traders group's
proportion, hence change the market state that is inﬂuenced also by individ-
uals' behavior (market price dynamic depends on agents' strategies).
Inﬂuence-opinion formation model of Kirman (1993) represents the direct
interaction scheme. The agent may hold one of two views. In each time step,
the two agents may randomly meet, and there is a ﬁxed probability that one
agent may convince the other agent to follow his opinion. In addition, there
is also a small probability that an agent changes his opinion independently.
Applied to a ﬁnancial market setting, one may observe such interaction be-
tween technical traders and fundamentalist. Note, that agents may change
rules due to direct interactions with other agents, but switching probabilities
are independent of the performance of the rules.
2.1.6 Calibration and validation
While agent-based models are able to represent the market structure and
trading rules in a very realistic manner and are capable to reproduce many
real market patterns, most models may be not easily calibrated to real-world
data.
Uncalibrated models may be used to investigate the periods of high and
low volatility, or agents learning and adaptation over time. Even if each
of these scenarios is designed to represent real world situations, it does not
rely on real data for calibrating the arrival rate of new information, the real
proportion between fundamentalists and chartists on the real market, the
assets held by each trader. The calibration of model parameters is one way
to connect artiﬁcial market model to the real world (LeBaron, 2001a). A
wide discussion on calibration is presented in Windrum, Fagiolo and Modeta
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(2007). The approach of incorporating parameters borrowed from real or
experimental market to calibrate a model can be found in Zimmermann et al.
(2001), Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan (2003).
In calibrating the parameters and behaviors in the simulations, Darley
and Outkin (2007) identify two interrelated areas: 1) calibrating to the real-
world trading volume distribution, and 2) calibrating behaviors, especially,
market makers behaviors. Darley and Outkin (2007) use a Nasdaq Inc. data
set for calibrations to identify an interval of the trading day and associate it
with an interval in the simulation, the total traded volumes in real market and
artiﬁcial market is statistically similar. Then, they create dealers and investors
orders with diﬀerent size that approximately reproduce the distribution of
traded volumes observed in the real world. Next, the authors use data mining
techniques to calibrate the agents' behavior. With the information provided
by time series data of real market transactions, the strategies are calibrated
to generate the price paths that are the most consistent with the real world
Nasdaq market.
Calibration consists in setting parameters to help the model best ﬁt em-
pirical data, while validation consists in verifying the hypothesis about the
ability of the model to ﬁt real data. Validation is needed to select the model
which best ﬁts real market data or data properties. An agent-based model is
validated if the generated data and the real data belong to the same distribu-
tion. Calibration methodologies are necessary and crucial in validation.
2.2 An overview of existing platforms
In this subsection we introduce two "classical" the most cited and the most
used artiﬁcial stock markets, the Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market and the
Genoa Artiﬁcial Stock Market. Then, we overview recently developed plat-
forms, Agent-Based Simulation of Trading Roles in an Asynchronous Contin-
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uous Trading Environment (ABSTRACTE) and the NASDAQ Market Sim-
ulator. In these platforms the developers made design choices close to those
in ATOM. The outﬂow of each subsection is as follows: ﬁrst, we describe the
choice of market mechanism and traded assets made in the systems; second,
diﬀerent types of agents and their learning capabilities; third, the technical
features including programming languages and libraries used for platform de-
velopment; ﬁnally, we review the research contributions in ﬁnance made using
concerned platforms.
2.2.1 Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market (SF-ASM)
The Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market is a well known agent-based system. It
is cited in many articles Arthur et al. (1997b), LeBaron et al. (1999), Palmer
et al. (1994), LeBaron (2002), Ehrentreich (2002), Ehrentreich (2006). The
Santa Fe market was not the ﬁrst. There were several early simulations that
tried to answer some concrete questions. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whit-
comb (1983) investigate the impact of randomly behaving agents on various
market structures, Kim and Markowitz (1989) look at the interactions of spe-
ciﬁc trading strategies.
It was originally designed to investigate the dynamics of a market in which
bounded rational agents form endogenous expectations by means of inductive
reasoning (Arthur, 1994c). It helps study the emergence of trading patterns
as agents learn over time.
Market mechanism. Double-auction mechanism. Market makers an-
nounce the price to all the traders.
Agents. There are N traders in the market, fundamentalists and technical
traders using moving average trading signals. Agents take their decisions
synchronously and send the orders with direction ai,t (buy ai,t = 1 or sell ai,t =
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−1), and the market maker calculates the imbalance between demand and
supply (It =
∑
i ai,t). The price of orders is computed as pt+1 = pt(1+ β× It)
Traders use constant absolute risk-aversion expected utility function
CARA U(Wt+1 = −e
−λWt+1), where λ is their degree in risk-aversion, and
Wt+1 is an agent's expected wealth level for the next time period. Agents use
a classiﬁer system to make predictions on the ﬁrst and second moments for
stock returns. Agents maximize their utility function with respect to their
budget constraint:
Wi,t+1 = xi,t(pt+1 + dt+1) + (1 + rf )(Wi,t − ptxi,t) (2.10)
Traders are homogeneous with respect to utility function and risk aversion,
they are heterogeneous with respect to expectations about future price and
dividends. The agents buy/sell stocks and receive interest/dividends on their
investments.
SF-ASM allows the interactions between heterogeneous agents as described
in Lux and Marchsi (1999)
Assets. There are only two assets. First, there is a risk free bond with a
constant interest rate r = 0.10. The second asset is the risky stock , paying
a stochastic dividend that follows the autoregressive AR(1) process : dt =
d+ p(dt−1− d) +µt, where d = 10, p = 0.95, µt ∼ N(0, σ2µ). The fundamental
share value is unknown to the traders. It depends on the price, the dividends
and the risk-free interest rate. There are no complex instruments, such as
options.
Learning. SF-ASM uses a generic algorithm (GA) to modify the trading
rules. Each trader i = 1, · · · , N updates his set of forecasting rules with
probability P in each period t using generic algorithm (GA). The updating of
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forecasting rule sets happens in diﬀerent time periods for diﬀerent traders. P
is an important parameter determining the speed of learning. For each agent,
GA is invoked every K period and replaces S worst rules of the rule set.
Technical features. The SF-ASM market was programmed in the C pro-
gramming language under UNIX, later it was modiﬁed to objective-c. One
important feature of the empirical results presented in LeBaron et al. (1999) is
that they use a cross section of 25 diﬀerent market runs. The second key result
is that these features are very sensitive to the learning speeds of agents, or
the frequency with which they run the generic algorithm. The platform pro-
grammed based on the Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market and its modiﬁcation
were introduced in the papers of LeBaron (2002), Johnson (2002), who discuss
platform design issues. A current objective-C version using the Swarm package
is currently hosted by Paul Johnson at http://ArtStkMkt.sourceforge.net.
It was also reprogrammed using Java and RePast library.
Research questions. SF-ASM is a relatively simple platform actively used
to address several important and controversial questions in ﬁnancial eco-
nomics. SF-ASM is used to examine whether the introduction of trader learn-
ing helps explain empirical observations. Depending on the generic algorithm
invocation interval, LeBaron et al. (1999) report two diﬀerent regimes: 1)
the so-called rational expectations regime emerges when agents have a slow
learning rate 2) the so-called rich psychological or complex regime arises when
agents have a fast exploration rate. When the agents frequently update their
rules the market is more likely to generate the patterns common to actual
ﬁnancial time series. When the agents update their rules more slowly the
market is very close to what would be predicted in the homogeneous ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium. The price series exhibit bubbles and crashes,
fat tails in return distribution, trading volume exhibits GARCH-behavior and
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is auto-correlated. Trading volume is also strongly persistent and correlated
with price volatility. The authors report that the emergence of these statistical
properties is due to the interactions between many heterogeneous agents.
2.2.2 Genoa Artiﬁcial Stock Market (GASM)
The Genoa is the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial stock market presented by Marchesi et al.
(2000), Raberto et al. (2001), Cincotti et al. (2005). The Genoa platform
contains several modules: i) assets ii) trading iii) clusters iv) simulation part
implements market organization with trading rules, agents who follow these
rules. The authors claim that this platform has been developed not as a stand-
alone optimization application for present model, but as an evolving system
able to be continuously modiﬁed and updated. For instance, the platform can
be extended to an unlimited number of diﬀerent kinds of securities, it can be
used as an engine for a trading game and, moreover, for implementing real
online trading.
Market mechanism. The trading mechanism of the GASM is based on
a realistic double-auction order matching mechanism. The clearing price is
deﬁned as the crossing of demand and supply functions.
Assets. Initially this platform has been introduced as a mono-asset market
in Marchesi et al. (2000), but it has been recently updated to a multi-asset
system by Ponta et al. (2011).
Agents. Each agent is an autonomous entity that uses a speciﬁc number
of assets and cash, which are speciﬁed as the initial parameters. There is a
variety of trading strategies: random trading, fundamental analysis, technical
analysis, mean-variance portfolio optimization, and mean-reversion traders.
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 Random Traders (R) have zero intelligence and simply issue random
orders. They issue a buy or a sell limit order with equal probability.
The order size is computed at random with a uniform probability, but
there are budget constraints, meaning that the issued sell order depends
on available cash and stocks.
 Fundamentalist traders (F) believe that each asset has a fundamental
price Pf related to external factors.
 Momentum Traders (M) follow the past price trends. They buy (sell)
when the price goes up (down).
 Contrarian Traders (C) are trend followers too, but they speculate, if
the stock price is rising, it will stop rising soon and fall, so it is better
to sell near the maximum, and vice versa. Contrarian Traders compute
the order size in the same way as Random Traders.
Learning. The Genoa platform uses a generic algorithm (GA) to modify
the trading rules.
Technical features. The system is developed using the Smalltalk language.
Research questions. The Genoa artiﬁcial stock market has been employed
to investigate asset price dynamics from a microscopic perspective. Within a
multi-asset artiﬁcial stock market, zero-intelligence traders generate realistic
price series (see ﬁgure 2.1) with returns exhibiting volatility clustering, fat
tails and reversion to the mean. The authors report that only the restriction
on agents' allocation strategies produce such realistic stylized facts. They
also analyze the impact of stock option trading on the market of the under-
lying security, and the inﬂuence of hedging strategies on the long-run wealth
distribution of traders and on price volatility.
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Figure 2.1: Prices and Returns in simulations without dividends paying with
ZIT.
The question of the long-run wealth distribution of agents with diﬀerent
trading strategies is studied using the Genoa Artiﬁcial Stock Market (Raberto,
Cincotti, Focardi and Marchesi, 2003). The results show that a trading strat-
egy cannot be judged solely on the basis of the strategy itself. Its success
depends also on market conditions. The authors conclude that in an artiﬁcial
market with ﬁnite resources, the average price level and the trends are deﬁned
by the amount of available cash that is injected in the market. Diﬀerent pop-
ulations of traders with simple but ﬁxed trading strategies cannot coexist in
the long run. One population prevails and the others progressively lose weight
and disappear.
Mannaro, Marchesi and Setzu (2008) use the Genoa framework to assess
the impact of a Tobin-like transaction taxes on market volatility and trading
mechanism. For this research they introduce several types of traders: ZIT,
fundamentalist ans two kinds of chartists. The authors report that the price
volatility increases consistently with the tax rate, but only when the chartist
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traders are present in the market.
2.2.3 Agent-Based Simulation of Trading Roles in an
Asynchronous Continuous Trading Environment
(ABSTRACTE)
ABSTRACTE is a modular agent-based trading environment introduced and
described by Boer-Sorban (2008). This is a modular tool for representing and
studying several types of markets and trading strategies. The main purpose
of ABSTRACTE developers is the understanding and explanation of mar-
ket dynamics. ABSTRACTE is based on JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment
Framework). JADE agents communicate through asynchronous message pass-
ing. The agents use Agent Communication Language (ACL) format to write
their messages.
The framework consists of three main components. The market place mod-
els the institutional structure behind price formation. This component inte-
grates ﬁnancial traders (market makers and brokers). Their role is determined
by the market rules of speciﬁc markets. Investors are not an internal part of
a market organization. They observe markets, make trading decisions, and
send their orders to ﬁnancial traders. The information source component is
designed to generate news related to the stock traded on the market, such as
dividends or fundamental value. The information source component generates
news about a stock. Based on this information, the investors send their orders
to brokers or market makers on the marketplace. The process of order exe-
cuting depends on the speciﬁc execution system and on the strategy applied
by ﬁnancial traders. The ﬁgure 2.2 introduces the structure of the system.
Market mechanism. Primarily, the authors focus on continuous quote-
driven system, where bid and ask quotes are placed by market makers. Later,
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Figure 2.2: The components of the ABSTRACTE framework
the auction-based execution mechanism has been also incorporated into the
environment.
Continuous and call trading sessions are implemented within the platform.
It is up to the user to decide with which form to experiment. In continuous
trading sessions, the orders are executed as far as there is a possibility of
matching. If call sessions are used, the orders are placed only at designated
times. Traders are notiﬁed whenever a call session opens or closes.
Limit and market orders can be placed within this framework. Orders are
described by a stock name, size, side, quoted price and timestamp.
Assets. Like the majority of artiﬁcial stock markets ABSTRACTE develop-
ers focus on experiments where one risky stock is traded Boer-Sorban (2008).
Cash is regarded as a risk free instrument.
Agents. The ABSTRACTE incorporates three types of market participants.
Market makers execute the orders of other market participants. They are
responsible for providing market liquidity, perceiving the environment, deter-
mining bid and ask quotes, receiving orders and their executing.
Brokers are primarily entitled to execute orders on behalf of investors.
Theoretically a broker has three ways to carry out a trading instruction: a)
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match orders internally: if there are other earlier received orders in the order
book of the broker that clears at a price close to the current market price; b)
try to negotiate with other brokers within the market maker's quoted spread.
c) submit the order to a third party (such as a market maker or a central
matching system) for execution.
There are two classes of investors in the system. Trader agents represent
the market participants, who hold a list of stocks and trade them on the mar-
ket. Manager agents control the market by keeping track of the time, creating
and managing a given list of traders, getting information, and diﬀusing news.
In the ABSTRACTE framework traders are not centrally selected for their
tradings, but are individual autonomous elements. They decide when to place
an order. Autonomy results from the chosen agent-based implementation.
Moreover, agents can carry out diﬀerent tasks at the same moment.
Technical features. ABSTRACTE is built using the Java Agent DEvelop-
ment Framework (JADE) environment.
Research questions. Boer et al. (2007) study the behavior of a learn-
ing market maker in a market with information asymmetries, and observe
the diﬀerences caused by market dynamics (discrete and continuous). They
show that the market price is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the choice of market
dynamic. The authors report that the main diﬀerence in the outcomes of
the discrete-time and continuous-time simulation is the ﬂuctuation of bid-ask
quotes, and consequently prices. Prices tend to ﬂuctuate more often and with
larger amplitude in continuous, asynchronous setting. The magnitude of the
ﬂuctuations tends to increase with the increasing number of investors. Boer
et al. explain this phenomenon by the interaction of agents, who act all at
the same time, and market maker, who overreact to changes in order queues.
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2.2.4 NASDAQ Market Simulator
The NASDAQ Market Simulator (Darley and Outkin, 2007) is an agent-based
model that has been initially developed to explore the eﬀects of the changes
in market microstructure or market rules on the behavior of participants such
as market makers and traders in the Nasdaq market.
At the highest level, the simulator consists of four types of objects: Price,
Dealers, Investors, and Market.
Market mechanism. This platform mimics the architecture of the NAS-
DAQ real market.
Assets. A single risky security is traded. The "true" value of the stock
follows a stochastic dynamics.
Agents. The players in the market, Dealers and Investors, are represented
as "agents" in the Nasdaq market simulator. Each investor has access to the
current "true" value of the underlying security adjusted by an "error", that
depends on the individual agent's "informedness". Investors decide whether
to purchase or to sell stocks by comparing their current price with the "true"
value. Dealers, on the other hand, do not have any prior information about
the "true" value. They post their current bid and ask prices on the public
board. If a dealer's current prices are below (above) the investor's perception
of the value, then the Investor will buy (sell) a pre-determined number of
shares of the security.
Several Dealer strategies have been implemented in the Nasdaq market
simulator:
 A Basic Dealer maintains his quotes until he receives a certain number of
trades on the buy (or sell) side, and then adjusts the quote appropriately.
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 A Price Volume Dealer tries to deduce from the market data the current
demand and supply schedules and thus decides whether the current price
is above or below of the "true" value.
 A Volume Dealer looks at the past discounted volume only, without
explicitly taking the price into account. If the Volume Dealer observes
more buys in the past, he concludes that the price is probably above the
"true" value. Thus, he increases the ask price.
 A Parasitic Dealer waits until a suﬃciently narrow spread with suﬃcient
volume appears on the board to be able to realize a transaction without
price discovery.
 A Matching Dealer learns the connections between observations and
actions which are proﬁtable.
 A Classiﬁer Dealer is similar to a Matching Dealer, except that he learns
over patterns of observations.
 A Dynamic System Dealer uses a discrete dynamical system to set his
bid-ask spread and mean price.
Technical features. Nasdaq simulator is developed using the Java pro-
gramming language. There are tree main classes: the Market class, the Dealer
class, and the Investor class. Both Dealers and Investors have strategy func-
tions that determine their trading desires. Investors decide whether to buy or
sell the security, while the dealer decides what bids and asks to post on the
Market's Quote Montage.
Research questions. One of the questions investigated using NASDAQ
Market Simulator is the eﬀect of decimalization and reduction of tick size on
price discovery, market volatility, and behavior of market participants Darley
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and Outkin (2007). Decimalization means a change to expressing prices in a
decimal system, rather than in dollars and fractions of dollars. The authors
conclude that the decimalization may have a signiﬁcant negative impact on
price discovery in the presence of parasitic strategies. A parasitic strategy is
deﬁned as a strategy which attempts to make a proﬁt without contributing
to the process of price discovery, or as a strategy that is to take advantage of
other players' actions.
2.3 ArTiﬁcial Open Market (ATOM)
We have presented in the section 2.1 an extensive overview of the existing
methodology to design an agent-based models of ﬁnancial stock markets. A
series of existing artiﬁcial stock market platforms has also been introduced.
Their entities' organization, agents' strategies and price setting mechanisms
have been detailed. As concluded, there is a vast number of markets. Most of
present artiﬁcial market platforms suﬀer from a lack of ﬂexibility and must be
viewed as software rather than as Application Programming Interface (API).
They are oriented for speciﬁc problem solving, but cannot be used to explore
a wide range of ﬁnancial issues due to some structural choices made by the
developer during the coding phase. These observations have motivated the
development of a new agent-based artiﬁcial trading environment in order to
overcome some limits of other platforms and to provide a new research tool.
ATOM is a robust and reliable platform, on which researchers can run the
thousands of sophisticated evolving agents (Mathieu and Brandouy, 2012).
It has been developed at Lille 1 University1 . This software architecture is
currently realized based on an architecture which is close to the Euronext-
NYSE Stock Exchange, described in the Backgrounds Section. We with start
the description by giving the architecture features.
1http://atom.univ-lille1.fr
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Execution system ATOM implements both quote-driven and order-driven
systems. In the quote-driven framework, bid and ask quotes are placed by
market makers. The investors decide whether to accept or to refuse those
oﬀers and demands.
In the order-driven framework, an order book is the core of the application.
Incoming orders are gathered and trades are cleared whenever there exist the
conditions for price setting. Orders are sorted according to price-time priority.
In an order-driven market the price is set as the result of matching the orders
of buyers and sellers.
In ATOM, there is also a possibility to implement several order books,
each for speciﬁc stock, agents send their orders to the market, that forwards
these orders to concerned order books. As far as a price is set, it is sent to
the market and becomes a public information. As a result, agents will react
to such market changes, which creates feedback loops in the system.
Discrete and continuous time trading regimes In ATOM, one has a
possibility to switch between discrete and continuous trading regimes. Dis-
crete time trading (or call session) means that agents should act at the moment
of time t before any action can be performed at t + 1. In a call session all
traders trade at the same time when the market is called. This regime is real-
ized with controlled scheduling that implies the consequent action collection
and their execution.
If a continuous trading session is applied, orders can be continuously placed by
investors, and trades are arranged whenever possible. Trading is continuous
in the sense that traders may continuously attempt to arrange trades. Con-
tinuous trading is provided in ATOM by controlled scheduling with multiple
processes.
Many continuous order-driven exchanges open their trading session with
call market auctions and then switch over to continuous trading. The number
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of call auctions and the time interval between two call-auctions can be easily
speciﬁed in the ATOM framework. Such parameterization is at the heart of
day time-frame realization in artiﬁcial stock markets.
Intraday and extraday time grain The choice of the time step of the
model is an important design question. Contrary to most existing artiﬁcial
markets that consider one trading round as one day or one year time period
(Jacobs et al., 2004; Martinez-Jaramillo, 2007), ATOM reproduces intraday
(with openning, continuous trading and closing process) as well as extraday
trading. Many continuous order-driven exchanges open their trading sessions
with discrete market auctions or pre-opening session and then switch over
to continuous trading. During the pre-opening session orders are sent to the
central order book without any transaction taking place. It allows to deter-
mine the opening price and to provide initial market liquidity. One trading
round corresponds to one intraday trading tick. We provide this market func-
tionality in ATOM, the number of ticks of discrete and continuous trading is
conﬁguration parameter.
Orders In ATOM, most of NYSE-Euronext orders are allowed: limit, mar-
ket, cancel or update orders, as well as sophisticated combinations such as
stop-limit orders or limit orders with "iceberg" execution (see table 2.1).2
Orders always specify which instrument to trade, how much to trade, and
whether to buy or sell. Additionally, each order has a validity duration. The
order is active in the order book until it has generated a trade, or it has been
canceled by an agent or automatically due to the validity duration. Each order
has a time-stamp and a unique number providing the possibility to monitor
the order state. Order execution depends on the execution mechanism applied.
2See NYSE-Euronext rule-book, at http://www.euronext.com.
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Order Types Pre-Opening Continuous Trading Closing Price Required
Limit Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Yes Yes No No
Iceberg Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stop Limit Yes Yes No Yes
Stop Loss Yes Yes No Yes
Table 2.1: Orders and trading scheduling implemented in ATOM
Multi-asset market Most artiﬁcial markets deal with one single asset.
This choice is made for software solution simplicity. At the same time this
choice excludes the possibility of portfolio optimization and risk management
question of research conducted based on such market. Today, there are only
a few artiﬁcial stock markets presenting multi-asset order book (Chen et al.,
2002; Jacobs et al., 2004; Ponta et al., 2011). ATOM is one of them. It allows
to simulate more advanced agents' behavior with risk-return management and
wealth optimization utility functions (for example, see section 2.3.2). Cash
supply expresses an asset with the risk free rate. The information, return and
risk of the risky assets can be regularly generated on the market and is publicly
available information. Moreover, agents have diﬀerent memory span length,
they can store their own relevant information and can elaborate various kinds
of strategies based on these data.
Endogenous and exogenous sources of information Usually, the arti-
ﬁcial agents aim to maximize their wealth by investing in diﬀerent assets. To
make proﬁtable decisions they rely on diﬀerent information for their decision
making process. We propose diﬀerent sources of information. First, we can
impose to agent an exogenous information, such as dividend distributions or
moments of return distribution. Second, the agents can use the past price
history (endogenous information) to estimate an 'endogenous' (ex-post) rate
of return and volatility of securities or to predict future trends and turning
points in stock prices. These options can help understand the origin of the
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price ﬂuctuations exogenous or endogenous (i.e. reaction to external events
or caused by the trading activity itself).
Unrestricted trading volume Other unrealistic assumption made in some
artiﬁcial markets is the restriction to "one share per trade". This is a common
simpliﬁcation in order to reduce the implementation time, but a questionable
one. Volume plays an important role in ﬁnancial market stylized facts emer-
gence. Unrestricted trading volume is also essential for portfolio diversiﬁcation
questions. In ATOM, traders decide not only the trading direction (buy or
sell) and price, but also volume. This functionality allows the ATOM users
to investigate volume-volatility relation.
Replay-engine All information about trading (identiﬁcation of stock, iden-
tiﬁcation of agents, ﬁxed price, etc.) on the real stock market or on the arti-
ﬁcial stock market is usually logged in the special log-ﬁle. ATOM takes less
than few seconds to replay an entire day of trading from such log-ﬁle, that con-
tains 400,000 activities. This tool is extremely important for policy-oriented
experiments focusing on the technical features of the market microstructure
(tick size, price setting protocol) and its inﬂuence on the price dynamic. It
also allows the perfect reproductibility of any experiment run on ATOM which
is a major advantage for both scientiﬁc and technical research.
We can, for example, use the trading data from a given day or week, replay
them in the artiﬁcial market framework, and then answer questions about how
the market would have behaved during that time period "if" the tick size or
"if" transaction costs had been diﬀerent. This ability also allows to re-produce
real-world order ﬂow.
Flexibility One of the critics of ABM is that the modeler can not intervene
to adjust system evolution. All initial speciﬁcations should be completely pre-
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deﬁned. To overcome this weakness the platform should be ﬂexible and should
easily incorporate the evolving parameters settings. For example, it has been
shown that as far as agents easier undertake a risk. Thus the system should
allow to update the risk aversion parameter of agents in accordance with their
available wealth (Iglesias, Goncalves, Abramson and J.L.Vega, 2004). ATOM
introduces the possibility to have evolving agent populations. ATOM is able
to remove or introduce agents into the market during the simulations. More-
over one can easily control the proportion of sent orders. For instance, we can
generate or not the market or stop-limit orders.
Transaction costs For the sake of simplicity, the majority of multi-agent
models does not incorporate transaction costs. However, the latter are es-
sential for several questions in ﬁnance, such as portfolio rebalancing, because
proﬁt maximizing agent will trade only if the expected return of the transac-
tion is higher than the expenses generated by their orders for example. We
implement transaction costs in our platform.
2.3.1 Technical design issues
Even if the objective of this work is to concentrate on the ﬁnancial applications
more than on implementation details, we still illustrate some technical solu-
tions for architecture development. This section is intended for those who are
interested in the software development of agent-based artiﬁcial stock markets.
The ATOM platform oﬀers the implementation of multi-agent systems ab-
stract design issues. For instance, agent autonomy and its behavior mean that
each agent asses his position and makes decisions individually. Price history
and orders sets are emergent phenomenon of market activities. Extremely fast
simulations are realized based on distributed simulations with many comput-
ers interacting through a network as well as local-host. Possibility to design
experiments mixing human being and artiﬁcial traders are implemented in our
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platform.
2.3.1.1 Modular organization
From the very beginning, this API was designed having in mind the desired
properties of "scalability". That implies the possibility to easily modify the
system in order to incorporate some new features and functionalities. Hence
during the development of an artiﬁcial stock market many MAS design princi-
ples are employed. For example, "modularity" and "encapsulation", suggest-
ing the division of the system into diﬀerent sub-organizations.
There are diﬀerent attempts to organize artiﬁcial stock markets (modular
organization). For example, LeBaron (2001c) propose following components
of the system: Agents, Rules, and Securities. Separate binary modules of
Autonomous engine (platform core), Simulation User Interface, and Agents
are implemented in Muchnik and Solomon (2006); Boer-Sorban (2008)
organizes her platform using Traded instruments  Market participants
Market microstructure parts.
The choice of the ATOM organisation is results from the intention to
introduce fairly tractable markets, to be close to the NYSE-Euronext stock
exchange organization and to ground modelling on MAS design main concepts.
Thus, the ATOM architecture can be viewed as a system with interacting
components: i) Market is deﬁned in terms of microstructure ii) Agents, and
their behaviors, and iii) Bank reﬂects intermediaries and monetary ﬁnancial
institutions iv) the Artiﬁcial Economic World provides economical indicators.
We link each system entity with the sets of Responsibilities in order to cover
all functionality and complexity of real world market.
The Market is the main class that incorporates and maintains all agents
and order books. "Market" is responsible for the generation of market scenar-
2.3. ArTiﬁcial Open Market (ATOM) 85
ios. It presents the set of constraints, rules, regulations, leading participants
to activities. Moreover it generates the ﬁles that gather the simulation out-
puts. The content of these ﬁles is easily parametrized. One can include the
information about sent orders (order book Id, agent's identiﬁcation, direc-
tion (Bid/Ask), volume and price), the information about ﬁxed prices (order
book Id, price, volume, direction, Id of counterparts), the information about
agents (unique identiﬁcation, available cash, the number of hold assets with
its' current price), and the information of trading sessions (opening, continu-
ous trading or closing) as well the price of opening and closing.
Agents may play roles of either buyer or seller, on both roles with dif-
ferent trading objectives. Agents directly initiate transactions. An agent is
represented as an object with either private or public attributes.
The Bank component represents all intermediaries; it maintains informa-
tion exchange between buyers and sellers. At the same time, Bank can be
considered as a special type of buyer or seller, that has unlimited wealth,
hence take active part in stock trading. We propose to consider Bank as a
trading and intermediary agent.
Artiﬁcial Economic World provides external information about respective
corporate developments, dividends and coupons, tax policies modiﬁcation and
so on. This information may inﬂuence agent's decisions. The artiﬁcial market
architecture (system elements and interaction between them) is presented in
ﬁgure 2.3.
We now turn to a technical question, which is crucial in ABM development:
how time is handled in our platform.
2.3.1.2 Time handling and scheduling system
A crucial question for the design of distributed systems is the way one deals
with time. There are two aspects for this problem: the modeling choice (se-
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Figure 2.3: Market organizations and interactions
quential vs. parallel evaluation of agents) and the architecture choice (single
stream or multiple streams processes). In ATOM, the scheduling system is
parametric, thus one can choose between four possible conﬁgurations (see ﬁg-
ure 2.4). In each case, one can also decide if order issuing will be balanced
among agents or not. These possibilities give the researcher a real power for
answering a wide range of problems through an appropriate design for his
experiments.
The main diﬀerence between the sequential and the parallel simulation
principle consists in how the tick time is managed.
In MAS philosophy, one considers that time changes along environments
changes:
 In the sequential mechanism, the tick time changes after each order sent
by an agent. This means that an agent is always able to see other agents'
decisions before making his own decision.
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Figure 2.4: Modelling and architecture choices in time handling problem
 In the parallel mechanism, the tick time changes after one decision round
processed over all agents. It is a way to simulate parallelism between
agents. This is the principle followed by the Conway's game of Life
(Garder, 1970).
However choosing one of these arrangements is just a modeling choice.
Any of them can be obtained in a single stream architecture as well as in a
multiple stream architecture.
In a single stream architecture, one needs a speciﬁc software engineering
pattern to code the parallelism. The easiest way is to let the Market collect
all the orders before their execution. ATOM uses a "equitable round table"
for acting to ensure fairness among agents.
It is a way to simulate simultaneity in agents' decisions. If one needs to
ensure fairness among agents, ATOM uses a loop to give the talk to all agents
 "equitable round table". An agent is allowed to act only once in each talk
round. Of course, if one wants to depart from this fairness, it is suﬃcient to
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pick randomly an agent and to oﬀer him the possibility to decide again.
One feature of real stock market is that at each time step there is only
a small fraction of the market population which is involved in trading. The
assumption that all investors trade at each time step is unrealistic due to high
transaction costs. Even professional fund managers realize only few trades
per day in order to get closer to target portfolio weights. So it is important to
control trading frequency of agents. Note that in ATOM an agent can decline
the possibility to issue a new order, hence, even if we have a single stream, we
can easily simulate diﬀerent talking frequencies.
A possibility to express an intention does not necessarily imply that a
new order is issued. Since agents are autonomous, they can evaluate their
positions every round, modify trading rules according to new market condi-
tions. Developing an agent that sends twice less orders than the others can
be made by programming his behavior such as he will decline word on odd
turns (keep unchanged position), while others accept to talk each time they
have the possibility to do so.
The main advantage of the single stream architecture is that the designer
can reproduce perfectly all the experiments. He keeps control on agent's talk.
We consider that it is the best way to build and test experiments.
In a multiple stream architecture, parallelism is obvious, but the designer
does not have control over the talking order of agents. This order is deﬁned
by the Operating System, and of course, it can produce biases in simulations.
Nevertheless, one particularity of this approach is that the time is given in
seconds  real time. It is also easy to express the diﬀerent trading frequencies
for diﬀerent agents, similarly with what is described above. If there is no
synchronization mechanism between the streams, the simulation is unfair, an
agent can talk twice more than another one. In a fair simulation, one just
has to put a synchronization pattern like a "Cyclic Barrier" to grant this
property. This architecture is preferable if one wants to include humans in
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the loop. This statement is detailed in the subsection 2.3.2.1
As ATOM is a multi-asset artiﬁcial market platform, we have implemented
a "one order for one book" rule: during a talk round, agents are just allowed
to send at most one single order to a given order book (i.e. one order at most
per stock) within the same "round table discussion". This principle helps keep
fairness in agents actions. However, note that agents have the possibility to
send several orders within the same "round table discussion" to several order
books: this ability is simply constrained by the "one order for one book" rule.
If the ASM is settled such as it runs a multi-stock experiment, an agent can
therefore rebalance his portfolio using one order per category of stocks he
holds. The proper system scheduler provides this possibility.
It is necessary to stress again that ATOM can govern all combinations
between sequential and parallel mechanisms, equity or unfairness in agents'
actions, one stream or multiple streams processes. The combination of single
stream, parallel mechanism, equity in actions is used for most of the exper-
iments concerning ﬁnancial problems. Parallel mechanism, multiple streams
processes are used to allow the human investor to trade in equitable conditions
with artiﬁcial agents within the platform.
2.3.2 Agents
In this subsection we consider the trading strategies implemented in ATOM. In
ATOM, there exists a large variety of agents' trading strategies, from Zero In-
telligence Traders (ZIT), whose behavior is merely based on stochastic choices,
to complex Sophisticated Intelligence Traders (SIT) with memory, information
analysis, and expectations.
In ATOM, artiﬁcial traders are characterized by their a) available set of
actions (buy, sell, or remain positions) and possibility to switch between these
activities (from buyer to seller) b) decision making rules: the simplest example
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of decision making is when buyers cannot buy if he does not have enough cash
for transaction c) scheduling of actions: how often an agent is able to send
orders in response to market request, some agent participate one time per
week, while others trade every minute d) information consideration: agent
requires speciﬁc information from the market or external world, he can also
share the information with others e) possibility to describe current state of
each trader: number of held assets, available cash, or budget constrains. In
such a way, each agent is represented by it's own object with diﬀerent number
of stocks, memory span, risk preferences, trading frequency, utility, target
weights. The platform allows an implementation homogeneous as well as
heterogeneous population depending on the purposes of research.
Zero Intelligence Traders (ZIT). This behavior is merely based on
stochastic choices: there are equal possibilities to send ask or bid order, ZITs
do not observe and do not ask any information to set up prices and quantities,
that are random variable. Concerning scheduling, such traders respond to
every market request. This kind of behavior has been popularized in economics
by Gode and Sunder (1993). The discussion introduced in section 2.1.3 shows
that despite their extreme simplicity, ZIT agents are widely used because
more sophisticated forms of rationality appear to be useless to explain the
emergence of the main ﬁnancial stylized facts at the intraday level. The
possible calibrations and applications of ZITs in ATOM are introduced in
section 3.
Technical Traders. Technical analysis is an important tool for decision
making in investment. Technical traders is a trend followers making deci-
sions depending on the trend of past prices. In the literature this type of
traders is usually referred as noise or chartist traders (Brianzoni, Mammana
and E.Michetti, 2010; Ponta et al., 2011; Brianzoni, 2012). As shown in sec-
tion 2.1.3, these agents try to identify patterns in past prices (using charts or
statistical signals) that could be used to predict future prices and henceforth
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send appropriate orders. One can ﬁnd an example of such behavior in Arthur
(1994c). From a software engineering perspective, these agents need to have
some feedback from the market and some kind of learning process as well
(reinforcement learning for large sets of rules is generally used). At the same
time, technical traders ignore the actual nature of the company, currency or
commodity. This leads to some complex algorithmic issues. For example, if
one considers a population of a few thousand Technical Traders, it is highly
desirable to avoid that each agent computes the same indicators, or simply
stores the whole price series.
In ATOM, the agents are given the possibility to use Moving Aver-
age Crossovers, Exponential Moving Average (EMA), Momentum, Relative
Strength Index (RSI) and Period techniques to identify when the market is
overbought or oversold, and to generate Ask and Bid orders.
Sophisticated Intelligence Traders (SIT). Cognitive Agents generally
have a full artiﬁcial intelligence, such as memory, information analysis pro-
cesses, expectations, strategies and learning capacities. For example, an agent
buying at a speciﬁc price and sending immediately a "stop order" to short her
position if the price drops under θ% times the current price, will fall in this
category. Agents using strategic order splitting (see for example Tkatch and
Alam (2009)) or exploiting sophisticated strategies (for instance, Brandouy,
Mathieu and Veryzhenko (2009)) can also be considered as Cognitive Agents.
The other example of agents belonging to this group is the traders that allo-
cate their funds across diﬀerent risky assets and riskless assets according to
their risk preferences. These agents at each time step confront two decisions:
how much of their wealth to invest and how mush to save in cash. Usually,
they are guided by their utility functions.
ATOM contains agents characterized by diﬀerent utility functions (all
mentioned in the section 2.1.3): Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA),
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), Logarithmic Utility Function,
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Quadratic Utility Function.
We have also implemented the agents that try to minimize risk for a given
target return following the mean-variance optimization rules introduced by
Markowitz (1952). This type of agents is called mean-variance traders (or
optimizers). The features of this trading strategy and its implementation for
portfolio optimization issues investigation is described in detail in the section
4.1.
2.3.2.1 Human in the loop
Nowadays, software agents are commonly used to replace human traders in
making decision and taking action in the electronic trading. Thus, advanced
software platforms should combine artiﬁcial agents and human. ATOM can
include human-beings in the simulation loop. This is an important feature that
is seldom oﬀered in multi-agent artiﬁcial stock markets, if simply possible with
respect to the algorithmic choices made in other platforms. A human agent is
an interface allowing for human-machine interaction. Through this interface
one can create and send orders. Notice that human agents do not have any
artiﬁcial intelligence: they just embed human intelligence in a formalism that
is accepted by the system.
To allow the introduction of humans in the loop, ATOM has been designed
to deal with communications over the network. Human agents can be run
on diﬀerent machines and the system allows client-server conﬁgurations. This
approach is particularly fruitful for a pedagogic use of the platform during
ﬁnance class for example. In this latter case, several students have their own
trading interface on their computers. In other terms, each of them runs a
human agent linked to the ATOM server through the network. However, the
presence of human agents does not alter the way the scheduler operates.
Two kinds of human agents can co-exist in ATOM: Modal Human Agents
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(MHA) and Non Modal Human agent (NMH). MHA can stop the scheduling
system. As long as a human-entity does not express her intentions (to issue
a new order or to stay unchanged), the simulation is temporary frozen. In a
classroom, this aspect is particularly important and leaves time for students
to estimate current position and to make decision.
NMH cannot freeze the simulation, which means that human agents com-
pete in real time with artiﬁcial traders. Even if human agents can have a
hard time in this situation, it remains realistic in a ﬁnancial world where
algorithmic trading is more and more frequent.
2.3.3 Validation tests
As mentioned previously, every artiﬁcial stock market should succeed in pro-
cessing a given order ﬂow collected from a real-world stock market at a speciﬁc
date. The conclusion about system validity is made by comparing prices de-
livered by the real stock market and prices generated by artiﬁcial one using
the same set of orders. It should also generate relevant "stylized facts" with
regard to their real-world counterpart: these stylized facts are statistical char-
acteristics of ﬁnancial time series that prove to be systematically observed in
various contexts (diﬀerent assets, periods of time, countries).
This section presents how ATOM fulﬁlls these requirements. Moreover,
we also introduce here a series of performance tests.
ATOM reality-check
In this section, we report a series of tests conducted to check whether ATOM
can generate ﬁnancial dynamics in line with those of the Euronext-NYSE
stock-exchange or not. The ﬁrst series of test is devoted to the ability of
ATOM to generate unbiased prices when it deals with a real-world order-ﬂow.
We check whether the agents are able to re-processes real orders submitted to
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the market on a given day with the prices similar to those of real market. Fig-
ure 2.5 illustrates such an experiment with a set of 83616 real-world orders of
the French blue-chip France Telecom (FTE) submitted to the NYSE-Euronext
market on June 26th 2008 between H9.02'.14.813 ' and H17.24'.59.917 '.
Figure 2.5(a) presents the price series produced with ATOM and the real-
order ﬂow while Figure 2.5(b) presents the corresponding exchanged volumes.
In each of these ﬁgures, two set of data are plotted. The upper set corre-
sponds to the series generated by ATOM in processing the real-world order
ﬂow. The bottom part displays those actually observed on NYSE-Euronext
market. One clearly sees that the replay-engine included in our artiﬁcial plat-
form can process the real-world order ﬂow in the same way it is treated by the
NYSE-Euronext engine. Handling time in simulations is particularly complex
and may lead to unsolvable dilemma. We cannot guarantee an exact matching
of waiting times but rather a coherent distribution of these values delivered
by the simulator engine with regard to the observed waiting times.
Notice that ATOM performs rather decently in satisfying the ﬁrst reality
check procedure.
Stylized facts
The second test focuses on ATOM's ability to generate realistic artiﬁcial prices
when populated by artiﬁcial agents. We run a series of simulations to verify
if ATOM can generate major stylized facts that are usually reported in the
literature (Cont, 2001). In this subsection, we report only the classical depar-
ture from Normality of asset returns at the intraday level (Figures 2.6(a) and
2.6(b)). Real data are those used previously for the reality check, artiﬁcial
data is generated using a population of ZITs. ATOM produces qualitative and
quantitative stylized facts in line with real market data, that is quite diﬃcult
task for most of artiﬁcial market platforms (Veryzhenko et al., 2010). Even if
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Figure 2.5: Results of the "Reality Check" procedure. The population of artiﬁ-
cial "hollow" agents treats a set of 83616 real-world orders of the French blue-chip
France Telecom (FTE) submitted to the NYSE-Euronext market on June 26th 2008
between H9.02'.14.813 ' and H17.24'.59.917 '
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Figure 2.6: Stylized facts, ATOM vs. Euronext-NYSE. ATOM returns are
generated by Zero Intelligence Traders (ZIT) (see subsection 2.3.2). Real data
correspond to France Telecom (FTE) prices settled to the NYSE-Euronext on
June 26th 2008)
some artiﬁcial markets are able to reproduce the main stylized facts such as
the non Gaussian return distribution or volatility clustering, the corresponding
quantitative characteristics (basic statistics) do not ﬁt real ones. ATOM can
be easily calibrated to match speciﬁc quantitative market features (moments).
This calibration facility is described in detail in the paper Veryzhenko et al.
(2010). Additionally, section 4.1 puts forward ATOM's ability to perform
realistic price dynamics in the multi-asset framework.
Performance test
We run several experiments to demonstrate running time for realistic price
series generation and existing order-ﬂow execution.
To demonstrate the ATOM price setting ability, we use a group of heteroge-
neous agents. The population consists of Zero Intelligence Traders (ZIT) and
Technical Simple Moving Average Traders (in equal proportions), described
in section 2.3.2. The number of set prices is 105 (on the Euronext Stock
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Exchange the number of ﬁxed prices for diﬀerent stocks varies from 1000 to
5000 per day). The number of agents varies from 10 to 105. The results are
reported in ﬁgure 2.7(a). It takes about 12 minutes to run 105 agents for price
setting.
To test the running time of the replaying engine, we use real market order
ﬂow. The same population of agents is used to read all variety of orders
(limit, market, stop-limit, iceberg, etc.) and send them to the order book. It
is up to the market to set prices in a proper way (according to a price setting
protocol). The number of orders varies from 100 to 105. It takes 2 minutes to
replay 105 orders (see ﬁgure 2.7(b)).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has given an overview of the current state of research in agent-
based computational ﬁnance along with some ideas concerning the design and
construction of working simulations. We have stressed that the development
of artiﬁcial stock market platforms puts forward a series of complex issues in
terms of computer science. Probably, the most important question is the de-
sign of the economic environment itself. What type of market microstructure,
quote-driven or order-driven, will be implemented? What types of securities
will be traded? Will there be some kind of fundamental value? How infor-
mation will be presented and how the agents process it? This chapter has
provided some answers to these questions. We have started with some in-
sight concerning the construction and design of trading environment (market
mechanisms, number of assets, types of trading securities, types of orders,
trading sessions etc). We have also focused on modeling of traders' behav-
ior. The aspects that diﬀerentiate investors are: investment objectives, invest-
ment constraints, attitude to risk, investment strategy, portfolio maintenance,
trading frequency, and memory span. We have introduced some existing plat-
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Figure 2.7: Results of the performance testing
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forms. It has been impractical to mention all or even most existing models,
we have focused on the pioneering and the most successful eﬀorts to design
and develop artiﬁcial stock markets. Finally, we have introduced the ATOM
platform, designed to deal with market dynamics and agents' decision making
in an absolutely diﬀerent way, compared to equilibrium representative agent
models. This artiﬁcial stock market generates the necessary and reasonably
realistic market dynamics that allow us to use it as a testbed for evaluating
of trading strategies in the next chapter.
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In this chapter we investigate the question of the sophisticated level of
agents' behavior and intelligence to obtain with realistic market microstruc-
ture both qualitative and quantitative stylized facts. We show that qualitative
stylized-facts can be generated with ZIT, but they are without any quantita-
tive predictive power. In this chapter we report that at coarse grain, in most
of the cases, such qualitative stylized facts hide unrealistic price dynamics at
the intraday level and ill-calibrated return processes as well. Generating real-
istic ﬁnancial dynamics that reproduce quantitatively ﬁnancial distributions
is out-of-reach within the pure ZIT framework.
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In addition we show that even with highly constrained ZIT agents, one
cannot reproduce real time series. Except in a few cases, none of the ﬁrst
order moments of ZITs versus real data will be equal. We therefore claim
that stylized facts produced by means of ZIT agents are useless for ﬁnancial
engineering.
Our results lie in the strand of literature of ZIT, which we review in
section 3.1. We are interested not only in coarse grain, qualitative empirical
regularities, but also in the actual ability of ZIT at generating quantitatively
acceptable stylized facts. For that purpose, we produce several families of ZIT
agents (introduced in section 3.2) similar to those found in the literature, but
calibrated using real market data. Section 3.3 puts forwards an introductory
case study, presents the core results and proposes a sensitivity analysis of the
latter.
3.1 Literature survey
Stylized facts are diﬃcult to explain by the mainstream theory and the eﬀort
in empirical research to describe data lacks of a convenient theoretical foun-
dation of these facts. However, an alternative approach has emerged from
econophysics which described the same ﬁnancial facts as scaling laws. Indeed,
this approach considers that physical systems which consist of a large number
of interacting particles obey universal scaling laws that are independent of
the microscopic details and that economics could be considered in the same
way as Amaral, Cizeau, Gopikrishnan, Liu, Meyer, Pend and Stanley (1999).
The approach seems to imply that the rational individual choice seems not
important in explaining facts. But, as Lux (2009) points out, it might be
the heterogeneity of market participants together with a few basic principles
of interactions which may exert a dominating inﬂuence on the macroscopic
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market behavior in more or less the same way in diﬀerent institutional set-
tings. Indeed a large literature has emerged which aims at discerning among
two major explanations: market micro-structure and agents' behavior and
heterogeneity.
Papers in favor of the explanation by the microstructure initiate with
the research on Zero Intelligent Traders (here-after ZIT) of Gode and Sunder
(1993) who show that traders acting randomly but within a budget constraint
act comparably well in terms of convergence to equilibrium price and eﬃciency
as compared to human subjects in experimental economics (see Smith (1962)).
Dave Cliﬀ (1997) show that for special demand or supply function this may not
be the case and a slightly more complex behavioral assumption is required to
achieve equilibrium in continuous double auction markets. Ladley and Schenk-
Hoppe (2009) in a similar framework as Gode and Sunder's one, but with a
constant ﬂux of traders entering the market, reproduce price movements and
show that aspects of the order book such as size of spreads and conditional
probabilities of order submissions can be obtained by the interplay of ZITs
and the book. The observed frequency of the diﬀerent order types submitted
seems however related to strategic behavior based on the observed book state.
Maslov (2000) introduces a model where traders randomly choose to trade
either at the market price or by placing a limit order. Maslov shows that fat
tails, long range correlation in the volatility and non-trivial Hurst exponents
arise in such framework. One paper by Farmer et al. (2005) shows that a
simple ZIT model working as a continuous double auction with both market
and limit orders predicts well bid-ask spreads, price diﬀusion rates and market
impact function related to the supply and demand of 11 stocks in the Lon-
don Stock Exchange. Their conclusion is that the price formation mechanism
strongly constrains the market, playing a more important role than strategic
behavior. They adjust their model to real data by making simple assump-
tions about order placement, canceling process of limit orders and ticks (price
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increments). These quantities are estimated on a daily basis from the real
stocks and serve to make predictions. Nevertheless, their framework exhibits
odd assumptions such as an order issuing based on log prices rather than raw
prices and various Poisson laws.
Other studies have shown that stylized facts can be reproduced by the
behavioral assumptions of agents and heterogeneity of behavior. Most of
these models (LeBaron et al., 1999; Hommes, 2006; Lux, 2009) suggest that
the aggregation of simple interactions at the micro level leads to complex non
linear behavior at the macro level. Typically, the heterogeneity of behavior
is due to diﬀerent types of rationality (informational and computational) and
heterogeneity in preferences as well.
The experimental economics literature also tackles some issues concerning
stylized facts. Early experiments have already shown how easily it is to re-
produce bubbles in double auction markets (Smith, Suchanek and Williams,
1988). Bubbles are resilient to market conditions such as short selling , mar-
gin buying opportunities, limit price-change rules, informed insider trading
(King, Smith, Williams and Bening, 1993).
Plott and Sunder (1982) are the ﬁrst to report some stylized facts within
the lab without however providing any explanation about it. They show excess
kurtosis and lack of autocorrelation of returns in prices. Kirchler M. (2007)
presents an explanation based on asymmetric information between traders in
a double auction markets. Typically they introduce a market characterized by
heterogeneous traders concerning information. They show that the heteroge-
neous fundamental information is the source of fat tails and absolute returns
whereas higher noise trading (trading not based on fundamentals) does not
explain absolute returns.
To the best of our knowledge, only one paper (Liu, Gregor and Yang,
2008) tries to reconcile two streams of literature by suggesting that diﬀerent
elements can be at the heart of stylized facts emergence in diﬀerent time hori-
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zons. Liu et al. (2008) show that a market microstructure and zero intelligent
agents are responsible for reproducing leptokurtosis and heavy-tailed distri-
butions, autocorrelation and excess volatility for intradays data. However,the
microstructure is only responsible for excess volatility in daily returns. There-
fore, behavioral assumptions are required to explain other facts.
3.2 Simulation methodology
In this section we introduce four diﬀerent types of ZITs. For the sake of
possible replication of the results presented in this research, the pseudo-code
describing each agent is available in Appendix A.2.
3.2.1 Calibration elements: agent's behavior
The most basic ZITs we use (called hereafter Unconstrained ZIT) are di-
rectly inspired by the work of Maslov (2000). From this starting point, we
progressively add constraints to their allowed behavior in accordance with the
real market data with the aim of reproducing quantitatively some stylized
facts. Notice that we denote, in the following developments, by capital letters
all real market data (P, V,R, for example resp prices, volumes and returns)
and by small letters all simulated data.
Except when a cancel instruction is issued, the trading activity consists in
sending to the market an order made of a direction, a price limit (except when
this order is a market order), and a quantity. The common characteristics for
all of our ZITs, whatever their level of constraints, are as follows:
 The proportion between diﬀerent order types is 80% of limit orders,
15% of market orders and 5% of cancel orders which reﬂects realistic
characteristics of real markets. These ﬁgures were obtained from a data
set of real order ﬂows gathering around 36000 observations of intraday
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trading (courtesy of Calyon SA, here-after CDS, for Calyon Data Set).
They may vary from a given stock to another and across categories of
investors (Foucault, 1999; Handa and Schwartz, 2006). Furthermore,
this proportion is modiﬁed in the sensitivity analysis (see page 127).
 Each agent can submit both orders, Buy and Sell.
 Buy and Sell orders arise with equal probability (p = 0.5).
 A single asset is traded.
 Budget constraints are implemented: agents cannot make a trade that
yields a negative proﬁt, i.e., buyers cannot buy at a price higher than
their reservation value and sellers cannot sell for a price below their
marginal cost.
 Within each ZIT family, we deﬁne two subcategories of agents with
respect to the real market average volume observed for a given stock.
Big ﬁshes draw volumes between the mean and the maximum real
volume , while Small ﬁshes, draw this value between the minimum
and the mean real volume. The reason for this choice is that it may
generate a realistic picture of contemporary markets, where, in a typical
experiment, the ratio of big to small ﬁshes is 1 over 5. This proportion
is also obtained from the CDS.
Note that all the parameters chosen for the initial settings of the simula-
tions are calculated based on real market data. These parameters are inferred
for each stock on each day.
In our simulations, we denominate ZIT artiﬁcial agents that mostly use
random number generators to determine prices and volumes in their orders.
These agents are more or less sophisticated but none of them use artiﬁcial
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intelligence methods such as classiﬁers or learning mechanisms to adapt their
behavior and/or to evolve. We thus do not claim to investigate all possible
extensions of ZITs but a series of models that are common in the literature.
 Unconstrained ZIT (UZIT ) with two types of price-generating processes:
 Uniform price distribution (UZITU , see algorithm 7, page 244):
pt is drawn from a Uniform distribution in [Pmin, Pmax] where, for
a reminder of the convention, Pmin and Pmax are the minimum,
respectively maximum price observed on the real market. These
values are determined at the beginning of trading day.
 Normal price distribution (UZITN , see algorithm 8, page 245): pt
is drawn from a Normal N(Pmean, Psd).
 Statistically calibrated ZIT (SZIT , see algorithm 9, page 245) are kind
of bounded UZITU , meaning that i) they still perform a random draw
from a Uniform distribution ii) the price range is limited by [Pmin, Pmax]
and iii) the range of admissible price is diﬀerent between Sellers and
Buyers, since we took for Sellers a simulated range for ask prices amin
and amax and for bid prices bmin and bmax. These simulated boundaries
are obtained from the CDS as mentioned previously. To go into the
details, we ﬁrst separate Bids and Asks and then ﬁnd for each of these
subsets the minimum and the maximum values observed on a given day.
Similarly, the same procedure was applied to volume data.
 Trend calibrated agents (TZIT , see algorithm 10, 246) are SZIT with
the following additional feature: when they issue a new order, they pick
a price that is formed using two additional parameters γt and δ. γt is
geared at reproducing the tendency of a given series. δt generates some
additional randomness. More precisely, TZIT agents are modeled in
the following way:
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 We divide the day into n sub-intervals. The number n inﬂuences
the accuracy of results. The larger the number of sub-intervals the
greater the ﬁtting accuracy of simulations.
 We compute min and max prices within each sub-intervals
 We choose the time period t (by ﬁxing the parameter θ) and apply
equations (3.1) to (3.4) to estimate prices.
We next consider the following example: on a given period, one observes
for a given stock a slow decay from a maximum to a minimum price.
This slow decay can be described using equations (3.1) to (3.4).
γ0 = 0 (3.1)
γt = γt−1 + (1/θ) with t ∈ [0, θ] (3.2)
δt ∼ logN(0, 1) (3.3)
Pt = Pmax + (Pmin − Pmax)× γt × δt (3.4)
Note that in equation 3.2, γt is an increasing step function from zero
to one with step size equal to θ. θ allows to track the underlying trend
with a certain level of accuracy. The bigger θ, the more accurate this
ﬁtting.
Thus, the behavior of these agents necessitates to specify within a given
day n sub-periods and, for each of these sub periods, the maximum and
the minimum price. The precision in this procedure can be tuned so
as to track more or less closely the underlying dynamics. n = 50 is
the value arbitrarily chosen for the experiments. Note that equation 3.4
implies that the ﬁrst price set by this category of agents is close to Pmax,
for this example of a slow decay in prices.
Based on these information, agents can track the global price tendency
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Figure 3.1: Example of calibration procedure, Renault SA. SPn: Subperiod
n
so as to algorithmically grasp the underlying dynamics (see Figure 3.1).
So to speak, we endow TZITs with limited foreseeing capabilities in the
very short run.
 Inspired by the procedure introduced by Farmer et al. (2005), the fourth
category of ZIT agents is characterized by their relative aggressiveness
(AZIT , see algorithm 11, 247):
 Patient agents (AZITP ): send limit buy orders with prices drawn
from a uniform distribution between zero and amin and limit sell
orders from bmax to ∞. amin and bmax are inferred as described for
SZIT . These agents are parameterized in such a way that they
cannot trade one with other. Note that in Farmer et al. (2005)
log prices and not prices where drawn from a Uniform distribution.
Trades cannot occur within this population. The quantity is deter-
mined randomly using a uniform distribution between two integers
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min(V ) and max(V ).
 Impatient ZIT (AZITI): send market orders using the same distri-
bution for quantities as Patient ZIT.
There are 85% of AZITP and 15% of AZITI in a typical simulation, these
ﬁgures corresponding roughly to the proportion of market vs. limit orders in
real markets. The quantity posted by AZITP is twice the quantity posted by
AZITI .
3.3 Empirical design and results
We introduce a case study to illustrate the main concepts and statistics used
in the empirical part of this research and then generalize our results.
3.3.1 An introductory case study
In this section, we focus on a single stock (Renault SA) for a single day (August
1, 2002) and compare simulated vs. real data in terms of price dynamics and
stylized facts. It is clear that the return series coming from Renault S.A.
prices is not normal. Moreover, it exhibits fat tails and the autocorrelation in
absolute returns decays slowly in log-log scale (see Figures 3.2(a) to 3.2(d)).
To assess the Volume-Volatility relationship we use the following, simpliﬁed
framework:
1. We ﬁrst slice the series in non overlapping time windows containing 300
observations. Depending upon the length of the series under investiga-
tion, the number of time windows may vary slightly.
2. We calculate for each of these slices and each artiﬁcial series produced
by the agents, two indicators: the mean volume over this period (mvt)
and the standard deviation of these returns (sdt).
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Figure 3.2: Renault SA intraday returns, departure from Normality. Intraday
data on August 1, 2002
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Figure 3.3: Qualitative Stylized facts, Uncalibrated ATOM ZIT (UZITU).
ATOM generated intraday returns with calibration to Renault SA on August
1, 2002. Experiment settings: Pmin = 45.2, Pmax = 47.83, Vmin = 1, Vmax =
8075
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Figure 3.4: Intraday volumevolatility relationship
3. We then estimate a linear model:
sd′t ∼ α + φˆmv
′
t (3.5)
We use the value of φˆ for comparing the volume volatility relationship
between simulated and real data. In doing so, and for the sake of sim-
plicity, we explicitly exclude from the analysis the value of the constant
α (said in diﬀerent terms, we consider this constant as similar for both
models).
This process is used in this article whenever the volume-volatility relationship
is investigated. For example, this relationship for Renault is presented in
Figure 3.4(a). The value of the regression slope is 1.3086E-6. The same Figure,
(see Figures 3.4(b)) is also produced using Unconstrained ZITU agents.
In Table 3.1 we report a series of univariate statistics illustrating some of
the stylized facts analyzed in this research.
Even if several stylized facts are reproduced by UZITU , TZIT or even
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Real UZITU UZITN SZITU TZIT AZIT
nobs(1) 2214 2302 2273 2222 2219 2005
Minimum(2) -0.0085 -0.0211 -0.0156 -0.0232 -0.0151 -0.0900
Maximum(3) 0.0170 0.0233 0.0153 0.0279 0.0157 0.0900
Mean(4) -1.30E-05 6.00E-06 -2.00E-06 -8.00E-06 -1.40E-05 -2.64E-04
Stdev(5) 0.0011 0.0035 0.0036 0.0050 0.0019 0.0163
Skewness(6) 1.5192 0.1071 -0.0216 0.1130 0.1471 0.2351
Kurtosis(7) 33.1606 10.0905 3.6706 5.2325 12.1035 9.8945
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics. (1): number of observations; 2214 means for
example 2214 returns for the given trading day. (2),(3) ,(4) ,(5) ,(6) ,(7): minimum,
maximum, and moments for observed returns.
AZIT , one should also consider the underlying price dynamics from which
these statistics are computed. In Figure 3.5, we report the prices coming from
the real market (Subﬁgure 3.5(a)) and for the ﬁve families of ZIT (Subﬁgure
3.5(b) to 3.5(f)). It is clear that most of the ZIT families, beyond their
apparent ability to generate congruent stylized facts, have a hard time at
producing realistic price dynamics. The only possible exception, even if
this can be discussed, is the TZIT example that produces a price dynamics
that looks like, at coarse grain, the real one.
In summary, we point out two shortcomings in the use of ZIT for ﬁnancial
markets simulations: i) The adequacy of stylized facts generated by ZIT with
regard to the quantitative values of observed stylized facts coming from real
data is questionable. ii) The underlying price motion remains most of the
time totally unrealistic from a qualitative point o view.
In the following section, we present a procedure enabling us to make a
comparison between a set of 37 real data and diﬀerent simulations from the
ﬁve ZIT families described section 3.2.1.
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Figure 3.5: Intraday price dynamics, real vs simulated. ATOM generated
intraday returns with calibration to Renault SA on August 1, 2002. Ex-
periment settings: Pmin = 45.2, Pmax = 47.83, Vmin = 1, Vmax = 8075,
Pmean = 46.88915, Psd = 0.6015639, amin = 45.2, amax = 50, bmin = 30.3,
bmax = 47.83, the number of prices is 2215, the number of sliced windows is
50.
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3.3.2 Beyond the case study: zero is not enough
Our data consists in intraday prices collected from the Paris Euronext Stock
Exchange covering 37 stocks in August 2002 (22 trading days). These stocks
are components of the CAC 40 index and are therefore amongst the most
traded within the French market. In table 3.2 we show a summary of the
data including information regarding the trading activity (number of trades
per stock family and exchanged volumes).
For each day and each of the i = 37 stocks in the sample we produce a
set of 5 simulations with the 4 diﬀerent ZIT families (2 uncalibrated ZITS,
statistically calibrated, Trend ZITs, Agressive ZITs) described in section 3.2.1.
Notice again that ZIT agents are calibrated using real values calculated from
the sample.
For each simulation, we produce one concatenated return series based on
the 22 simulated days. To avoid closing-to-opening jumps due to overnight
information accumulation, we exclude returns that can be computed using
closing prices at date t and opening prices at date t + 1. In other terms,
the 22 days for each stock are summarized in j = 1 long time series. Note
that the same concatenation procedure is run over the real dataset. We thus
have k = 6 subsets, 1 from real data, 5 from simulated ones. The dataset is
therefore equivalent to a i = 37× j = 1× k = 6 tensor.
For each of these simulations, we estimate, over the 37 observations, the
distribution for the following statistics calculated on returns:
1. Mean
2. Standard deviation
3. Skewness
4. Kurtosis
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Prices Volume
Name Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Accor 1587 447 938 2345 525 144 357 889
Air France-KLM 822 269 416 1426 332 101 182 623
Air Liquide 2279 736 1161 3685 150 29 112 251
Alcatel 6294 2178 3252 10488 1616 349 1059 2678
Axa 6440 1806 3394 9596 1583 231 1182 2107
BNP 4236 1041 2277 6387 848 122 639 1205
Bouygues 1411 368 728 1962 671 468 357 2719
Cap Gémini 1801 414 1087 3041 508 99 355 687
Carrefour 3782 1119 1849 5912 634 150 455 1090
Credit Agricole 2187 607 1108 3523 1116 1960 390 9828
Danone 2236 549 1208 3274 266 40 208 358
Dexia 1212 410 599 2290 1465 289 931 2009
EADS 1579 379 1165 2459 1051 284 722 1898
Essilor Int. 450 135 189 761 485 205 246 1052
France Télécom 7044 2271 3442 12554 1034 180 699 1524
L'Oréal 3068 814 1800 5628 437 83 288 602
Lafarge 1674 468 883 2388 397 347 221 1924
Lagardère Groupe 1024 231 578 1506 439 285 260 1671
LVMH 2706 852 1620 4942 572 254 392 1622
Michelin 1030 263 567 1666 555 522 284 2822
Pernod Ricard 498 167 260 885 333 258 136 1425
Peugeot S.A. 1712 497 1093 2921 605 381 338 2240
PPR 2518 1001 1180 6246 290 125 184 758
Publicis Groupe SA 770 215 464 1188 772 260 449 1639
Renault 1785 283 1408 2299 534 145 356 1084
Saint Gobain 3166 1089 1679 5363 720 166 477 1138
Sanoﬁ Synthé labo 3023 771 1941 4718 594 101 434 760
Schneider 1361 438 597 2297 482 88 327 663
Société Générale 3342 922 1633 5311 560 115 417 795
STMicroelectronics 4160 1058 2060 6404 1185 161 861 1533
Suez Lyonnaise 4139 1165 1857 6051 812 77 635 993
Thomson CSF 730 180 362 1154 461 457 263 2488
Total 5269 1321 2613 7667 535 164 391 1230
Unibail-Rodamco 251 102 63 444 234 78 83 421
Veolia Environnement 1930 925 937 4355 898 262 510 1400
Vinci 1150 287 513 1605 309 88 198 482
Vivendi Universal 9400 5956 3755 23318 1220 269 803 2012
Table 3.2: Data: Univariate Statistics Summary
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5. ρ1 and ρ2, the ﬁrst two values for autocorrelation coeﬃcients computed
using raw returns
6. The slope of the decay function for autocorrelation coeﬃcients calculated
over absolute returns.
7. The value of φˆ (see equation 3.5) indicating the direction and the
strength of the volume volatility relationship.
We then run two series of non-parametric tests using one simulation and
real data as a benchmark to: i) test equality in population distribution (two-
sample KS test). For two distributions D1 and D2, the null is that D1 and D2
come from the same distribution. ii) test equality in means (Fligner-Policello
test, which is the equivalent to the Mann-Whitney test but without assuming
equality in variance, and paired Wilcoxon test). For two distributions D1 and
D2, the null is that D1 and D2 have the same mean value.
These tests are geared at appreciating whether the quantitative stylized
facts are reproduced or not by means of ZITs.
For illustration purposes, a limited example of the distribution over the 37
samples of each characteristic value for stylized facts calculated on TZIT is
plotted against the corresponding values calculated with real data in Figure
3.6.
We ﬁrst report a series of non-parametric tests geared at examining
whether the whole distribution of each stylized fact (summed-up with a single
parameter) is similar to the distribution of the corresponding stylized facts
calculated from the real world distributions.
Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality in distribution is pre-
sented in Table 3.3. The results are rather unambiguous: except for the
single case of the distribution of mean returns generated by Trend Calibrated
ZIT (TZIT ) (see ﬁgure 3.6(a)) and for the volume/volatility relationship for
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Figure 3.6: Stylized facts distributions for TZIT , real (solid lines) vs simu-
lated (dash lines). The distribution is based on 37 statistics of ATOM sim-
ulated series (generated with 4 families of ZITs) and intraday concatenated
data of 37 real stocks.
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UZITU and UZITN , the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoﬀ test can be rejected
with high levels of conﬁdence. The interpretation is straightforward: neither
higher moments nor autocorrelation-based stylized facts can be matched by
any of our ZIT families. However, unconstrained ZITs, probably due to their
high level of freedom, generate a realistic relationship between the average
volume traded and the resulting average volatility observed within the same
time window. One can also notice that when ZITs are more and more con-
strained, this stylized fact, if still noticeable, does no longer ﬁt the values of
our benchmark.
If we restrict our attention on ﬁrst order moments, and check equality of
means for these moments between simulated and real data by the use of a
Fligner-Policello test (see Fligner and Policello (1981)), we get the following
results (see table 3.4).
Here again, the tests reject the ability of our ZIT families at reproducing
quantitative stylized facts. The only cases where these tests cannot be rejected
are those of UZITU , UZITN , SZIT for the skewness distribution and for the
value of the volume/volatility relationship, and TZIT for the mean. Said
diﬀerently, the ﬁrst three categories of agents might do a relative good job
at generating realistic third-order moments for the return distribution and,
as mentioned previously, in delivering a realistic volume/volatility interplay.
However, in these tables only the mean of each parameter distribution is
tested against its real-world counterpart. If the test cannot be rejected the
only think we can conclude is that the central values of the distribution are
not so diﬀerent. In our opinion, this is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition
to accept a family of Agents. For example, if one considers the distribution
of the Skewness for UZITU against the real series, the equality of the means
cannot be rejected (see Table 3.4 and 3.5) although it is clear that the whole
distribution is diﬀerent (see ﬁgure 3.7).
Rejection for TZIT may be more surprising since they were constrained
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Skewness for UZITU dash line vs. Real World
series solid line
to generate more realistic price dynamics, nevertheless, they were not able
to reproduce ﬁrst orders moments beyond the mean. Even if skewness is
an important feature of ﬁnancial distributions (notably important for asset
managers), given the overall negative conclusions drawn on other moments
and correlations of the distributions, this is a rather weak result.
If we go further in the analysis with a paired Wilcoxon rank test, TZIT is
now rejected while none of the skewness-related tests are rejected at the 5%
threshold.
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Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis ρ1 ρ2 Slope φˆ
UZIT aU D 0.4865 0.9189 0.4324 0.4865 0.9459 1.0000 1.0000 0.2162
p.value 0.0002 0.0000 0.0017 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3565
UZIT bN D 0.5676 0.6757 0.3784 0.4595 0.9459 1.0000 1.0000 0.1892
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5279
SZIT c D 0.4324 0.9459 0.3243 0.5135 0.9189 1.0000 0.9730 0.2973
p.value 0.0017 0.0000 0.0402 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0757
TZIT d D 0.1892 0.6486 0.3784 0.4324 0.8919 0.9189 0.7838 0.3514
p.value 0.5279 0.0000 0.0094 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0201
AZIT e D 0.9459 0.3514 0.5676 0.9189 0.7027 0.7027 0.3243 0.6757
p.value 0.0000 0.0201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0402 0.0000
Table 3.3: Two-Sample Kolmogorov Smirnov Tests. Signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level. ATOM generated intraday returns
with calibration to Renault SA on August 1, 2002. Experiment settings: a basic design of UZITU , Pmin = 45.2, Pmax =
47.83, Vmin = 1, Vmax = 8075. b basic design of UZITN , Pmean = 46.88915, Psd = 0.6015639, Vmin = 1, Vmax = 8075. c
basic design of SZIT , amax = 50, bmin = 30.3, bmax = 47.83. d basic design of TZIT , the number of sliced windows is
50. e basic design of impatient agents AZITI , order volume is 250; basic design of patient agents AZITP , order volume is
500. The number of impatient agents is 30, the number of patient agents is 170. The number of prices is 2215.
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Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis ρ1 ρ2 Slope φˆ
UZITU Mean 1.276E-7 0.0035 -0.0001 17.7071 -0.3015 -0.0781 -0.0035 4.288E-6
U* -5.6787 -40.3570 1.5459 3.6420 25.6899 −∞ ∞ -0.3682
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1221 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7127
UZITN Mean 1.754E-7 0.0022 -0.0119 19.6185 -0.3001 -0.0746 -0.0035 1.912E-6
U* -5.9756 -8.9075 1.6285 3.0100 25.4974 −∞ ∞ -0.9570
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1034 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3385
SZIT Mean -1.395E-6 0.0040 -7.5817 2221.9776 -0.2809 -0.0800 -0.0033 5.725E-6
U* -4.2283 -39.8479 0.9062 3.6821 12.4847 −∞ 17.5064 0.0049
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3648 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9960
TZIT Mean -1.747E-6 0.0008 -0.1787 40.6920 -0.1526 -0.1349 -0.0030 2.781E-6
U* -0.9957 7.3446 3.3761 -3.8624 -16.1067 -32.4546 8.1609 2.3564
p.value 0.3194 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0184
AZIT Mean -4.035E-5 0.0010 -16.9185 2739.8962 -0.1996 -0.1997 -0.0017 6.623E-7
U* 155.6127 2.4828 4.3272 -20.2753 -2.6619 -2.6619 -2.4313 -8.8679
p.value 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0078 0.0078 0.0150 0.0000
Real Mean -2.656E-6 0.0012 0.1441 25.8839 -0.2137 -0.2137 -0.0018 2.816E-6
Table 3.4: Fligner Policello Test. Signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level. ATOM generated intraday returns with calibration
to Renault SA on August 1, 2002. Experiment settings: a basic design of UZITU , Pmin = 45.2, Pmax = 47.83, Vmin = 1,
Vmax = 8075. b basic design of UZITN , Pmean = 46.88915, Psd = 0.6015639, Vmin = 1, Vmax = 8075. c basic design of
SZIT , amax = 50, bmin = 30.3, bmax = 47.83. d basic design of TZIT , the number of sliced windows is 50. e basic design
of impatient agents AZITI , order volume is 250; basic design of patient agents AZITP , order volume is 500. The number
of impatient agents is 30, the number of patient agents is 170. The number of prices is 2215.
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Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis ρ1 ρ2 Slope φˆ
UZITU Mean 1.276E-7 0.0035 -0.0001 17.7071 -0.3015 -0.0781 -0.0035 4.288E-6
W 69.0000 5.0000 458.0000 576.0000 702.0000 0.0000 703.0000 720.000
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1105 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7068
UZITN Mean 1.754E-7 0.0022 -0.0119 19.6185 -0.3001 -0.0746 -0.0035 1.913E-6
W 76.0000 44.0000 468.0000 536.0000 702.0000 0.0000 703.0000 774.0000
p.value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.338
SZIT Mean -1.395E-6 0.0040 -7.5817 2221.9776 -0.2809 -0.0800 -0.0033 5.726E-6
W 115.0000 4.0000 449.0000 584.0000 665.0000 0.0000 702.0000 684.0000
p.value 0.0002 0.0000 0.1448 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1
TZIT Mean -1.747E-6 0.0008 -0.1787 40.6920 -0.1526 -0.1349 -0.0030 2.781E-6
W 154.0000 677.0000 532.0000 98.0000 12.0000 0.0000 679.0000 473.0000
p.value 0.0023 0.0000 0.0056 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0219
AZIT Mean -4.035E-5 0.0010 -16.9185 2739.8962 -0.1996 -0.1997 -0.0017 6.623E-7
W 703.0000 516.0000 616.0000 1.0000 183.0000 184.0000 239.0000 1191.0000
p.value 0.0000 0.0121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101 0.0106 0.0913 0.0000
Real Mean -2.656E-6 0.0012 0.1441 25.8839 -0.2137 -0.2137 -0.0018 2.816E-6
Table 3.5: Paired Wilcoxon Tests. Signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level. ATOM generated intraday returns with calibration
to Renault SA on August 1, 2002. Experiment settings: a basic design of UZITU , Pmin = 45.2, Pmax = 47.83, Vmin = 1,
Vmax = 8075. b basic design of UZITN , Pmean = 46.88915, Psd = 0.6015639, Vmin = 1, Vmax = 8075. c basic design of
SZIT , amax = 50, bmin = 30.3, bmax = 47.83. d basic design of TZIT , the number of sliced windows is 50. e basic design
of impatient agents AZITI , order volume is 250; basic design of patient agents AZITP , order volume 500. The number of
impatient agents is 30, the number of patient agents is 170. The number of prices is 2215.
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3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis: the importance of model pa-
rameters
A variety of factors may have an eﬀect on the results presented above. This
section is dedicated to a discussion on two factors that may aﬀect notably our
results: i) the impact of the proportion of Big ﬁshes vs. Small ﬁshes and
ii) the role of the ratio Limit to Market orders. To address these points,
we ﬁrst vary only one of these parameters while the other stays constant. We
then report the impact of these variations on the market.
Note that TZIT are not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the variation in the
proportions of the two factors, but rather by the price trend itself. Among the
two remaining families, SZIT is the more driven by the dynamics of order
ﬂows, and thus is the best potential candidate for an eﬃcient calibration
through both factors. We have chosen to restrict the presentation of the
sensitivity analysis to the latter and to the AZIT inspired by the Farmer
model (Farmer et al., 2005). For the latter, we vary the proportion of
patient vs. impatient agents in the population.
In table 3.6, we report the correlations between the model parameters and
the statistical properties tracked throughout this essay.
i) Big ﬁshes / Small ﬁshes : The results in table 3.6 clearly show that
except for the mean, which is insensitive to the modiﬁcation of the model
parameters, all other stylized facts do react in some way to the latter. Even if
the correlation coeﬃcients may be relatively small (ranging from -0.5781 for
the Kurtosis to 0.5876 for the slope), all of them are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. However, if volatility tends to increase with this ratio (the correlation
coeﬃcient being equal to 0.5744), kurtosis tends to decrease (coef = -0.5781).
Big ﬁshes, due to the large trading volume they can generate, provide a siz-
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Statistics Big/Small ﬁshes Limit/Market Impatient Patient
proportiona proportionb Agents Agents
Mean corr. 0.3216 0.1408 -0.1551 0.1848
p− value 0.1250 0.2414 0.2493 0.1942
SD corr. 0.5744 -0.9759 0.2259 -0.6677
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.0911 0.000
Skewness corr. -0.05648 0.1688 0.0990 -0.0597
p− value 0.000 0.1593 0.4637 0.000
Kurtosis corr. -0.5781 -0.1872 -0.5669 0.2283
p− value 0.000 0.1179 0.000 0.1070
ρ1 corr. 0.4663 -0.7495 0.6469 -0.7771
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ρ2 corr. 0.1470 0.0580 -0.7164 0.6859
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Slope corr. 0.5876 -0.5572 0.0339 -0.2688
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.8021 0.0564
φˆ corr. -0.3429 0.0571 0.0084 -0.3503
p− value 0.000 0.6358 0.9502 0.0117
Table 3.6: Linear correlation coeﬃcient of model parameters and stylized
facts. 100 replications for each parameter set have been conducted. Each
value is an averaged result. a Experiment settings: basic design of SZIT .
The number of Small Fishes is ﬁxed as 200, while the number of Big Fishes
varies from 0 to 200. b Experiment settings: basic design of SZIT . The
proportion of Cancel orders is ﬁxed, ∆C = 5. The proportion of Limit orders
∆L varies from 60 to 95 percent, and proportion of Market orders is deﬁned
according to formula ∆M = 100−∆L−∆C . Signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level.
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zling amount of liquidity that directly beneﬁts to Small ﬁshes. In other words,
Big ﬁshes feed Small ﬁshes. Thus, Small ﬁshes can easily buy or sell stocks
with a price close to the current market price, until a big order is completely
executed. When the number of Big ﬁshes signiﬁcantly increases, these big
players loose their role of liquidity providers, as they trade more frequently
within their own group.
Increasing the proportion of Big ﬁshes has also a positive eﬀect on the slope
of the decay function for autocorrelation coeﬃcients calculated over absolute
returns (correlation coeﬃcient equals 0.5876). This result may suggest that
the more Big ﬁshes in the market, the more likely the emergence of volatility
clusters.
In summary the fact that we observe signiﬁcant correlations in that case in-
dicates that ﬁnding the appropriate proportion of Big ﬁshes vs. Small ﬁshes
might be a route to quantitatively ﬁt stylized facts observed on real markets
using ZITs. However, we were unable in our simulations to ﬁnd that ideal
mix which would have led to the perfect emergence of the whole set of stud-
ied stylized facts. In fact it seems a rather impossible task to ﬁt most of the
stylized fact by varying only one parameter. Moreover, the point is not to
ﬁnd the proportion which would ﬁt theses stylized facts but rather to show
that within a reasonable range corresponding to what is commonly observed
on the market, this is not the case.
ii) Limit / Market orders : From the same table 3.6, one can notice that
the proportion of limit to market orders has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on most
of the studied stylized facts except the Skewness, the Kurtosis and the vol-
ume/volatility relationship.
Concerning the Standard deviation (SD), the correlation coeﬃcient is close to
-1. This result was expected: on the one hand, traders supply liquidity by
posting limit orders and, on the other hand, demand liquidity by submitting
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market orders that yield immediate partial or full execution. Thus, a large
proportion of limit orders provides an important liquidity on both sides of the
order book (Bids and Asks). On the contrary, a market order is immediately
executed against order(s) standing in the limit order book: it moves the mar-
ket by walking up or down the limit order book. Clearly, the proportion of
Limit/Market orders has a signiﬁcant impact on market volatility. A higher
proportion of limit orders stabilizes the market by decreasing the standard
deviation (correlation coeﬃcient = -0.9759).
The negative coeﬃcient for ρ1 (-0.7495) suggests that the more Limit orders,
the lower the auto-correlation of raw returns: this is a well-known fact related
to the Bid-Ask bounce.
To summarize, some important stylized facts (Skewness, Kurtosis and vol-
ume/volatility relationship) seem to be insensitive to the modiﬁcations of the
ratio Limit to Market orders. This indicates that ﬁtting with accuracy real-
world stylized facts is probably out of reach using this ratio alone.
iii) Patient/Impatient agents One can observe that increasing the num-
ber of these two categories of agents has a similar impact on various stylized
facts as the variation of the proportion between Limit and Market orders
does (see table 3.6). This result was expected since patient agents provide
liquidity while impatient agents demand liquidity.
We now explore the sensitivity of the studied stylized facts to a modiﬁ-
cation of both parameters simultaneously using a regression approach. The
results are reported in Table 3.7. In this table, we report, for each depen-
dent variable (a stylized facts parameter), the estimate of the ordinary least
squares (OLS) parameter for our two independent variables (proportion of Big
vs. Small ﬁshes and proportion of Limit vs. Market orders). A panel data
compiling the outcomes of the 1000 replications of our analysis was collected.
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We then run multiple linear regressions on the parameter values to observe
their impact on empirical market outcomes. The general form of the model
is:
SF ∼ α + β1BvS + β2LvM (3.6)
In equation 3.6, SF is one of the stylized facts we study in this article, BvS
is the proportion of Big vs. Small ﬁshes and LvM the proportion of Limit
vs. Market orders.
One ﬁrst observes that all the values for β1 and β2 have non-zero values
(at the 1% level). A second observation is that all R2 coeﬃcients have decent
levels, ranging from 0.137 to 0.931. These results indicate that the levels of
each stylized facts can be explained to some extent by a combination of the
two ratios.
Unfortunately, the use of such relations to calibrate one ZIT model to the
real-world stylized facts appears rather complicated: for example in model 2
(SD), the eﬀects of β1 and β2 are similar whereas they are opposite for model
4 (Kurtosis). In other terms, ﬁne tuning SD may result in an incorrect level
of Kurtosis. The same problem can be identiﬁed comparing models 5 and 6
(ρi).
However, all these models make the assumption of multiple linear relations be-
tween independent and dependent variables although non-linearities between
the latter may exist.
In summary, here again we conclude to the high level of complexity for ﬁtting
real-world stylized facts only using the two ratios BvS and LvM within a ZIT
population.
A ﬁrst conclusion can be drawn from this sensitivity analysis : simulations
using ZIT should probably use the two leverages of the size of the traders and
the type of orders to calibrate the level of volatility. However, the relation-
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Model Statistics α β1 β2 R2
1 Mean 1.859E − 4 1.573E − 8 −2.137E − 6 0.301
< 2E − 16 < 2E − 16 < 2E − 16
2 SD 0.231 −2.300E − 5 −0.0025 0.931
< 2E − 16 < 2E − 16 < 2E − 16
3 Skewness 2.3831 0.0006 −0.0252 0.642
< 2E − 16 < 2E − 16 < 2E − 16
4 Kurtosis 5.7459 0.0143 −0.0469 0.137
3.09E − 11 < 2E − 16 1.59E − 5
5 ρ1 −0.2864 −0.0002 0.0015 0.324
< 2E − 16 < 2E − 16 < 2E − 16
6 ρ2 −0.0951 0.0002 −0.0011 0.259
< 2E − 16 < 2E − 16 < 2E − 16
7 Slope 1.542E − 4 −4.750E − 6 −6.467E − 6 0.247
0.4180 < 2E − 16 0.0074
8 φˆ 2.558E − 2 −1.130E − 5 −2.542E − 4 0.266
< 2E − 16 1.86E − 11 < 2E − 16
Table 3.7: Regression results for eﬀects of model parameters on stylized facts.
aSigniﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level. 1000 runs. A = 500  total number of agents
in population, ABig ∼ D(0, 500)  proportion of Big ﬁshes, ASmall = A−ABig
proportion of Small ﬁshes. The proportion of Cancel orders is ﬁxed, ∆C = 5.
The proportion of Limit orders ∆L ∼ D(60, 95), and proportion of Market
orders is deﬁned according to formula ∆M = 100 −∆L −∆C . Signiﬁcant at
the p < 0.05 level.
ship within the higher moments set seems to rely on a more subtle interplay:
increasing the volatility may well decrease the kurtosis of the series, and al-
ter in a rather complicated way the Skewness and other stylized facts. Said
diﬀerently, generating calibrated stylized facts all together using ZITs seems
hard to realize, if simply possible.
3.4 Conclusion
In the current work, we used a methodology based on artiﬁcial stock markets.
Typically, we ran experiments on an agent-based platform which microstruc-
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ture is close to the Paris NYSE-Euronext stock exchange to simulate the price
distribution of 37 stocks with the use of Zero Intelligence Traders (ZIT). Five
families of agents deriving from the ZIT deﬁnition were considered and all were
calibrated with the use of 37 real stocks data listed on the CAC 40 index. No-
tably, agents' choices were constrained by volume and prices exchanged on
the real market, and we tested for diﬀerent parametrizations either related
to existing procedures in the literature or by increasingly constraining agents
with respect to parameters of the real stocks.
The overall conclusion of this research is that none of the ZIT families can
really be considered as a candidate to duplicate quantitative stylized facts.
Furthermore, in most of the case (without calibration, TZIT for example)
price dynamics are completely unrealistic. This implies that these results
discard the use of such agents in quantitative ﬁnance.
So to speak, ZITs help in understanding at coarse grain what drives the
main stylized facts in actual price dynamics and can explain patterns in or-
ders submissions (notably in high frequency trading schemes). They also
qualitatively highlight that beyond behaviors, market microstructure does
matter. However, they are poor candidates for examining the dynamics of the
price time series. The amount of information on data necessary to reproduce
stylized facts (as for example with TZITs) seem outrageous and probably a
better avenue will be to explore behavioral issues. Thus we need more sophis-
ticated behaviors for artiﬁcial agents and/or strong calibrations processes as,
for example, by Johnson system (see Johnson (1949)), that could lead to good
replication of real data and predictive power of simulations. This is a neces-
sary step if one wants to use agent-based simulations in quantitative ﬁnance.
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Despite the common understanding that the market is populated by
traders with diﬀerent tastes, skills, and beliefs, most asset pricing models
are based on the so called representative agent models (see section 1.2.3
for details). Multi-agent simulations of ﬁnancial markets frequently address
investment problems by describing markets as complex systems of bounded
rational and heterogeneous agents (Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2006; Tefatsion
and Judd, 2006). This approach seeks to improve the traditional framework
by introducing more ﬂexible, robust, and realistic assumptions and to pro-
vide more powerful and sophisticated analysis tools for investment decision
making.
The contributions of agent-based models can be divided into two partially
overlapping classes (Anufriev, Bottazzi and Pancotto, 2006). The ﬁrst class
contains models where results come from a strict analytical investigation, like
in Chiarella and He (2001), or Chiarella and He (2002). The second class con-
sists of models based on the presentation and discussion of extensive computer
simulations, such as in Lux and Marchsi (1999), Farmer and Joshi (2000), and
Bottazzi et al. (2005). The research results presented in this chapter belong
rather to the second class of research contributions.
In this chapter we describe the implementation of mean-variance model
137
within agent-based framework. That allows us to introduce the heterogeneity
of the traders and to study their relative performance. In this work we use
dollar wealth and the Sharpe ratio as portfolio performance measures. De-
spite diﬀerent opinions about good sides and drawbacks of the Sharpe ratio,
it appears to be a standard measure for evaluating portfolio performance. We
also use the Sharpe ratio as a performance measure for better comparability
of results with previous research.
This thesis sheds some new light on the question: whether mean-variance op-
timization can be outperformed by simpler allocation strategies. Furthermore,
we examine what factors in the optimization are prominent for portfolio per-
formance. The study takes into account transaction costs incurred by portfolio
rebalancing. The results indicate that it is possible to achieve notably higher
wealth and the Sharpe ratio with portfolio optimization rules than by using a
naive strategy. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the risk aversion as well as rebalancing
frequency (or tolerance to deviation from target weights) signiﬁcantly aﬀect
portfolio performance.
The natural question is whether this heterogeneous population evolves
into homogeneous one, or whether one strategy dominates the market. To
answer these questions, we use computational simulation techniques allowing
the evolution of populations and their performance indicators. We compare
the relative performance of investment strategies using an ecological compe-
tition (Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1926) where populations of artiﬁcial investors
co-evolve. This research methodology is widely used to understand nonlinear
dynamical systems in which two or more species or agents interact through
competition for resources.
This chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe in section 4.1 the
implementation of mean-variance model in the ATOM framework. In sec-
tion 4.2, we propose a new analysis of the relative performance of investment
strategies, rational mean-variance portfolio optimization versus naive diversi-
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ﬁcation. Section 4.3 investigates the eﬀect of risk preferences on the survival
of agents in a long run. Section 4.4 presents how the rebalancing frequency af-
fects both the ﬁnal wealth and the Sharpe ratio in the presence of transaction
costs.
4.1 Implementation of Mean Variance Opti-
mization Model using ATOM
The mathematical basis of mean-variance optimization is detailed in the ap-
pendix A.3. As it is shown in the appendix A.3, the solution of mean variance
optimization problem can be derived analytically. The result depends on the
agent's expectations about the mean and the variance of the returns for the
next period, and individual agent's risk preferences. In this section, we show
how theoretical mean-variance optimization model can be implemented in the
artiﬁcial stock market framework.
4.1.1 Simulation Model
We consider a securities market populated by a ﬁnite number of traders with
heterogeneous preferences, indexed by i ∈ 1, 2, ...I. Time is discrete and in-
dexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... There is also a ﬁnite number of assets j ∈ 1, 2, ...J .
Traders come to the market with an initial amount of assets: trader i holds
the following combination of assets (qi,1, qi,2, ...qi,J), i = 1...I.
We denote investor i′s wealth at time t by W it :
W it =
∑
j=1,J
pj,t · q
i
j,t + C
i
t (4.1)
In equation 4.1, pj,t is the current market price of asset j at time t, and
qij,t is the quantity of assets j held by trader i at dime t, C
i
t is an available
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cash holding by agent i at t.
Agents, called mean-variance optimizer (or trader), endowed with this
strategy try to minimize risk for a given target return following the mean
(µ)  variance (σ2) optimization rules.
min
1
2
σ2p = min̟̟
TV ̟ (4.2)
µp = ̟
Tµ (4.3)
n∑
i=1
̟i = 1, ̟ = (̟1, ̟2, . . . , ̟n) (4.4)
where n  number of assets, µp  expected return of the portfolio, σp  standard
deviation of the portfolio, V  correlation matrix, ̟  target weights deﬁned
according to Markowitz rules. This program can deliver solutions outside the
range [0, 1] for the portfolio weights, which means that shorting is allowed.
This problem can be reformulated since each agent maximizes the mean-
variance utility of the next period total return
U(̟) = µp −
1
2
Aσ2p = ̟
Tµ−
1
2
A̟TV ̟ (4.5)
An important parameter in this process is the investor's risk aversion A. Note,
that in ATOM there exists also risk free asset yielding a zero percent interest
rate, actively bought by conservative agents.
Agent i computes the optimal allocation of wealth of the risky assets̟i,∗t =
(̟1,∗1,t , ̟
i,∗
2,t, ̟
i,∗
j,t ). This allocation is a reﬂect of the risk preferences or the rate
of risk aversion of an agent. Based on this information, a mean-variance
trader calculates a desired quantity of stock j required to adjust its portfolio
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to the ideal one.
qi,∗j,t =
̟i,∗j,t ·W
i
t
pj,t
(4.6)
Thus, to get as close as possible to the target weights deﬁning his optimal
portfolio, a trader i issues at date t buy or sell orders following these
rules: if the diﬀerence between the desired amount of stocks qi,∗j,t and the
amount qij,t−1 of stocks he actually hold is negative, he has to issue a sell order
(ask). Conversely, if this diﬀerence is positive, he has to issue a buy order
(bid). If there is no diﬀerence, the agent let his position unchanged. These
rules are described in Algorithm 1. Transaction costs are incurred in the
if qi,∗j,t − q
i
j,t−1 > 0 then
Send a Bid order
else if qi,∗j,t − q
i
j,t−1 < 0 then
Send a Ask order
else
Remain unchanged
Algorithm 1: Decision making process. qi,∗j,t  desired amount of asset j
at the moment of time t held by agent i, qij,t−1  real amount of stock j
held by agent i at the moment of time t− 1
purchase and sale of each security. The costs are proportional to the value of
each transaction vj,t = c×pj,t×|qij,t−q
i
j,t−1|, where pj,t denotes the price of the
jth security at time t; qij,t−1 is the current number of stocks j held by agent
j and the date t − 1; qij,t is the desired number of stocks j deﬁned according
by optimization rules by agent i at the period t; c are the transaction costs
of buying of selling. The total costs of portfolio rebalancing consisting m
security are T (v1, . . . , vm) =
∑m
j=0 vj,t, j = 1, . . . ,m ≤ J .
Another important question is how the limit price is determined. We
propose the procedure inspired by price setting principle described in Jacobs
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et al. (2004).
1. Bid price
PBidt = PBidt−1 + βt (4.7)
where PBidt−1 is the best bid price in the order book in t − 1; βt is a
random value in the range [1; 10]: it means that best bid price at the
moment t will be increased by value from 1 to 10 cents. PBid0 is equal
to the previous day closing price.
2. Ask price
PAskt = PAskt−1 + αt (4.8)
where PAskt−1 is the best ask price in the order book in t − 1; αt is a
random value with the range [1; 10]: it means that best ask price at the
time t will be decreased by value from 1 to 10 cents. PAsk0 is previous
day closing price.
In the condition of double auction market, a proﬁt-oriented buyer sets up the
price lower his limit price because there would be a seller willing to accept this
low bid price. Similarly, a seller sets a price higher his limit price, expecting
that there would be a bidder ready to accept a high ask price. In condition of
competitive market, the price comes closer to the market equilibrium price.
As long as the buyer can undercut a competitor and still make a proﬁt, he
will add some insigniﬁcant amount to the last best bid price, similarly, seller
will decrease the last best ask price by insigniﬁcant value, if it does not exceed
his limit price.
These trading rules lead to bid-ask spread. Moreover, if a trade is not
executed, the bids will tend upwards, and the asks will tend downwards until
a trade occurs. Such situations will arise in sharp increasing or decreasing
price dynamics. If there are some groups of agents with the same preferences,
they will issue orders to buy or sell the same assets. If these participants want
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to purchase a particular asset, they will send the bid orders one by one with
slightly increasing price. That will move price upwards. This is exactly the
case in the simulation of Jacobs et al. (2010). For this reason, they propose
an anchoring rule, limiting the emergence of such side eﬀect trends. These
rules become eﬀective when the security's price deviates too far from its recent
level. Jacobs et al. (2010) provide the possibility for users to set up the recent
value and the measure of maximum deviation from the recent level. For ask
orders, the anchoring rule limits the minimum price according to the following
formula PO,min = PR − cPL, where PR is a recent price, c is the user-speciﬁed
parameter, and PL is the average recent price or the standard deviation of
recent prices (as deﬁned by the user).
Inspired by the anchoring rules deﬁned by Jacobs et al. (2010) and observ-
ing the same phenomena in our early experiments, we introduce the anchoring
rules in our simulation in the following way (see algorithm 2).
if PBidt−Pinit
Pinit
> Λ then
PBidt = PBidt × (1−∆)
else if PAskt−Pinit
Pinit
< −Λ then
PAskt = PAskt × (1 + ∆)
end
Algorithm 2: Anchoring rule of price adjustment. At the beginning of
each day we set up the initial price Pinit, equals to the previous day
closing price. Λ is the possible "deviation" of the current price from the
initial one. ∆ is an adjustment parameter, ∆ > Λ, ∆.
After a series of simulations, we have observed that if all the market partic-
ipants are heterogeneous, then the market is active and stable. However, the
results change dramatically if agents are homogeneous. Mean-variance opti-
mizers are heterogeneous with respect to several characteristics (or attributes).
The ﬁrst one is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion A. It determines agents' at-
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titude toward risk. Agents with A = 0 are risk lovers or aggressive traders
while agents with A ≥ 1 are absolute risk averters (or conservative traders).
The literature provides a large range for risk aversion parameter estimation.
For example, the lowest risk aversion measure producing a proﬁt is found in
Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) and is equal to A = 0.3. Hansen
and Singleton (1982) deﬁne the possible ranges of risk aversion as 0.3502 and
0.9903. Gordon, Oaradis and Rorke (1972) use a risk aversion value between
0.6 and 1.4. Chen et al. (2007) deﬁne risk aversion in the range [0.5, 5] with
CRRA utility. Levy et al. (1995) investigate two groups of agents with risk
aversion measures equal to 0.5 and 3.5 (in a CRRA framework). Risk aversion
is equal to 18 in Obstfeld (1994), 30  in Kandel and Stambaugh (1991). Kall-
berg and Ziemba (1983) deﬁne the ranges for the risk aversion parameter for
a quadratic utility function as 0→∞. In this research, we consider the range
[0.1, 10] as representative of the diﬀerent levels mentioned in the literature.
The second component of agents heterogeneity that maintains market liq-
uidity and long-therm trading, is trading (or rebalancing) frequency Θ for
diﬀerent investors, said diﬀerently: agents rebalance their portfolios every Θ
rounds. This condition helps to avoid empty order books, which could result
from all orders cancellation by all agents at the same time. As noted in several
articles (Shatner et al., 2000; Hommes, 2006), the heterogeneity of time scale
for agents actions is the important feature for emergence of stylized facts.
The next parameter of heterogeneity is a source of information about future
asset returns and correlations. In ATOM there are two possibilities to get this
information. The ﬁrst one is to distribute exogenous information over agents.
This option is important for initialization of simulations. The other way is
to allow traders to calculate assets properties individually based on historical
closing prices. At the end of the day (or trading period) t, investor i observes
the time series (history) of assets Sjt−1 ≡ {P
j
n}
t−1
n=s, where s < t − 1, P
j
n is
the closing price of stock j at day n. Based on this information, the agent
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recalculates the expected return and the correlation matrix of assets that are
necessary for the weights calculation procedure. The length of historical data
set |(t−1)−s| used for statistical calculation is an individual agent parameter.
4.1.2 Basic example of trading
To demonstrate the application of previously described rules we propose to
consider following basic example.
1. Assets properties
Weekly data
E(R) =


A0 0.0001818194
A1 0.001121336
A2 0.0002112892

σ =


A0 0.01565114
A1 0.03523479
A2 0.02448014


Corr =


A0 A1 A2
A0 1.00000000 0.1473994 −0.02493462
A1 0.14739937 1.0000000 0.14394131
A2 −0.02493462 0.1439413 1.00000000


P =

 A0 A1 A2
53 33 30


The data for agents parametrization is described in the table 4.1
Name Markowitz0 Markowitz1 Markowitz2 Markowitz3
Assets quantity (44; 62; 68) (74; 92; 61) (96; 46; 17) (58; 90; 74)
Risk aversion 7.8 4.3 1.4 1
Initial cash 0 0 0 0
Frequency 1 1 1 1
Optimal weights


0.596087
0.159774
0.244139




0.540475
0.239173
0.220352




0.442361
0.379257
0.178384




0.131488
0.823101
0.045411


Table 4.1: Agents Initialization
The degree of risk aversion is deﬁned in the interval [0, 10]. The agent
Markowitz3 has a risk aversion equal to 1 and is thus a risk lover. He
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has an intention to invest a relatively large part of his wealth (0.8231009)
into high-risk Asset1. While, the agent Markowitz0 is risk reverter, his
degree of risk aversion is 7.8. This agent avoids risk and invests less into
high-risk Asset1.
2. Trading.
First of all, agents estimate the quantities for their optimal portfolios
according to equation 4.6. The ATOM scheduler randomly chooses an
agent to act. Since simulations are asynchronous, the agent should take
into account any price changes at any moment and the action of other
traders during their decision making.
The total wealth and the optimal allocation of the agent, named
Markowitz0, can be calculated in the following way:
W 00 = 44× 53 + 62× 33 + 68× 30 + 0 = 6418
q00,0 =
0.5960871×6484
53
= 73
q01,0 =
0.1597735×6484
33
= 31
q02,0 =
0.24413943×6484
30
= 53
SinceMarkowitz0 initially has 44 units of Asset0 and the optimal quan-
tity is 73, he should buy 29 units of Assets0, sell 31 units of Assets1
and 15 of Assets2.
We repeat the same procedure for other traders. The total wealth and
the optimal asset allocations of the agent Markowitz3 are as follows:
W 30 = 58× 53 + 90× 33 + 74× 30 + 0 = 8264
q30,0 =
0.13148814×8264
53
= 21
q31,0 =
0.8231009×8264
33
= 206
q32,0 =
0.04541096×8264
30
= 13
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Since Markowitz3 initially holds 58 units of Asset0, 90 units of Asset1,
and 74 units of Asset2, he should sell 37 units of Asset0 and 61 units of
Asset2, and buy 116 of Asset1.
As simulations are continuous, prices change in any moment, even if
not all agents have sent their orders during the current round. This
is inspired from the functionality of real markets, where the environ-
ment can change while participants make decisions. This is why agent
Markowitz1 should take into account the new prices of Asset0 and
Asset1, that stem from the orders issued by Markowitz0, Markowitz3
(see tables 4.2, 4.3). The total wealth and the optimal asset allocations
of agent Markowitz1 are as follows:
W 10 = 74× 53.4 + 92× 32.6 + 61× 30 + 0 = 7159.1
q10,0 =
0.540475×7159.1
53.4
= 72
q11,0 =
0.23917317×7159.1
32.6
= 53
q12,0 =
0.22035183×7159.1
30
= 53
From these equations and initial information in table 4.1, we conclude
that Markowitz1 should sell 2 units of Asset0, 39 units of Asset1, and
8 units of Asset2.
Markowitz2 calculates his current wealth and optimal asset allocations,
taking into consideration price changes resulting from orders issued by
Markowitz0, Markowitz1, Markowitz3:
W 20 = 96× 53.4 + 46× 32.6 + 17× 30 + 0 = 7136
q20,0 =
0.64913344×7136
53.4
= 87
q21,0 =
0.0840371×7136
32.6
= 18
q22,0 =
0.26682946×7136
30
= 64
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Markowitz1 should sell 9 units of Asset0 and 28 of Asset2, and buy 47
units of Asset1.
The prices of the orders are deﬁned according to the formulas 4.7 and 4.8.
For the moment, all order books are empty, and an initial set of prices
should be used for initializing the process. In this example, βt ∼ U(0, 10)
and αt ∼ U(0, 10): the agents can modify the current price from 0 to 10
cents. There are two realized trades concerning Asset0 and Asset1 (see
tables 4.2, 4.3) resulting from the ﬁrst round of trading.
Direction Quantity Price Agent ref. Fixed price Fixed quantity
B 29 53.4 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
A 37 53.0 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.4 29
A 8 53.0 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
A 2 52.7 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
A 9 53.0 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
B 6 53.6 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0 6
B 3 53.2 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 52.7 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0 1
B 4 53.9 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0 4
A 9 52.8 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
Table 4.2: Asset0
The second round runs with updated prices; moreover, the agents should
either update or remove their orders pending in the order books. For
this reason, the agents recalculate their wealth, and ﬁgure out how close
they are to the targets.
The agent Markowitz0 is quite close to his target weights, however, he
should make some adjustments:
W 01 = 73× 53.4 + 31× 32.6 + 68× 30 + 0 = 6948.8
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Direction Quantity Price Agent ref. Fixed price Fixed quantity
A 31 32.6 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
B 116 32.6 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 32.6 31
B 85 32.6 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
A 39 33.0 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
B 47 32.9 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
B 3 33.1 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 33.0 3
A 36 33.0 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
B 61 33.2 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 33.0 36
B 25 33.2 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
B 19 33.5 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
A 28 32.9 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 33.5 19
. . . . . . . . . . . . 33.2 9
B 16 33.2 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
Table 4.3: Asset1
q00,1 =
0.5960871×6948.8
53.4
= 78
q01,1 =
0.1597735×6948.8
32.6
= 34
q02,1 =
0.24413943×6948.8
30
= 57
During the second round, Markowitz0 should try to buy 6 units of
Asset0 and 3 units of Asset1, sell 9 units of Asset2.
The current portfolio of Markowitz3 is far from optimal weights.
W 31 = 21× 53.0 + 121× 33.0 + 71× 30.6 + 0 = 7278.6
q30,1 =
0.13148814×7278.6
53.0
= 18
q31,1 =
0.8231009×7278.6
33.0
= 182
q32,1 =
0.04541096×7278.6
30.6
= 11
Markowitz3 will buy 3 units of Asset0 and 61 units of Asset1, sell 60
units of Asset2
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Direction Quantity Price Agent ref. Fixed price Fixed quantity
A 61 29.5 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
A 15 29.1 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
A 8 30.2 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
A 28 30.6 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
B 9 30.5 Markowitz0 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 30.6 9
A 19 30.6 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
A 60 30.3 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
A 6 29.8 Markowitz1 . . . . . .
B 45 30.4 Markowitz2 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 29.8 6
. . . . . . . . . . . . 30.3 39
A 21 30.3 Markowitz3 . . . . . .
Table 4.4: Asset2
Markowitz1 recalculates his optimal allocations since the prices have
been changed.
W 11 = 74× 53.0 + 56× 33 + 61× 30.6 + 0 = 7636.6
q10,1 =
0.540475×7636.6
53.0
= 78
q11,1 =
0.23917317×7636.6
33
= 55
q12,1 =
0.22035183×7636.6
30.6
= 55
Markowitz1 should buy 4 units of Asset0 and 19 of Asset1, sell 6 units
of Asset2.
Markowitz2 updates his positions in the following way:
W 21 = 87× 53.0 + 46× 33.0 + 17× 30.6 + 477 = 7126.2
q20,1 =
0.64913344×7126.2
53.0
= 87
q21,1 =
0.0840371×7126.2
33.0
= 18
q22,1 =
0.26682946×7126.2
30.6
= 62
Markowitz1 should sell 9 units of Asset0 and 28 of Asset1, buy 45 units
of Asset2.
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The agents will repeat the same procedures over next trading rounds, un-
til all of them get their target portfolio weights and all traders are satisﬁed.
Hence, we can assume that after several trading rounds all traders will be
satisﬁed, thus there will be no trade any more. To avoid such unrealistic situ-
ation, one should introduce heterogeneous agents' populations with diﬀerent
beliefs, risk aversion degrees, rebalancing frequencies, trading strategies, and
so on.
4.1.3 Model validation
In this subsection we test the ability of mean-variance traders, introduced in
section 4.1.1, to maintain a long-run trading on the system, and to repro-
duce main stylized facts observed in real ﬁnancial time series in intraday as
well as in extraday time-frame. For this purpose, we investigate the pres-
ence of known stylized facts of ﬁnancial time series, i.e., volatility clustering
and fat tails in the distribution of returns. We run the experiments within
the three-asset limited framework. The following simulation assumptions are
considered. Hundred traders populate the market. At the beginning of the
simulations the agents get the information about expected returns, variances
and correlation matrices of stocks. Based on this information, agents calcu-
late the target weights and try to keep their portfolios closer to these target
weights over the next 200 days, that is regarded as trading period. After this
period of trading, the agents use recently generated prices to estimate the
information concerning the traded stocks. For sake of simplicity, we assume
that the information concerning the underlying probability distribution of se-
curities prices as well as current securities prices is perfect information that is
available continuously and costlessly to all investors.
One simulation day contains 50 rounds of preopening session, 1000
rounds of continuous trading, and 50 rounds of the closing session. Such time
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organization helps us control the rebalancing frequency of agents. Each agent
is attributed by parameter, trading frequency, θ ∼ U(1, 10000). It means that
there are some agents trading every day, while others reoptimize their port-
folios every 10 days. The agents are also heterogeneous with respect to their
attitude toward risk. The degree of risk aversion is uniformly distributed in
[0.1, 10]. 50 agents out of 100 are allowed to hold short position.
We reproduce the years of trading on the ﬁne grain level through intraday
trading. This feature provides us with an outstanding possibility to investi-
gate the stylized facts that require diﬀerent time granularity. For example,
aggregational gaussianity is observed when one increases the time scale △t
over which returns are calculated Cont (2001).
Figure 4.1 displays the intraday price series. We quantitatively (table 4.5)
and qualitatively (ﬁgure 4.2(b) and 4.2(c)) show the nongaussian behavior in
intraday returns. Figure 4.2(b) puts forward the deviation from normality,
especially sharp peaked distribution (for comparison, the solid line represents
the distribution of standard normal distribution); ﬁgure 4.2(c) clearly exhibits
fat tails. Kurtosis and skewness displayed in table 4.5 conﬁrm the deviation
from normality, as all kurtosis are far from their Gaussian values and positive
skewness exhibits gain/loss asymmetry in return distributions.
In ﬁgures 4.2(d) and 4.2(e), we present the autocorrelation C(τ) of the
raw returns and the absolute returns at diﬀerent time lags τ . While the
autocorrelation of raw returns exhibits rapid decay, the autocorrelation of the
absolute value of returns shows the presence of long-range correlations with
a very slow exponential decay. We can conclude that the simulated time
series exhibit the well known stylized fact of volatility clustering observed in
real-world markets.
Next, our research is conducted to examine the ability of mean-variance
artiﬁcial investors to generate the prices with realistic statistics in accordance
with theoretical and empirical researches on statistical return properties in
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Figure 4.1: Intraday price dynamics. Prices are generated by 100 mean-
variance optimizers, heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs, risk aversion
A ∼ U(0.1, 10), trading frequency θ ∼ U(1, 10000).
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Figure 4.2: Stylized facts for intraday prices. Prices are generated by 100
mean-variance optimizers, heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs, risk
aversion A ∼ U(0.1, 10), trading frequency θ ∼ U(1, 10000).
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Statistics Asset0 Asset1 Asset2
Minimum -0.03008936 -0.1920777 -0.0800427
Maximum 0.03008936 0.282567 0.08701138
Mean 4.182412e-05 -0.000438054 0.0001725323
Variance 0.0001120417 0.003788261 0.0004502855
Stdev 0.01058498 0.06154885 0.02121993
Skewness 0.07756422 0.07483113 0.1398351
Kurtosis 17.802075 11.49896 15.49548
ρ1 -0.0780217 -0.1637344 -0.1571716
ρ2 -0.07361454 -0.1166177 -0.1195904
Slope -0.0008539391 -0.001849647 -0.001875495
Table 4.5: Basic Statistics for indraday returns. Prices are generated by 100
mean-variance optimizers, heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs, risk
aversion A ∼ U(0.1, 10), trading frequency θ ∼ U(1, 10000).
extraday time frame.
Extraday trading
On the real market, investors characterized by mean-variance optimization
rules, limit their tradings only to a few orders per day. They use daily, weekly
or even annual returns data to estimate the volatility and correlations of
assets. In this subsection we examine the ability of mean-variance optimizers
to generate extraday price dynamics in line with real market. For this
purpose we extend previously described example to thousand of days. The
price series as well as long-returns are shown in ﬁgure 4.3.
We now test how the population of artiﬁcial traders is able to reproduce
the price dynamic with statistical properties close to the real one at a daily
horizon. First, we analyze the qualitative stylized facts. In Figures 4.4(i) and
4.4(j) we compare the autocorrelation functions of the absolute returns, these
results show the presence of long-range nonlinear correlations. The autocorre-
lation of raw returns decays immediatly 4.4(g) and 4.4(h). The computational
experiments performed for this work show a number of important results.
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Figures 4.2(b) and 4.4(d) exhibit aggregational Gaussianity: as we increase
the time scale over which returns are calculated from intraday to daily, the
returns distribution is approximately Gaussian, the shape of distribution
is not the same. Figure 4.4(i) puts forward a positive autocorrelation of
absolute returns over several days. From these results we can conclude that
the returns of extraday price series exhibit the main features of real market:
fat tail, zero autocorrelation or raw returns, slow decay of the autocorrelation
of the absolute values.
Finally, we run a series of extensive simulations to check whether the artiﬁ-
cial mean-variance agents generate prices in accordance to their expectations.
In this work, this ability is called predictive power. In other words, we re-
port that the mean-variance optimizers are able in some degree to generate
the price series with moments in line with those imposed to them for opti-
mization at the beginning of simulations. This test is detailed in Appendix
A.4.
In summary we can say that the artiﬁcial agents are able to perform realis-
tic price dynamics with quantitative and qualitative stylized facts at intraday
as well as daily horizons in line with those from real stock markets.
Next sections are devoted to study the relative performance of portfolio
optimization strategies and factors aﬀecting them in the artiﬁcial stock market
framework.
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Figure 4.3: Extraday price dynamics. Prices are generated by 100 mean-
variance optimizers, heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs, risk aversion
A ∼ U(0.1, 10), trading frequency θ ∼ U(1, 10000).
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Stylized facts for Extraday Price Series (1000 days).
Prices are generated by 100 mean-variance optimizers, heterogeneous with
respect to their beliefs, risk aversion A ∼ U(0.1, 10), trading frequency θ ∼
U(1, 10000).
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4.2 Optimal Portfolio Diversiﬁcation? A multi-
agent ecological competition analysis
4.2.1 Introduction
In this section, we renew the analysis of a classical question in ﬁnance,
namely, the relative performance of investment strategies. We try to ﬁg-
ure out whether a rational mean-variance portfolio optimization can be
outperformed by naive diversiﬁcation. This research is motivated by the
contradictory and controversial ﬁndings of DeMiguel et al. (2009), Kritzman
et al. (2010), and Tu and Zhou (2011) who did the same kind of research
but within the traditional ﬁnance philosophy (no agents, no co-evolution,
no complexity, no heterogeneity). DeMiguel et al. (2009) compare several
investment strategies using a backtesting methodology. They evaluate the
sample-based mean-variance strategy and its extensions designed to reduce
estimation errors. The authors conclude that non of these strategies is
consistently better than the naive diversiﬁcation rule in terms of the Sharpe
ratio. This result can be explained by the errors in estimating means and
covariances.
Kritzman et al. (2010), as practitioners, argue that by relying on longer-term
samples for estimating expected returns, optimized portfolios outperform
equally weighted portfolios out of sample. Kritzman et al. estimate expected
volatility and correlations, using the monthly 5-, 10-, and 20-year data,
while DeMiguel et al. (2009) state that for a portfolio with 50 assets,
the estimation window should be more than 6000 months. However, the
minimal-variance portfolio generates superior out-of-sample performance
compared with equally weighted portfolio in the simulations conducted by
Kritzman et al. (2010). The authors suggest that investors should not rely
solely on naive extrapolations of long historical samples. Instead, investors
4.2. Optimal Portfolio Diversiﬁcation? A multi-agent ecological
competition analysis 159
may beneﬁt by adjusting optimization inputs on subsamples of high-volatility
and low-volatility regimes in accordance with their expectations.
Tu and Zhou (2011), extending the backtesting methodology of DeMiguel
et al. (2009), suggest that a combination of the 1/N strategy with the
sophisticated diversiﬁcation can each of its constituents taken separately.
This result is proposed in an empirical framework which is extremely similar
to the one of De Miguel and al.
Understanding the characteristics of winning and losing market strategies
is an important question for investors and regulators. But in our opinion, the
main problem with the researches mentioned above is the unrealistic "atom-
istic" assumption that underlies the backtesting methodology. Said simply,
this assumption allows to gauge an investment strategy with historical data
as if its true implementation would have not modiﬁed these prices. This as-
sumption is in sharp contrast with analyses of Levy et al. (1995), Hommes
(2006) who clearly show that prices may well be inﬂuenced by several pa-
rameters (investment strategies, the cognitive skills of investors or the mar-
ket microstructure itself) that are neglected in the backtesting approach. It
seems obvious that diﬀerent investors are characterized by diﬀerent invest-
ing behaviors that are, at least partially, responsible for the time evolution
of market prices. We argue in this research that a convincing answer to the
question "among this set of investment strategies, which one outperforms the
others?", overcoming the previously mentioned limitations, can be delivered
by a multi-agent system allowing to implement ecological competitions among
these strategies. We show, among others, that the best possible strategy over
the long run relies on a mix of mean-variance sophisticated optimization and
a naive diversiﬁcation. This result reinforces the practical interests of the
Markowitz framework that is strongly discussed in DeMiguel et al. (2009) for
example.
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4.2.2 Agents behavior
One of the advantages of ABM is that the agents are autonomous. In a math-
ematical model, all market participants are deﬁned as equal-power rational
entities facing homogeneous constraints. Agent actions are predetermined by
strict equations describing their reaction in response to particular market con-
ditions. ABM allows to overcome the limitations imposed homogeneity. In
this research, we design 8 agent populations, each of them following a generic
strategy. These strategies are presented in subsection 4.2.2.1.
4.2.2.1 Trading strategies
We start by introducing how a portfolio of assets is modelled and what kind
of decision agents must make in a simulation. The purpose of each strategy is
to allow agents to manage a diversiﬁed portfolio of ﬁnancial assets over time
in diﬀerent ways.
A portfolio is deﬁned as a vector of weights over the investment universe.
This vector is denoted ̟xx, xx allowing to identify the generic strategy deter-
mining this vector. Depending upon the strategy deﬁnition or the empirical
design, these weights can be negative or not. If this is the case, one will refer
to this situation as "shorting allowed", which means that agents are allowed
to sell borrowed assets and they will repurchase them later on.
Each time a new portfolio is computed, the current weight vector ̟xxt is com-
pared to the previous one ̟xxt−1 to adjust the number of stocks to hold. This
adjustment take into account the weight vectors and the corresponding assets
current prices. As a result agents decide to buy or to sell certain assets they
hold to reach their new (weight vector) target (see algorithm 1). These de-
cisions must be practically implemented, that means "translated into buy or
sell orders", with quantities and prices in accordance to the target. One must
remember that each strategy implies diﬀerent parameters that may have dif-
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ferent values within the same agent population; thus each agent has his own
weight vector holding during a simulation.
This process being the same whatever the behavior, we can now describe
at ﬁne grain the 8 generic strategies (see Table 4.6).
Name Short
Name
Basic deﬁnition & particularities
Naive N Equal weights, no sophisticated behav-
ior
Mean Variance 1 MLong Markowitz optimization, long positions
only
Mean Variance 2 MShort Same as MLong, shorting allowed
Market Portfolio Holders MP Weights according to assets capitalisa-
tion on the market
Bayesian Traders 1 BLong Based on Markowitz, estimation of mo-
ments co-moments of asset returns im-
proved, long positions only
Bayesian Traders 2 BShort Same as BLong, shorting allowed
Strategy Combinators 1 CLong Mix of N and MLong
Strategy Combinators 2 CShort Mix of N and MShort
Table 4.6: Strategies description
Population 1: Naive diversiﬁcation investors The agents endowed
with the naive strategy (N) ignore all information about risk and return of
assets. Naive investor i allocates his funds equally among the J risky assets in
equal proportions ̟i,Nj,t =
1
N
∀j =
−−→
1, J the weights of wealth allocated to stock
j of agent i at the moment of time t. In contrasts to sophisticated rules that
are usually asymptotically unbiased but have a large (variance) estimation
error in small samples, the 1/N rule is biased, but has zero estimation error.
Populations 2 and 3: Mean-variance optimizers Agents endowed with
this strategy deﬁne optimal allocation weights ̟M = (̟1, ̟2, . . . , ̟J) by ap-
plying the mean (µ) variance (σ2 ) optimization rules (Section 4.1). This op-
timization problem provides the solutions outside the range [0, 1], that allows
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shorting. From its deﬁnition, we create two agents population, one allowed to
use short selling (MShort), the other not allowed to do so (long only, MLong)
Population 4: Market portfolio holders Market portfolio (MP) holder
is the type of agent with a portfolio consisting of all the assets in the market
with weights proportional to asset capitalization (Treynor, 1962). In a more
realistic context, if an investor has no special insight about expectation returns
and volatility of individual stocks he is supposed to hold the market portfolio
(portfolio of all available stocks).
̟i,MPj,t =
Pj,t ×Qj,t∑J
n=0 [Pn,t ×Qn,t]
(4.9)
Pj,t price of asset j at moment t, Qj,t number of asset j traded on the market
at the moment t, Ct total market capitalization.
Population 5 and 6: Bayesian traders Agents within this population
have a behavior that extends the Markowitz rules. The Markowitz approach
has been criticized due to measurement errors in the estimation of assets
moments and co-moments. To overcome these problems authors like Klein and
Bawa (1976) or Brown (1979) propose to improve the co-moments estimation
by using a factor equal to 1+ 1
M
that reduces the estimation error and leads to
more reliable investment weights. Moments and co-moments being estimated
following this rule, agents the same rules as Markowitz agents to determine
the target weights.
From this logic we deﬁne two diﬀerent populations, one in which short
selling is allowed, Bayesian Short Selling (BShort) and one in which it is
forbidden, Bayesian Long Only strategies (BLong).
Population 7 and 8: Strategy combinators The last population has
the ability to combine the naive 1/N strategy with the sophisticated mean-
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variance optimization strategy. It has been studied by some authors who
thought it could improve the overall performance of investors (Brown, 1976).
Mathematically the combination of two strategies can be described as follows:
̟i,Cj,t = (1− δ)̟
i,N
j,t + δ̟
i,M
j,t δ =
ϕ1
ϕ1+ϕ2
ϕ2 =
1
A2
[
(T−2)(T−J−2)
(T−J−1)(T−J−4)
] (4.10)
where ̟i,Cj,t  weights deﬁned by strategies combination, ̟
i,N
j,t are the weights
deﬁned according to the naive diversiﬁcation rule, ̟i,Mj,t are the weights deﬁned
according to the Markowitz rule, δ is the combination parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, J
is the number of assets, and T is the memory span or the length of available
historical data. "Markowitz Shorting allowed" and "Markowitz Long-only"
are used for combinations, hence Combination Short (CShort) and Combina-
tion Long (CLong) populations are studied in this research.
4.2.3 Simulation settings
We compare the relative performance of investment strategies using Ecological
Competition (EC) (Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1926), where agents change their
strategies between the trading periods using their historical performances.
This research approach is widely used to understand nonlinear dynamical sys-
tems in which two or more species or agents interact through competition for
resources. Stock market can be regarded as an environment where agents com-
pete for the value of traded stocks. Traders occur losses and change strategies
that performed well during the last round. The agents populations compete
each against the others in order to get higher wealth or the Sharpe ratio.
This approach not only allows us to track a particular performance measure,
but also to follow its evolution in the long-run. Additionally, ecological com-
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petitions show the eﬀects of each strategy on the others. For instance, one
population of agents can take advantage from the presence of the others.
Initially, we populate the ATOM environment with our 8 populations of
agents. The size of each of these populations xk for k =
−→
1, 8 is the same
∀k. The total number of agents is X =
∑8
k=1 xk. Populations are updated
every simulation round according to their performance xk = X
Pk
PT
, where Pk
the performance of population k and PT the overall performance of the whole
soup of populations. The performance can be measured as i) the total wealth
(cash + market capitalization of the stocks of all the agents in each population)
or ii) the average Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966) of the population, during the
previous round. A population is said to be extinct if xk = X
Pk
PT
< 1
Each strategy is encoded in an initial population of NNN agents. These
populations are mixed and compete in the same market, trading the same
stocks. Prices are the direct result of the ﬂow of orders sent by the agents to
the central order books ruling the artiﬁcial stock exchange. A time step in our
ecological competitions is made of several rounds, each of them encompassing
1000 trading days.
Simulation settings We study the 8 populations of agents presented in
table 4.6. Each population of agents starts with 100 agents, that have costless
access to all information concerning the underlying probability distribution of
security prices as well as current security prices. The agents are homogeneous
with respect to their initial budget (they enter the market with 50 units of
each type of stocks and 1000$ in cash). Contrary to DeMiguel et al. (2009)
and Tu and Zhou (2011) who set the risk aversion parameter to 1 or 3 for
Markowitz strategies and its extensions, risk aversion in our simulations is
uniformly drawn between [0.5,5] A ∼ U(0.5, 5) in order to test a larger variety
of behaviors, from risk averse agents to risk takers. The agents trade 30 dif-
ferent stock classes (like the 40 diﬀerent families of stocks listed in the CAC40
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index). Such relatively large number of stocks allows us to have signiﬁcant dif-
ference in portfolio composition of heterogeneous mean-variance agents. For
the ﬁrst trading period, we provide to agents an initial information about as-
sets, then they rely on historical price series generated by the trading activity
itself. Contrary to DeMiguel et al. (2009), that use monthly return data, we
deal with signiﬁcantly more information-rich daily data. Each dataset con-
sists of 500 observations. Monthly data would require an investment period
of nearly 40 years to include as many observations as are presented here in
the daily return data.
4.2.4 Results and Discussions
We present here the results of two diﬀerent ecological competitions. In the
ﬁrst one, the reproduction rate of each population is linked to dollar earnings
(see subsection 4.2.4.1) while in the second one, it is a function of the Sharpe
ratio (see subsection 4.2.4.2).
4.2.4.1 Ecological competition 1: wealth
The simulations results (ﬁgure 4.5(a)) show that all the constrained (long-
only) strategies (MLong, BLong, CLong), the naive (N) and the market
portfolio strategies (MP ) quickly disappear from the market at the end of
50 rounds. According to Levy and Ritov (2011), a possible explanation of
this phenomenon could be linked to the large positions (positive or negative)
implied by short selling, when it is allowed : the long-only strategies have
zero-positions (̟i,∗j,t = 0) in about 50% of the traded assets. Thus, the agents
with long-only strategies trade only half of the investment set to maintain
their target weights. At the same time, agents with short-selling strategies
trade the whole set of assets and increase their wealth more eﬃciently.
In addition, we observe that the population CShort are better than their
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individual component rules (MShort and N) which is clearly in line with the
results of Tu and Zhou (2011).
We also investigate a possible eﬀect of the initial size of the population
in its survival time. We therefore changed population initial distributions
dynamically (∼ U(20, 200)) so to get a majority of certain types of agent in
the whole population soup at the beginning of each experiment. Our results
indicate that even if the initial proportion of naive agents (≈ 200 individuals)
is much bigger than the proportion of others (100 individuals), they cannot
survive much longer in the ecological competitions where wealth rules the
reproduction rate.
To explain these results we should rely on experiment initial settings.
The population of mean-variance traders is heterogeneous with respect to
their risk preferences, that deﬁne the composition of their optimal portfolios.
Kallberg and Ziemba (1983) provide guidance regarding the signiﬁcance of
the changes in risk aversion for optimal portfolio composition. Thus, mean-
variance traders have diﬀerent preferences for diﬀerent stocks. On the other
hand, the population of naive agents (as well as market portfolio holders)
is completely homogeneous. All investors from this group invest the same
amount of wealth in the same assets ̟0,Nj,t = ̟
1,N
j,t = · · · = ̟
I,N
j,t . No trade
can occur within this group. The trading success of naive strategies directly
depends on the desire to trade of agents characterized by rational diversiﬁca-
tion rules.
Suppose that, on a particular day, naive investors try to reoptimize their
portfolios. For this purpose, they all should buy security A, sell security
B, and buy security C. At various times during the day, the investors from
population xk would try to purchase the desired numbers of shares A and send
bid orders. Once the supply oﬀered on the order book related to stock A is
used up (because there is no the same number of traders willing to sell stock
A), a naive strategy will raise the current bid a bit, and the next a bit more,
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the next a bit more, increasing bid-ask spread. It makes the buyers to accept
a price proposed by sellers and to conclude the unproﬁtable transactions.
4.2.4.2 Ecological competition 2: Sharpe ratio
We measure the Sharpe ratio in order to estimate the agents ability to hedge
the portfolio risk with many assets. Figure 4.5(b) reports the average evolution
of agent proportions based on this indicator. Note that the Sharpe ratio is
not consistent measure if the mean return of portfolio has a negative value. In
this case high standard deviation improves the Sharpe ratio, which is exactly
the opposite of what the investor prefer. In our simulations, as far as an
agent gets negative return of his portfolio, he is regarded as ran out of
the market. The evolution of the population is guaranteed by the holders of
portfolio with positive return. The unconstrained strategies outperform the
constrained ones. These results conﬁrm those of Levy and Ritov (2011), who
stress the importance of short selling in markets with many assets. At the
same time, our results are not congruent with those of DeMiguel et al. (2009)
who report that the Sharpe ratio of sample-based mean-variance strategy is
much lower than that of naive strategy. There are several issues that explain
such discrepancy of the results. One reason is that DeMiguel et al. (2009) use
diversiﬁed portfolios with low volatility in their numerical simulations while
our simulations rely on individual assets with more volatility. The other reason
is that mean-variance traders in our model use more information-rich daily
return data. The ﬁnal issue that plays a key role in explaining of simulation
results is predictive power of mean-variance traders (see section A.4 for
technical details). As the agents introduced in the current model are price
takers, they are able to produce price dynamics with realized statistics close
the expected statistics imposed at the beginning of simulations. It increases
their estimation accuracy, and makes their portfolios more stable.
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In addition to the Sharpe ratio, we also report the portfolios turnover.
This indicator provides evidence about the portfolio stability. The total
portfolio turnover is calculated as follows:
ϑi =
T∑
t=1
j=J∑
j=1
|̟i,∗j,t −̟
i,∗
j,t−1| , ∀i = 1, I (4.11)
where ̟i,∗j,t−1 is agent i's portfolio weight in asset j at time t − 1 (or target
weight); ̟i,∗j,t is the portfolio weight before rebalancing at time t; T is the
number trading days in the investment period (one year); J denotes the total
number of stocks.
Table 4.7 reports the average Sharpe ratio and the average portfolio
turnover; it allows to have a deeper understanding about the eﬀects of transac-
tion costs on portfolio performance. The highest portfolio turnover, the high-
est reallocation volume and as a consequence, the highest transaction costs.
The reason why naive strategies perform poorly is visible in the turnover
amount. The portfolio turnover of agents characterized by following a naive
diversiﬁcation strategy is two times larger compared with those of rational
portfolio optimizers. Naive diversiﬁcation strategies appear to produce more
unstable portfolio weights, requiring larger trading volume when rebalancing,
as a results, naive agents incur more transaction costs.
To sum up, we report that classical mean-variance optimization rules still
outperform the naive rules in artiﬁcial market framework where the price dy-
namics is a direct result of agents' trades. Our ﬁndings are consistent with
those of Tu and Zhou (2011) and Levy and Ritov (2011). The performance of
unrestricted portfolio strategies outperforms the long-only and naive strategies
in both ecological competitions where the Sharpe ratio or the earnings rule
the reproduction rate of the populations. The reason behind this performance
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Figure 4.5: Ecological competition.
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Strategy Avg. Sharpe Ratioa Avg. Portfolio Turnover
N 0.690896 7.022831
MP 0.241616 6.275086
MLong 0.957809 4.361393
MShort 0.909716 4.326295
BLong 1.062356 4.361645
BShort 0.954551 4.347188
CLong 0.95105 4.384113
CShort 0.892726 4.321861
Table 4.7: Table represents the average Sharpe ratios and average turnover
amounts (calculated according to equation 4.11) of 8 trading strategies, held
by 100 agents each over 250 days (≃ 1 year trading), 3 assets. a the average
Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows = 1
I
× 1
T
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 Sharpe
i,∗
t The highest
Sharpe ratio and the highest turnover are in bold.
can be at least partly attributed to the predictive power of mean-variance
agents, their heterogeneity with respect to risk aversion, and higher stabil-
ity of their portfolios, resulting in less trading costs. These results suggest
that with appropriate combinations of degree of risk aversion and rebalanc-
ing frequency, an investor can signiﬁcantly improve his portfolio performance.
We search for optimal degree of risk aversion (section 4.2) and reoptimization
policy (section 4.4) that maximize investment earnings. Our analysis also re-
ports that even though the ex-ante parameters estimation of moments and
co-moments involves estimation errors due to the small size of sample, the
combination of mean-variance sophisticated rules and naive rules can improve
the performance of their individual counterparts.
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4.3 Risk Aversion Impact on Investment Strat-
egy Performance
4.3.1 Introduction
The degree of risk aversion determines portfolio holdings and subsequently
the distribution of wealth. In ﬁnancial markets there is a trade-oﬀ between
the risk involved and the expected returns. Risky ﬁnancial securities should
generate, in equilibrium, a return higher than the one of the safer investments
such as Treasury Bills (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). For example, the CAPM
(Sharpe, 1964) assumes a linear risk-return relationship µP,t = rf + βPσi,t,
where µP is a portfolio expected return, rf the risk-free rate, βP the portfolio
beta and σi,t the market risk premium. Risk preferences of investors have a
direct impact on their investment decisions. A risk-averter (or conservative)
investor tends to hold more Treasury Bills than a risk-lover (or aggressive)
investor who will tend to invest in riskier stocks with higher expected return.
Thus, risk aversion aﬀects the portfolio composition of investors and therefore
the distribution of future wealth. In other words, each trader invests his
capital in a portfolio reﬂecting his risk-aversion.
In this section we address the question whether investors' survivability
depends on their risk preference. This work is motivated by empirical stud-
ies focusing on the relation between risk aversion and wealth dynamics (see
for example, Levy (2005)). Several agent-based simulations researches have
also investigated this question. In fact, some simulation-based works lean to-
wards a framework where investor optimal decisions depend on their wealth,
which is in line with the assumption of CRRA utility function (Levy et al.,
1995, 2000). Chiarella and He (2001) investigate the characteristics of as-
set prices and wealth dynamics arising from the interaction of heterogeneous
agents with CRRA utility. Levy et al. (1995) study the eﬀect of heterogene-
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ity of preferences, expectations and strategies on wealth and price dynamics
with CRRA and logarithmic utility functions using a microscopic simulation
approach. Chen and Huang (2004b), Chen and Huang (2004a), Chen et al.
(2007) investigate relative risk aversion (later RRA) relation to wealth dy-
namics (CRRA utility function) and relationship between RRA and survival
dynamics (CRRA, CARA, Logarithmic, CAPM). They ﬁnd that only the
CRRA investors with the RRA coeﬃcient close to one can survive in the
long-run time framework.
4.3.2 Simulation settings
We consider a securities market populated by a ﬁnite number of mean-variance
traders with heterogeneous preferences, indexed by i ∈ 1, 2, ...I (I = 1000).
These agents have an open access to information concerning the underlying
probability distribution of security prices. This population heterogeneous only
with respect to the degree of risk aversion, which is uniformly distributed in
[0.1, 10]. They enter the market with 50 units of each class of assets and
$1000 in cash. These agents rely on the same estimation window length for
estimating the covariance matrix and returns and use the same rebalancing
frequencies.
As the mean-variance traders send only a few orders daily to rebalance
their portfolios, we implement a special type of agents, which provide liquidity:
the liquidity providers. These agents do not seek to increase their wealth
or decrease their portfolio risk, they trade rather randomly. These traders
allocate in the risky assets a random fraction of wealth (uniform distribution).
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̟ij,t ∼ U(x|0, 100) ∀j =
−−→
1, J (4.12)
̟ij,t =
̟ij,t∑J
n=1̟
i
n,t
∀j =
−−→
1, J (4.13)
J∑
n=1
̟in,t = 1 (4.14)
The equations 4.124.13 guarantee a random distribution of weights in
[0,1], with a total sum equal to 1. Thus, we do not allow the liquidity providers
to have short positions or an aggregate negative wealth. The desired quantity
of stocks is then calculated based on the formula (4.6).
As liquidity providers do not seek to optimize their positions in the market,
we do not compare their performance with the other agents' results.
In addition, Milgrom and Stokey (1982) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
stress the necessity of heterogeneous expectations, diﬀerent opinions and trad-
ing rules in the market. As mentioned in several publications Shatner et al.
(2000), Hommes (2006), heterogeneity of time scale for the agents' actions is
an important feature to obtain realistic price dynamics. We thus introduce
diﬀerent trading frequency Θ ∼ U(x|10, 1000) for diﬀerent investors; said dif-
ferently, agents rebalance their portfolio every Θ rounds. This condition helps
avoid an empty order book, which could result from a general cancellation of
orders by all the agents at the same time.
Results and Discussions First of all, we estimate the performance of trad-
ing strategies based on the end-of-the-period values like in most models deal-
ing with similar research question. Then, we put the agents in a competitive
market such that the populations of investors co-evolve: agents change their
strategy between the trading periods based on their historical performance.
Finally, we compare the results.
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We run 1500 days of trading (which corresponds to 6-year or 15 trading
periods, 100 days each). For the ﬁrst trading period (100 days) we provide the
initial statistics for the traded assets to the mean-variance traders. During the
next periods, agents calculate assets statistics themselves, based on the gen-
erated price series. The traders do not change their risk preferences and their
trading strategies between periods (in an ecological competition framework
this constraint will be relaxed). We run 100 simulations with diﬀerent initial
asset statistics. We also test short-selling and long-only cases. We begin by
discussing the 3-asset case.
Figure 4.6(a) we depict the relationship between agents' risk preferences
and their wealth distribution. On the horizontal axis we set out the diﬀerent
initial parameters  risk aversion between 0.1 and 10, with 0.1 as an increment
in log-scale. The vertical axis shows the ﬁnal wealth corresponding to these
diﬀerent initial parameters. A great diﬀerence between the wealth distribution
and its linear regression ﬁtting (a gray solid line) indicates that the wealth
increases sharply for agents with risk aversion from 0.1 to 3.5. Thereafter, it
increases smoothly. This behavior can be explained by the composition of the
optimal portfolio. Kallberg and Ziemba (1983) provide guidance regarding the
signiﬁcance of the changes in risk aversion for optimal portfolio composition.
Agents with A > 4 are very risk averse and prefer portfolios with low variance.
If the degree of risk aversion A is superior of 4, the portfolio composition does
not vary even for large changes in A. Range 2 ≤ A ≤ 4 yields moderately
risky portfolios with a modest degree of change in the optimal portfolio with
changes in parameter A. The range 0 ≤ A ≤ 2 yields risky portfolios and
there are dramatic changes in the target weights for even small changes in A.
We also investigate risk-adjusted reward to the volatility of individual port-
folios, also known as the Sharpe ratio. Observing the Sharpe ratio dynamic
over diﬀerent risk aversion frameworks (see ﬁgure 4.6(b)), we get similar re-
sults as Chen et al. (2007). Even if high-risk-averse agents choose assets with
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Figure 4.6: 3-asset long-only case. Each point is the averaged value of 100
simulations. X axis is in log-scale
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low risk and low return, they earn a higher the Sharpe ratio and a higher
ﬁnal wealth. This eﬀect can be explained by the mathematical properties of
the eﬃcient frontier. The ﬁrst derivative of portfolio return µp with respect
to portfolio risk σp indicates that large values of A (the minimal variance
portfolio) correspond to a big slope on the eﬃcient frontier. Hence, conserva-
tive investors get signiﬁcant increase in portfolio returns by bearing a small
amount of extra risk. The slope becomes smaller when A decreases. The
second derivative of µp with respect to σp is negative, which means that the
eﬃcient frontier is concave. For large values of A, the second derivative has
a large negative magnitude, so the slope is sharply decreasing. With A → 0
the slope decreases much more slowly. Contrary to Chen and Huang (2004b)
and Chen et al. (2007), in our simulations, less risk-averse agents (A < 1)
do not run out of the market, even if, on average, they obtain a lower gain
than risk averters (A > 1). If the number of assets remains relatively small
and short selling is allowed, the Sharpe ratio distribution in relation to risk
aversion is close to that received with long-only constraint. Thus, the 3-asset
short-selling case is not considered in current work.
We continue to increase the number of trading assets. We now consider a
20-asset long-only case. The simulation results are presented in ﬁgures 4.7(a)
and 4.7(b). Wealth has not such a sharp increase as in the 3-asset case (the
linear regression coeﬃcient now equals 0.02977): it rather increases smoothly
with the increasing risk aversion. This behavior can be explained by the
fact that the portfolio composition is aﬀected diﬀerently by the changes in
A for diﬀerent number of asset classes that constitute the optimal portfolio
Kallberg and Ziemba (1983). The Sharpe ratio has an increasing dynamics
when risk aversion increases, but the diﬀerence between the maximum and
the minimum values is relatively small (1.644210 − 1.502465 = 0.141745).
Thus, we can conclude that risk aversion has a relatively small eﬀect on the
variations of the Sharpe ratio.
4.3. Risk Aversion Impact on Investment Strategy Performance177
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Figure 4.7: 20-asset long-only case. Each point is the averaged value of 100
simulations. X axis is in log-scale
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(b) the Sharpe ratio dynamics for agents with diﬀerent risk
aversions. Regression coeﬃcient= 0.17709
Figure 4.8: 20-asset short-selling case. Each point is the average value of 100
simulations. X axis is in log-scale
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As soon as short-selling is allowed, one part of the risk taking agents runs
out of the market, while other agents with the same risk preferences A < 1
obtain a much higher wealth than in the constrained-portfolio case. Thus,
there are two possibilities for the risk taking agents: either they lose their
initial endowment, or they increase their wealth by a factor much higher than
the one of risk-averters. The conservative agents (risk-averters). On the one
hand have a moderate wealth increase factor, on the other hand, they have
few chances to lose their initial wealth (see ﬁgure 4.8(a)).
Figure 4.8(b) as well as the regression coeﬃcient (0.17709) show that,
contrary to the constrained portfolio situation, risk aversion has a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the Sharpe ratio when short selling is allowed. Even if the Sharpe
ratio distribution exhibits a higher variance when the risk aversion increases,
conservative agents tend to considerably improve their the Sharpe ratio. We
can conclude that in the unconstrained portfolio framework it is better to be
risk averse and to invest in risk-free assets.
4.3.3 Ecological Competition Analysis of Strategy Per-
formance
Next, we compare the relative performance of investment strategies using
ecological competition. Initially, we consider an environment with N = 5
families of traders1 with populations xi i =
−−→
1, N in equal proportions (200
agents each) who interact through trading to obtain the highest possible wealth.
The only diﬀerence in population strategies is the risk preferences. 2×(i−1) <
Ai ≤ 2× i is the risk aversion measure for the population xi, i =
−→
1, 5.
The total number of agents is thus equal to 1000 and remains constant over
the simulations.
The strategy proportions of each family within this population are updated
1Liquidity providers are not included in competitions
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every n step corresponding to a "simulation generation" according to their
wealth (xi = X
Wi
WT
, where Wi is the wealth earned by agent population i,
WT is the total wealth). One generation of competition corresponds to 100
trading days.
A family of agents is said to be run-out of the market if xi = X
Wi
WT
< 1.
An analogous allocation principle is used with the Sharpe ratio instead of the
wealth criterion for the second set of simulations.
Ecological Competition Analysis: Short Selling Allowed
Figures 4.9(b) and 4.9(a) conﬁrm the results highlighted only with the end-
of-period results (see ﬁgures 4.8(a) and 4.8(b)). When short selling is allowed,
the risk lovers compete with other agents in terms of wealth but quickly run
out-of the market in the competitions where the Sharpe ratio is used as a
performance measure.
Ecological Competition Analysis: Long-only
In the case of long-only constrained portfolios, the ﬁgure 4.10(a) shows that
the highest (as well as the lowest) risk aversion values do not guarantee the
highest earnings. Risk lovers (0 < A ≤ 2) as well as absolute risk averters
(8 < A ≤ 10) run quickly out-of the competition (in ≈ 100 rounds). Only
the traders with a moderate level of risk aversion 4 < A < 6 survive in the
long run (> 500 rounds).
In the competition based on risk adjusted returns, the conservative traders
slightly outperform the aggressive ones (ﬁgure 4.10(b)). These results are con-
sistent with those previously presented in ﬁgure 4.7(b). A similar conclusion
emerges: risk aversion does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the Sharpe ratio
improvement.
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Figure 4.9: Ecological competitions: 20 assets, short-selling allowed. Strate-
gies are grouped by two for the sake of results tractability
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Figure 4.10: Ecological competitions: 20 assets, long only. Strategies are
grouped by two for the sake of results' tractability
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If the market is populated by agents with constrained portfolios and agents
with unconstrained portfolios, traders using short-selling easily win the com-
petition for wealth. A possible explanation for these phenomena is that the
portfolio performance is improved because traders sell the assets that outper-
form (sell overprices assets) and buys the assets that underperform during
the trading period (buy underpriced assets). According to Levy and Ritov
(2011) the long-only strategies have zero-positions (αi,∗j,t = 0) in about 50% of
the traded assets. Thus, the agents with long-only strategies rebalance only
half of their investment set to maintain their target weights. At the same
time, the agents with short-selling strategies trade the whole set of assets,
and increase their wealth more eﬃciently.
4.3.4 Results and Discussions
The computational experiments performed in this research show a number of
important results. First, we show that the degree of risk aversion signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the survivability of agents and their portfolio performance. However,
we cannot identify a unique and absolute winner of game. We also high-
light that the agents' proﬁts depend on market conditions and other market
participants as well.
By overcoming models based on ﬁxed proportions of agents, we conclude
that the ﬁnal wealth as well as agents' risk adjusted return not only depend
on their accuracy to predict expected returns and covariances of assets, but
also on their risk preferences.
Our model based on ecological competition characterizes the evolution of
agent populations when traders switch from the old strategy to a new one
(by adjusting their risk preferences) according to its performance in the past.
The main assumption is that all agents belonging to a group share the same
risk preferences (risk aversion range [Amin, Amax]), but are allowed to change
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groups between the trading periods. In such a way, the fraction of agents
using the same strategy characterizes its success in the past.
We report that when random traders and unconstrained mean-variance
traders populate the market, risk lovers (A < 2) outperform others when
wealth is used as the basis for ruling reproduction within the agent population.
However, they quickly run out of the market in the competitions based on the
Sharpe ratio. In that last case, only conservative traders survive in the long
run.
Furthermore, when short selling is forbidden (long-only case), the highest,
as well as the lowest risk aversion rates do not guarantee the highest earnings.
Aggressive (A < 2) and strongly conservative (A > 8) traders run quickly out
of the competition for wealth. Conservative traders beat aggressive traders in
the competition for a higher the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio.
4.4. Reabalancing Frequency Impact on Investment Strategy
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4.4 Reabalancing Frequency Impact on Invest-
ment Strategy Performance
A high rebalancing frequency reduces the portfolio performance due to trans-
action costs, whereas a low rebalancing frequency hides a risk not to react
in time to important market changes. Optimal rebalancing frequency helps
not only to control the risk, but also to enhance the portfolio return. In
the absence of transaction costs and when risky asset prices follow geometric
Brownian motions, the optimal investment policy is to constantly trade in
order to keep a constant dollar amount in each risky asset (Merton, 1971). In
the presence of transaction costs, trading continuously incurs inﬁnite trans-
action costs. There exists a series of works modeling an optimal tradeoﬀ be-
tween rebalancing beneﬁts and rebalancing costs. Akian, Menaldi and Sulem
(2004) consider an optimal investment problem with proportional transaction
costs and use numerical simulations to compute the no-transaction region.
Liu (2004) solve numerically the problem of the optimal transaction policy
when the risky asset returns are uncorrelated. The author shows that the
optimal investment policy in each risky asset is to keep the dollar amount
invested in the asset between two constant levels. Once the amount reaches
one of these bounds, the investor trades to the corresponding optimal targets.
Walter, Ayres, Chen, Schouwennars and Albota (2006) propose the dynamic
programming-based approach to construct a policy to trade only when the
costs of rebalancing is less than the cost of doing nothing.
There are two common methods for portfolio rebalancing: periodic (cal-
endar) (Donohue and Yip, 2003) and tolerance bands (Masters, 2003). The
calendar based approach is actively criticized in literature Walter et al. (2006).
This method relies on the fact that, on average, the portfolio becomes less and
less optimal, but it does not take into account the real portfolio and market
state. For this reason, in this research we consider only tolerance band (or
186
Chapter 4. ABM: Portfolio Performance Gauging and Attitude
Towards Risk Revisited
drift-based) rebalancing method.
Our ﬁrst contribution in this section is to derive the rebalancing policy
using agent-based simulations. An agent rebalances his portfolio in order
to maintain a long-term goal for asset allocation. The choice of rebalancing
frequency is an essential for reaching long-term objectives. Transaction costs
as well as taxes make frequent rebalancing highly unattractive. At the same
time, without rebalancing, the portfolio becomes less diversiﬁed and is subject
to greater volatility.
4.4.1 Tolerance band rebalancing
When the market is stable, the portfolio is reasonably close to its target allo-
cations, hence, an investor can rebalance his portfolio only when the current
weights run far from the targets. But how far is too far? To determine when
rebalancing is eﬃcient, we should compare the beneﬁts from rebalancing and
rebalancing costs. Moreover, the costs of rebalancing are increasing as the
drift out of target weights increasing. There are two main beneﬁts of rebal-
ancing: performance improvement and risk control. Portfolio performance is
improved because the trader sells the assets that outperform (overpriced) and
buys the assets that underperform over current trading period (underpriced).
Tolerance band rebalancing is the method to trade only when the weight of
an asset class drifts outside the tolerance ranges. It can be more eﬀective than
calendar-based rebalancing (rebalancing quarterly or annually) (Overway and
John, 2006). The optimal transaction policy is to trade only when the current
weights are far from the targets. Hence, the optimal way is to rebalance only
when the current portfolio weights run out the tolerance ranges. Portfolio
return tends to increase as tolerance is widened, but once it reaches the certain
limits return declines. We try to ﬁnd an optimal tolerance range of deviation
around the target weights.
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There exit two types of tolerance ranges:
1. Absolute range is the ﬁxed band for all assets. A commonly used range
is ±5%, that is the reasonable band.
2. Relative range is the relative band around each of target weights.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 demonstrate the possible bands in case of absolute and
relative tolerance ranges. Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 aim at clarifying the
diﬀerence between absolute and relative range rebalancing.
Target weight min weight max weight
30 20 40
20 10 30
50 40 60
Table 4.8: 10% absolute tolerance range
for j = 1 to J do
αij,t =
∑
j=1,J pj,tq
i
j,t+C
i
t
pj,tq
i
j,t
if αij,t − α
i
j,0 > T
i then
Rebalance all portfolio
end
end
Algorithm 3: Absolute tolerance band. αij,0 target weight of wealth
hold by agent i invested in the stock j. αij,t current weight of wealth
hold by agent i invested in the stock j at the moment t. T i tolerance
band for weights deviation of agent i
Target weight min weight max weight
30 27 33
20 18 22
50 45 55
Table 4.9: 10% relative tolerance range
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for j = 1 to J do
αt =
∑
j=1,J pj,tq
i
j,t+C
i
t
pj,tq
i
j,t
if
αit−αij,0
αij,0
> T i then
Rebalance all portfolio
end
end
Algorithm 4: Relative tolerance band. αij,0 target weight of wealth hold
by agent i invested in the stock j. αij,t current weight of wealth hold by
agent i invested in the stock j at the moment t. T i tolerance band for
weights deviation of agent i
Additionally, several research studies indicate that it is not cost-eﬀective
to return a portfolio completely the way back to its initial allocations. The
best way to minimize transaction costs is to do halfway back to initial weights.
Masters (2003) ﬁnds the optimal tradeoﬀ between the geometrically (quadrati-
cally) increasing beneﬁt of rebalancing and the linearly increasing transaction
costs. Masters (2003) argues that it is optimal to rebalance back only to
halfway between the target weight and boundary limit. It has been shown
that this strategy reduces transaction costs by approximately 50%.
Stewart (2005) empirically shows that it is better to take the portfolio
back to the target weights, but it is more proﬁtable to take it beyond the
targets weights. The results of the period he examines and the assets he
considers show the beneﬁt to overweight the assets that had underperformed
and underweight assets that had outperformed.
In the current work we test both methods of rebalancing complete way
back and halfway back to the target weights; absolute and relative bands of
deviation from targets (see ﬁgure 4.11).
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Figure 4.11: Scenarios of simulations
4.4.2 Simulation settings
We introduce 1000 mean-variance traders holding tree-asset portfolios.
Each of them has tolerance for deviation from the target allocation T ∈
{0%, 1%, 2%, ..., 100%}. Whenever a weight of an asset class drifts outside
its tolerance for deviation range, a portfolio is rebalanced.
The mean-variance agents are homogeneous with respect to their degree of
risk aversion A, that equal to 3. This choice is made based on the simulations
described in section 4.3. The degree of risk aversion 3 corresponds to the
moderate level of risk preferences. This parameter is constant during the
simulations.
We specify two market regimes: low volatility and high volatility (see table
4.10). Decreasing of tick size results in narrower bid-ask spreads. This directly
aﬀects market liquidity and volatility. When the tick size is made narrower
and possible increments are ﬁner, then potential price changes may be smaller,
thereby resulting in less variable price changes. Hence, to increase market
volatility, we increase a tick size. In periods of high volatility transaction
costs are higher than those of the low volatility regime. We consider 0.1 %
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Low volatility
µ σ2 skew. kurt.
S1 0.0015 0.0181 0.1524 5.7657
S2 0.0026 0.0418 -0.0209 4.1524
S3 0.0009 0.0264 -0.4681 3.4666
High volatility
µ σ2 skew. kurt.
S1 0.0021 0.12257 0.02051 3.8434
S2 0.0014 0.08399 -0.2971 2.5589
S3 0.0012 0.06221 -0.0946 2.6621
Table 4.10: Statistical properties of each asset class. Volatility regimes are
parametrized by tick size.
transaction costs in low volatility regime, and 2% for high volatility regime.
Transaction costs are not included in the budget constraints. The capital C is
used for both purposes to buy the securities and to pay the transaction costs.
Thus, agents can run out of market (get negative total wealth).
Finally, as in section 4.1, we introduce the liquidity providers that behave
rather randomly and simplify price settings.
4.4.3 Results and Discussions
The averaged results of 100 runs of each scenario are summarized in table
4.11. In the low-volatility regime, the agents characterized by 0 < T ≤ 20
absolute range and halfway rebalancing rules, slightly outperform the others.
The wealth distribution of these agents exhibits high kurtosis (≈ 18) and high
skewness (1.004011), indicating that majority of agents get average wealth,
while the minority tend to outperform this average level. We can conclude
that the absolute drift range (0 < T ≤ 20) and halfway-back rebalancing rules
is an optimal tradeoﬀ between rebalancing costs and rebalancing beneﬁts.
Moreover, the distribution of wealth in ﬁgure 4.12 reports that even though
5% tolerance band is actively used by market practitioners, in low-volatility
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conditions, they can tolerate until 20% deviation from the targets without
signiﬁcant losses.
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Figure 4.12: Wealth distribution. 0.1% transaction costs, low-volatility
regime, absolute tolerance band, halfway back rebalancing
In high-volatility regime, a frequent rebalancing or a large tolerance band is
not an optimal solution for gain maximization or even for risk adjusted return
improvement. A portfolio held by agents with low tolerance for deviation from
targets is a subject to high transaction costs (see ﬁgure 4.13).
The portfolio of agent with high tolerance for deviations is the subject to
high risk (see ﬁgure 4.14). The agent with low tolerance for deviation reduces
his portfolio risk by frequent rebalancing. However, he incurs wealth losses
due to the high transaction costs (2%). The results in the table 4.11 basically
point out that the halfway back rebalancing helps improve the Sharpe ratio
but it has a rather small impact on wealth increase.
The ﬁndings in this section basically point out the optimal rebalancing
policy in low- and high-volatility market in the presence of transaction costs.
Our simulations results conﬁrm the suggestions of Masters (2003) that the ab-
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Figure 4.13: Wealth distribution. 2% transaction costs, high volatility regime,
absolute tolerance band, complete rebalancing
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Figure 4.14: the Sharpe ratio distribution. 2% transaction costs, high volatil-
ity regime, absolute tolerance band, complete rebalancing
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solute drift range (0 < T ≤ 20) and the halfway back rebalancing is a tradeoﬀ
between small repeated tradings and large costs for high volume rebalanc-
ing of largely declining portfolio from its targets in low volatility conditions.
However, the same rules have rather negative eﬀect in high volatility regime.
The agents with low tolerance for deviations from targets loose easily their
initial wealth, even if they improve the Sharpe ratio of portfolio. These ob-
servations suggest a higher ﬂexibility in investment strategies: to rebalance
less frequently, but look more frequently at price dynamics to ﬁnd the best
rebalancing opportunities.
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Complete Halfway
0 < T ≤ 20 20 < T ≤ 40 T > 40 0 < T ≤ 20 20 < T ≤ 40 T > 40
min 4480.55 1451.53 1383.35 11055.09 4732.24 3746.65
A
b
so
lu
te
L
ow
max 91831.1 4974.11 5010.28 53248.75 50417.45 25106.58
mean. 9142.87 4138.10 4081.17 22291.08 16578.84 7349.90
skew. 4.03639 -1.36271 -1.2016 1.004011 1.362383 1.671348
kurt. 14.7653 0.32726 -0.43695 18.86696 9.86747 2.662102
Sharpe 1.3000625 1.3109093 1.3171058 1.431137 1.424201 1.408475
min 4181.64 4736.14 3935.22 9638.94 9633.82 1761.14
R
el
a
ti
v
e
max 5105.05 5245.77 5185.38 31773.78 31493.45 32387.11
mean. 5060.69 5082.15 5029.46 21949.21 21918.38 11958.63
skew. 4.70747 -1.509016 -3.369181 -0.5582034 -0.5535263 0.9118452
kurt. 21.5114 2.521223 12.12310 -1.354962 -1.366551 -0.7340671
Sharpe 1.1779515 1.1853119 1.1845493 0.9884437 0.986747 0.954649
min 593.24 5201.98 5861.35 1223.87 2007.83 4579.79
A
bs
ol
ut
e
H
ig
h
max 8161.01 8453.41 11321.10 2137.45 5831.42 6740.29
mean. 6391.73 6576.76 7453.12 1380.12 4901.85 5702.5
skew. -2.350237 0.6809661 1.105914 1.886898 -1.246212 -0.3178618
kurt. 5.466913 -0.3249746 -0.2448154 1.691031 -0.3578788 -0.7341588
Sharpe 0.2989989 0.2006190 -0.01141703 0.2618616 0.2808233 0.1582175
min 963.35 5804.17 6369.36 936.38 928.06 937.75
R
el
at
iv
emax 6586.71 7081.81 7028.13 1453.61 1446.12 5731.11
mean. 4773.17 6457.12 6581.23 1134.12 1136.81 2680.99
skew. -0.871587 -0.1288835 1.209252 0.6130973 0.5794839 0.4508615
kurt. -1.055114 -0.4300516 0.02682 -1.517962 -1.559853 -1.554189
Sharpe 0.05324615 0.05304157 0.05468743 0.5380607 0.5378979 0.4924253
min  minimum value, max  maximum value, mean  mean value, kurt.  kurtosis, skew.  skewness, Sharpe 
the average Sharpe ratio
Table 4.11: Statistics of wealth distribution for diﬀerent tolerance bands
4.5 Conclusion
In this section we have introduced the mean-variance model within the arti-
ﬁcial stock market framework. One of the critics of agent-based models is its
calibration and validation. For this reason, we have focused on these diﬃcult
issues. We have examined the ability of artiﬁcial agents to produce realistic
market dynamics in diﬀerent market conditions and time horizons. The re-
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sults have pointed out statistical properties of the multi-asset artiﬁcial market
similar to those of real market.
Next, we have applied this model to answer some important questions of
portfolio optimization. The major beneﬁt of our approach is its ﬂexibility
compared with backtesting, actively used in ﬁnancial studies. Indeed, the
ABM approach allows (i) any number of traders on the market (ii) combi-
nation of large variety of strategies (iii) any number of risky assets. This
ﬂexibility provides a distinct advantage over alternative approaches to the
portfolio optimization problems.
Contrary to research works claiming the uselessness of the Markowitz the-
ory, we have reported that this classical rule still outperforms the naive rules
in the artiﬁcial market framework where the price is a direct result of in-
vestors' trade and transaction costs are incurred whenever security is traded.
Our result has shown that naively diversiﬁed portfolios are sub-optimal. This
conclusion has stressed the importance of transaction costs and individual
preferences in portfolio optimization model and has motivated the studies in-
troduced in section 4.3 and 4.4. Special attention has been paid to the eﬀects
of degree of risk aversion and rebalancing frequency on portfolio performance
in the presence of transaction costs.
The importance of attitude toward risk of agents was evident in the results.
However, extensive simulation results could not provide us the best behavior in
all market conditions. Likewise, the simulation results have indicated that the
rebalancing frequency is an important factor aﬀecting portfolio performance.
However, we could not identify a unique winner of game. This speaks for the
importance of market conditions and other market participants on strategy
performance. Thereby, for thorough evaluation a strategy needs to be tested
in diﬀerent circumstances: during periods of high and low volatility, in the
presence of other heterogeneous traders. We have shown that the ATOM
platform perfectly suits for this sort of experiment.
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Several intriguing topics for future research arise from the results. For ex-
ample, we can establish the relationship between the length of the estimation
window (memory span) and portfolio performance. Consequently, it could be
interesting to investigate an optimal combination of all parameters: memory
span, rebalancing frequency, and risk aversion. Furthermore, the sensitivity
analysis of parameter changes could be examined in more detail when various
market conditions prevail.
Chapter 5
Algorithmic determination of the
maximum possible earnings for
investment strategies
Contents
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.2 Elements of the game, formalizations and examples . 201
5.2.1 Elements of the game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5.2.2 Basic illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
5.3 Mathematical models: linear programming method
and search in graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.3.1 Initial simpliﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.3.2 A linear programming method for the identiﬁcation of S∗209
5.3.3 An alternative dynamic programming method . . . . . 211
5.3.4 Embedding the identiﬁcation of S∗ in a graph structure 213
5.4 The S ∗ −determination algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
5.4.1 Floyd algorithm approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.4.2 DAG longest path algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.4.3 Extension of the S ∗ −determination problem . . . . . 221
5.5 Numerical Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
198
Chapter 5. Algorithmic determination of the maximum possible
earnings for investment strategies
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Strategy proﬁtability analysis is an important question in ﬁnance. For
instance, there is a long debate about proﬁtability of technical trading tech-
niques since Fama and Blume (1966). Recent empirical studies (Brock et al.,
1992; Blume et al., 1994) report evidence for the proﬁtability of technical anal-
ysis, that is able to "beat the market". It is conceivable that, by repeatedly
examining diﬀerent trading rules using the same data set, some rules would
appear to be proﬁtable, yet such proﬁtability may simply be due to luck. This
concern is shared by academic and market professionals (Bass, 1999; LeBaron
et al., 1999). In order to clarify the debate, White (2000) proposes a formal
test, White's Reality Check, on whether there exists a superior model (rule) in
a "universe" of models (rules). White's Reality Check requires constructing a
"full" universe of trading rules.
In this chapter we estimate the complexity of constructing a "full" universe
of strategies. We also introduce a new method for the determination of the
upper-bound in terms of maximum proﬁt for any investment strategy applied
in a given time window [0, T ]. This upper bound is characterized once all the
prices are known at time T and therefore stands for an ex-post maximum
eﬃciency to any investment strategy determined during the relevant time
interval. This approach, later called S∗, allows gauging in absolute terms
behaviors deﬁned with atomic buy and sell actions and can be extended
to more complex strategies. We show that, even in the ex-post framework,
it is extremely complex to establish this upper bound when transaction costs
are implemented.
This approach is also useful in agent-based framework. S∗−determination
approach can provide the information concerning allocative eﬃciency observed
in artiﬁcial market. Following Smith (1962), one can deﬁne allocative eﬃ-
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ciency of markets as the total proﬁt actually earned by all agents divided
by the maximum total proﬁt that could have been earned by all the traders
(total surplus extracted). S∗ can be a measure of allocation performance of
individual traders, as the proﬁt actually earned by the agent divided by the
maximum proﬁt that he could earn.
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 describe the context of this problem, provide simple
illustration, and introduce some important terminology used later. We ﬁrst
describe this problem using a linear programming framework in section 5.3.
Thereafter, we propose to embed this question in a graph theory framework
and show that the determination of the best investment behavior is equivalent
to the identiﬁcation of an optimal path in an oriented, weighted, bipartite
network or in a weighted directed acyclic graph in section 5.3.4. Section 5.5
illustrates this method using various real world data and makes a new point
on the notion of absolute optimal behavior in the ﬁnancial world.
5.1 Introduction
Performance gauging in Finance is a complicated issue that generates a se-
ries of methodological questions (Sharpe, 1991; Elton, Gruber and Blake,
1996; Malkiel, 2004). In assessing the performance of a sequence of invest-
ment/divestment actions relating to a ﬁnancial asset over time (for example
a particular tracker fund), two frameworks can be considered.
The ﬁrst option is to adopt an ex-ante evaluation point of view, answering the
following question: Were the choices of the investor, given his knowledge of
the future at that time, optimal or not when they were realized?. This point of
view acknowledges that investment occurs in a stochastic context and that a
poor ex-post result does not necessarily indicate that bad decisions were made
ex-ante, or during the decision process. Notice that this ex-ante performance
assessment requires an awareness of the investor's conception of the future at
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each stage in the process, and is therefore diﬃcult to achieve in practice.
The second option is to adopt an ex-post evaluation approach, which con-
siders only the statistical result of a given investment strategy over time, once
price dynamics are perfectly known. This approach is widely used in profes-
sional asset management. For example, the performance of various investment
styles is gauged using this technique. Financial journals use this ex-post ap-
proach to create yearly rankings and to report on the performance of asset
managers and funds. In the latter case, performance is evaluated using a rel-
ative comparison among funds, as it is impossible to know what would have
been the best behavior during the relevant period, or how the best output
compares with the performance upper bound.
This paper can provide, in the ex-post framework previously described,
the upper bound to any investment strategy in a given time window, for the
trading of a single ﬁnancial asset. We do not address strategic/tactical allo-
cation or the operational process that allows fund managers to identify states
in the market where buying or selling is particularly appropriate (for example
in exploiting results delivered by neural network forecasting). Neither do we
propose a method that ranks various strategies in terms of risk-return per-
formance (although our approach might be extended to this bicriteria frame-
work). Instead, we oﬀer a computational characterization of the proﬁts upper
bound that might have been reached, by chance or skill, in trading a single
ﬁnancial asset during a given time-window.
Computing this limit allows the determination of an ex-post optimal strat-
egy S∗ that actually delivers the upper bound. We call this problem the
S ∗−determination, and show that it is far from trivial, despite its similarity
to many popular models that have frequently proved completely ineﬃcient.
Our new method delivers an absolute performance indicator geared towards
the ex-post evaluation of a wide range of trading strategies.
This upper bound can be characterized using a linear programming frame-
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work and solved with a simplex approach or with dynamic programming for-
malism. Nevertheless, if these methods are theoretically correct, they suﬀer
from severe limitations in terms of computability (in the worst case, the under-
lying algorithm being non-polynomial for the simplex). We therefore propose
to embed this question in a graph theory framework and to show that deter-
mining the best investment behavior is equivalent to identifying an optimal
path in an oriented, weighted, bipartite network. We illustrate these results
with real data as well as simulated algorithmic trading methods.
5.2 Elements of the game, formalizations and
examples
5.2.1 Elements of the game
Consider the situation in which one investor has realized a sequence of invest-
ments/divestments for a given ﬁnancial asset (a stock, an index or a portfolio)
during a given time window [t = 0, t = n]. At time t = n, his actions (for
example Buy, Sell) and the prices at which they were undertaken (that is,
the historical price series −→p = {pt|t ∈ [0, n]}) are perfectly known. We do
not focus on how the investor behavior has been formed (for example, this
investor should have generated trading rules with genetic programming), or
on the relevant information that are needed to do so. We rather focus on the
decisions it delivered as data and that lead to a speciﬁc proﬁt (or loss) at time
t = n.
This investor has the opportunity to assess his performance with respect to
the best possible behavior in this time window. This assessment can be made
checking whether or not his behavior matches the absolutely optimal set of
actions that could have had realized. Notice this optimal set can theoretically
be computed at time t = n since all the prices are known.
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This comparison requires some hypotheses to be respected. The following
rules of the game present these hypotheses and describe a formal frame-
work in which the actual set of undertaken, compared actions can be matched
against any other set of trades pertaining to the same conditions, and specif-
ically, to the absolutely optimal set of actions.
Market liquidity: Let's assume that the prices in [t = 0, t = n], n ∈ N
are those at which this investor has had the opportunity to rebalance his
portfolio. We posit a price-taker framework, i.e.. The agent's decisions cannot
aﬀect these prices; suﬃcient liquidity at these prices is assumed.
The all or nothing general constraint: We now deﬁne a set of rules
for this investor, in other words, a series of constraints on his behavior. These
simpliﬁcations are useful in allowing rigorous comparisons between sets of ac-
tions (strategies) undertaken during a given period. In this article, these rules
deﬁne an all or nothing behavior: whether the investor is totally invested in
the risky asset or has realized all his wealth in cash:
• At the initialization stage (i.e. at t = 0), the initial wealth W0 of the
investor is composed of a certain amount of cash (C0) and no stock
(A0 = 0): W0 = A0 +C0. At date t = 1 (the beginning of the game) we
posit C1 to be equal to the ﬁrst price of the considered time series.
• The investor must decide for each t ∈ (1, n) one speciﬁc action with re-
gard to the composition of his portfolio: Buy, Sell or Remain unchanged
(respectively coded B, S and U). In other terms, the investor has to com-
pose a sentence of size n using characters in B,S,U. The interpretation
of each of these actions is as follows:
 Buy: One can write B if and only if Wt−1 = Ct−1. If B is written at
date t; all the investor's cash is converted into assets (delivering a
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new quantity for At 6= 0), assuming transaction costs at a c% rate,
At =
Wt−1
pt × (1 + c)
Additionally, the ﬁrst character in any sentence must be a B.
 Sell: if and only if At−1 6= 0, the investor can write S and convert
his position into cash. Considering an identical rate of transaction
costs c,
Ct = At−1 × (pt × (1− c))
 Remain Unchanged: Whatever the nature of Wt−1 (cash or assets),
he can also decide to write U and let his position remain unchanged
at date t: Wt = Wt−1.
• This sentence is one investment strategy Si over
−→p chosen in a set of
strategies {S}. Notice, that in this framework Card{S} = 2n.
Note that these rules of the game can be used by the investor without
knowing the future prices (he performs ex-ante decisions by deﬁnition) and
will deliver diﬀerent results: each instance of Si can be gauged in terms of
relative performance with respect to any other strategy Sj,j 6=i (and recipro-
cally). Among these strategies, the best possible one in terms of maximum
proﬁt, denoted by S∗, can be determined ex-post the realization of the price
sequence (when t = n). Consequently, the objective function is:
S∗ → max(Wt+n −Wt) (5.1)
Thus, it can be generated by an investor acting in the ex-ante framework
by chance or skill (the latter alternative is not discussed here). In any case, S∗
is the upper bound in terms of absolute performance in {S} and therefore a
much more interesting parameter for gauging any strategy Si. As we will show
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later, the best strategy is relatively easy to identify when transaction costs
are not implemented. When transaction costs alter proﬁts, this identiﬁcation
is far more complex.
5.2.2 Basic illustration
Let's consider the following (arbitrarily chosen) price series (see Table 5.1 and
Figure 5.1):
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
pt 100 120 90 160 126 150 140 160 110 170 168 180
Table 5.1: Basic Artiﬁcial Time Series
2 4 6 8 10 12
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
Date
Va
lu
e
TC=0
TC=0.1
Price sequence
Figure 5.1: Basic artiﬁcial time series & some strategies
This example illustrates simply that, when transaction costs are minor (or
absent), the best strategy consists in accumulating all positive spreads (i.e.
positive slopes) observed in Figure 5.1. This strategy is denoted S1∗ in Table
5.2 (see also Figure 5.1). When transaction costs are implemented, the same
strategy becomes far less interesting (see S3, Table 5.2). Some trades are
simply not proﬁtable in the context of high transaction costs. The optimal
strategy when such costs are supported is S2∗ (see the same Figure and Table).
It does not consist of realizing all proﬁtable trades as soon as they are observed
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in the price sequence (for example Buy in position 9 and Sell in position
10). It is clearly diﬀerent from the situation in which there are no transaction
costs, and does not match trivial formulations such as the following, which
would lead to S5 in Table 5.2:
capture the biggest spread in the price sequence (thus, here Buy at time
3 and Sell at time 12), then eliminate all impossibilities in further trades
implied by the rules of the game (thus, it remains one potential trade between
time 1 and 2 ...), and repeat this loop until all net positive trades are realized
( trade between times 1 and 2 would not be realized here because it is not
proﬁtable with 10% TC).
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 W12 −
W1
pt 100 120 90 160 126 150 140 160 110 170 168 180
T
C
=
0.
0 S1∗ B S B S B S B S B S B S 480.61
S4 U U B S B U U S B U U S 369.41
T
C
=
0.
1 S2∗ U U B S B U U S B U U S 202.33
S3 B S B S B S B S B S B S 144.17
S5 U U B U U U U U U U U S 163.64
Table 5.2: Some Strategies among all 212 potential sentences
Note that S2, which is similar to S3∗ in a transaction-cost free framework,
is not as interesting as S1∗. An easy way to solve this problem when trans-
action costs are implemented is to generate all possible sentences and to use
these to compute the net earning and identify S∗. This set is of ﬁnite size 2n
and thus exponential. As we will now show, there are at least two ways to
improve eﬃciently the computation of the optimal strategy S∗, whatever the
level of transaction costs. One is based on a simplex method, another relies
on locating an optimal path in an oriented bipartite network.
206
Chapter 5. Algorithmic determination of the maximum possible
earnings for investment strategies
5.3 Mathematical models: linear programming
method and search in graphs
In this section, we show that the identiﬁcation of S∗ can be described as
a linear programming problem with a classical simplex solution. Unfortu-
nately, this approach is relatively ineﬃcient since the simplex algorithm is
non-polynomial in the worst case (i.e.; one may lack the necessary computing
resources to obtain a result immediately, as soon as the size of −→p becomes
important. We also present a solution that uses the Bellman (1957) dynamic
programming approach.
5.3.1 Initial simpliﬁcation
Before formal results are presented, we introduce the two theorems neces-
sary for solving the problem. These preliminary elements aim to simplify the
solution we propose.
First simpliﬁcation: ﬁltering the price sequence.
Let's consider the price vector −→p consisting of three consecutive prices pt,
pt+1, pt+2 and the function
R(x, y) = y(1− c)− x(1 + c) (5.2)
In equation 5.2, the R(x, y), function computes the net earnings of
successive buy and sell actions with c% transaction costs. In this equation, x
denotes the price at which one buys and y the price at which one sells. By
deﬁnition, y appears later in the time sequence than x. We show that S∗ in
−→p , as deﬁned on page 202, can be identiﬁed in a subset of −→p denoted
−→
fp,
consisting of the extreme points in the price sequence (peaks and troughs) and
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ignoring any intermediary points (here, pt+1). We assume pt+2 ≥ pt+1 ≥ pt.
Therefore R(pt, pt+2) > R(pt, pt+1) and R(pt, pt+2) > R(pt+1, pt+2). In this
latter case, pt+2 is a peak while pt is a trough.
Theorem 1 Ignoring intermediary points: Identifying S∗, pt+1 can be ig-
nored.
Proof 1 Reductio ad absurdum / proof by contradiction:
If it were not the case, since buying and selling on the same date is not allowed:
R(pt+1, pt+2) > R(pt, pt+2)
Therefore: pt+2(1− c)− pt+1(1 + c) > pt+2(1− c)− pt(1 + c)
Which can be simpliﬁed: −pt+1 > −pt
Thus, pt+1 < pt since, by deﬁnition pt+1 > pt
Q.E.A
Note that an analogous demonstration can be made in the case where
pt+2 ≤ pt+1 ≤ pt. As a consequence, if pt+1 is an intermediary point, as
revealed previously; it is unnecessary to identify S∗. In other words, if one
considers a complete price sequence −→p , only peaks and troughs should be
used to identify S∗ (that is,
−→
fp).
Lemma 1 No inclusion of losses: To identify S∗, one can ignore all situa-
tions in which R(x, y) < 0.
In other words, no trade with negative net earnings can be included in the
best strategy, which also excludes situations in which the so-called buy and
hold strategy is unproﬁtable.
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Determining two subsets of prices for potential buy and sell
actions.
From Theorem 1 we know that it is necessary and suﬃcient for determining
S∗ to focus on extreme points in the price sequence. We now show that
−→
fp can itself be divided into two separate sub-vectors of peaks and troughs
corresponding to two independent potential buy and sell positions in −→p (resp.
denoted
−−→
fpB and
−−→
fpS).
Let's consider four consecutive prices pt, pt+1, pt+2, pt+3 such as pt+1 > pt,
pt+3 > pt+2 and pt+2 < pt+1. In the latter case, we do not consider a situation
in which pt+2 > pt+1, as it is equivalent to the initial simpliﬁcation case
discussed previously.
Theorem 2 To identify S∗, none of the
−−→
fpB can be associated with a decision
S and none of the
−−→
fpS can be associated with a decision B .
Proof 2 (i) Since pt+1 > pt ⇒ R(pt, pt+3) > R(pt+1, pt+3). Then pt ← B ≻
pt+1 ← B with ← denoting can be associated with a decision ... and ≻
the preference operator.
(ii) Similarly, since pt+2 < pt+1 ⇒ R(pt+2, pt+3) > R(pt+1, pt+3). Then pt+2 ←
B ≻ pt+1 ← B
From Lemma 1 we know that the situation in which pt+3 < pt can be omitted.
Therefore, from (i), (ii) and Lemma 1:
whether pt ← B and pt+1 ← U from (ii); thus pt+2 ← {U } and pt+3 ←
{U or S }
 or pt ← U and pt+1 ← U ; thus pt+2 ← {U or B } and pt+3 ← {U or S }
(pt, pt+2)← {U or B };
−−→
fpB = {pt, pt+2}
(pt+1, pt+3)← {U or S };
−−→
fpS = {pt+1, pt+3}
Q.E.D
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This theorem does not state where to buy or to sell in the subsets
−−→
fpB
and
−−→
fpS to identify S∗. It uniquely states that it is not worth buying in any
element of
−−→
fpB or selling in any element of
−−→
fpS.
5.3.2 A linear programming method for the identiﬁca-
tion of S∗
A ﬁrst way to solve the S∗ determination problem is to use a linear pro-
gramming method. The basic idea here is to maximize an objective function
subject to a set of constraints formalizing the rules in which this problem is
embedded. We now expose how this program should be written.
Let a(i, j) denote the potential beneﬁt one can obtain if pi ∈
−−→
fpB and
pj ∈
−−→
fpS. Notice a(i, j) is computed using equation 5.2. To be more explicit:
a(i, j) = pj(1− c)− pi(1 + c), with pi ∈
−−→
fpB and pj ∈
−−→
fpS (5.3)
Let x(i, j) be a dummy variable coding 0 or 1 that will be used to ignore (resp.
to identify) transitions between any two prices pi and pj. If pi ← U or pj ← U
then x(i, j) = 0, else x(i, j) = 1. The S∗ strategy consists in increasing an
initial wealthWt to obtain the maximum terminal wealthWt+n in selecting an
optimal set of trading actions at pi and pj. Using the notations deﬁned above,
the identiﬁcation of S∗ can be done solving the following linear problem:
max
∑
(i,j)∈−−→fpB∪
−−→
fpS
a(i, j)x(i, j) (5.4)
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(s.t.)
∑
(i,j)∈S∗
x(i, j) ≤ n (5.5)
∑
(i,j)∈
−−→
fpB∪
−−→
fpS
x(j, i) + x(i, j) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈
−−→
fpB (5.6)
∑
i,k∈fpB
x(i, k) +
∑
j,k∈fpS
x(j, k) = 0 (5.7)
∑
i>j
x(i, j) +
∑
j>i
x(j, i) = 0, ∀i ∈
−−→
fpB , j ∈
−−→
fpS (5.8)
0 ≤ x(i, j) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈
−−→
fpB , j ∈
−−→
fpS (5.9)
Literally, the objective function (5.4) states one seeks to maximize the
total beneﬁts in trading (that is, to identify S∗). Note that the program in
Equation 5.4 to Equation 5.9 is equivalent to Equation 5.1.
Constraint (5.5) implies that S∗ cannot be composed of more than n prices
(if the graph has n nodes) while constraint (5.6) requires that the number of
matching edges incident to vertex i not exceed one.
Constraint (5.7) guarantees the absence of any connection inside buy and sell
subsets.
Constraint (5.8) does not allow backwards in the price series with respect to
their sequential ordering.
Constraint (5.9) requires that x(i, j) = 1 if a trade occurs between position
i and j in
−→
fp , otherwise, x(i, j) = 0 (This constraint requires that each edge
(i, j) not be used in the matching more that once). This latter constraint
means that the problem can be solved by simplex method.
However, it is virtually impossible to explicitly enumerate all these constraints
when
−→
fp is of moderate size. It is also recognized that the simplex algorithm
is exponential even if it can be solved for certain cases in polynomial time.
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Provided the problem does not involve integers,1 an underlying matrix of
dimension (m,n) (where n is number of variables and m, the number of con-
straints) will lead to an exponential computational time O(nm) which means
that any computation of such an algorithm for large price sequences will have
a signiﬁcant computing elapsed time.
5.3.3 An alternative dynamic programming method
The S ∗ −determination problem can also be described in the terms of the
Bellman (1957) equation.
We ﬁrst need to deﬁne an objective utility function, which, in the present
case, is simply the investor's ﬁnal wealth maximization: Wn = Qn×pn+Cn →
max. Let's consider that at moment k − 1 we are in the state xk−1, then
following control:
uk =


buy

 completepartial k = 1, 3, · · ·n− 1,
sell

 completepartial k = 2, 4, · · ·n
leads the system to state xk = fk(xk−1, uk) and future controls
uk+1, uk+2, ..., un should be deﬁned with respect to the optimality in the state
xk. The diﬃculty of this problem is that we do not try to maximize the value∑n
i=1 fi(xi−1, ui), but are rather interested in the maximization of the ﬁnal
wealth. Therefore we can rewrite the problem as a recursive deﬁnition of the
value function:
Wn = Qn × pn + Cn → max (5.10)
1In this last case, the problem is clearly NP-Hard, see for example Garey and Johnson
(1979)
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Wk = Qk × pk + Ck (5.11)
Ck =


Qk−1  pk complete if k = 2, 4, · · ·n,
ℜ  pk partial if k = 2, 4, · · ·n,
0 complete if k = 3, 5, · · ·n− 1,
Ck−1 −ℜ  pk partial if k = 3, 5, · · ·n− 1.
(5.12)
Qk =


0 complete if k = 2, 4, · · ·n,
Qk−1 −ℜ partial if k = 2, 4, · · ·n,
Ck−1
pk
complete if k = 3, 5, · · ·n− 1,
ℜ partial if k = 3, 5, · · ·n− 1.
(5.13)
C1 = 0 (5.14)
Q1 = X (5.15)
ℜ < X (5.16)
k = 2, · · ·n (5.17)
This problem can be solved with backward induction method with running
time O(n3) which is an improvement with respect to the simplex method but
remains more complex than the S∗ algorithm described further.
We now propose to develop an alternative approach for this problem al-
lowing an eﬃcient solution. We tackled the S∗ determination problem as the
identiﬁcation of an optimal path in an oriented bipartite network.
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5.3.4 Embedding the identiﬁcation of S∗ in a graph
structure
Let each price in
−→
fp be depicted as a vertex in a network. The cardinality of
this subset is equal to k. Each vertex is indexed with an integer with respect
to its place in the price series. We show now how to construct a bipartite,
oriented and weighted network N
(
E,
−−→
fpB,
−−→
fpS
)
connecting points in
−−→
fpB and
−−→
fpS.
Deﬁnition: Let ℵX represent the subset of vertices succeeding vertex X.
The network N is deﬁned by the successors of each vertex.
Graph construction: The initial situation from which we start is: ∀X ∈
−→
fp,ℵX = ∅. From this situation, two diﬀerent kind of edges can be built:
• Trading edge (TEi,j): for any two vertices i ∈
−−→
fpB and j ∈
−−→
fpS, vertex
j ∈ ℵi if and only if:
1. j > i (to ensure temporal consistency)
2. c being the rate of transaction costs,
Ri,j = pj(1− c)− pi(1 + c) ≥ 0 (5.18)
• Forward edge (FEm,n): for any two vertices m ∈
−−→
fpS and n ∈
−−→
fpB,
n ∈ ℵm if and only if:
1. n > m (which ensure temporal consistency)
2. ℵn 6= ∅
Notice we impose a time consistency rule, similar to equations 5.7 and 5.8,
to avoid backward connections in this bipartite oriented graph. This means
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that a starting vertex pt+k cannot be connected to an ending vertex pt+l with
k ≥ l.
The rule presented in equation 5.18 obviously determines a proﬁt as in equa-
tion 5.2. For any two vertices, these proﬁts can be analyzed as weights for the
corresponding edges of N .
Consequently, we receive a balanced quasi-bipartite, weighted and directed
network. We propose to interpret weights computed with 5.18 as distances
between two vertices.
In the construction of N , one can see that the number of edges depends
upon the level of transaction costs c:
• The greater c makes the network N sparser and the solution of the
problem easier.
• When c  0, the number of edges increases and makes the network
dense. For a speciﬁc threshold, θ, N is a complete antisymmetric net-
work (with respect to the time consistency rule). θ can be computed
linearly; for any two consecutive prices in fp, pi ∈
−−→
fpB and pj ∈
−−→
fpS:
θ = min(pj − pi)/(pj + pi), ∀(i, j) (5.19)
In the example provided in section 5.2.2 (see table 5.1), this threshold
is 3%.
Proposition 1 If c < θ, then the S ∗ −determination problem is the maxi-
mum number of edges appearing in the path.
When c < θ, N is completely antisymmetric. In this situation, we can
derive Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 If c < θ and any 4 consecutive prices pt, pt+1, pt+2, pt+3 in a
ﬁltered price series such as
−→
fp (see section 5.3.1) with R(t, t+1) > 0, R(t, t+
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3) > 0, R(t+ 2, t+ 3) > 0 then:
R(t, t+ 1) +R(t+ 2, t+ 3) > R(t, t+ 3)
Proof 3 We make the diﬀerence between R(t, t + 1) + R(t + 2, t + 3) and
R(t, t+ 3) to show that this diﬀerence is positive.
−pt(1 + c) + pt+1(1− c)− pt+2(1 + c) + pt+3(1− c) + pt(1 + c)− pt+3(1− c) =
pt+1(1− c)− pt+2(1 + c) =
(pt+1 − pt+2)− c(pt−1 + pt+2)
From that point it is clear that if: c = pt+2−pt+1
pt+2+pt+1
⇒ pt+1(1−c)−pt+2(1+c) = 0
and if c < pt+2−pt+1
pt+2+pt+1
or c < θ, ⇒ pt+1(1 − c) − pt+2(1 + c) > 0, thus R(t, t +
1) +R(t+ 2, t+ 3) > R(t, t+ 3)
Q.E.D
Thus, if c < θ, computing the longest path taking into account the proﬁts
made at each Trading Edge is similar to computing the longest path in terms
of number of edges appearing in the path: ∀c < θ, S∗ =
∑k−1
i=1 TEi,j=(i+1). In
other terms, when c < θ, it is proved that S∗ is the path connecting all the
edges as they appear in sequential order (see ﬁgure 5.2(a)). S∗ connect all
the vertices.
!"
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(a) Complete Bipartite Network
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!"#$
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!"#(
(b) Incomplete Bipartite Network
Figure 5.2: Diﬀerent paths related to diﬀerent levels of c regarding Θ
When c > θ, this result cannot be established and the longest path taking
into account the proﬁts made at each Trading Edge is not similar to computing
the longest path in terms of the number of edges on it. For example, in Figure
5.2(b), we posit c such as R(t+ 2, t+ 3) < 0; one cannot follow a path in the
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of complexity and computing time
price series connecting all vertices; several potential and interesting paths can
be discovered (see Figure 5.2(b)) and therefore must be compared to determine
S∗. One way to tackle this problem might be to compute all possible paths,
thus delivering an exponential algorithm.
Notice (i) that the maximum complexity of the task appears when c = θ+ε
and decreases gradually beyond this threshold (see Figure 5.3); (ii) a numerical
illustration of the graph construction is provided in Annex 1.
We now show how to solve this computational problem using algorithms
to determine S∗ in this graph formalism.
5.4 The S ∗ −determination algorithms
In order to make this paper self-contained, we present two diﬀerent algorith-
mic solutions for the S ∗ −determination problem. The ﬁrst derives from a
technique demonstrated by Floyd (1969); the other is an algorithm for search-
ing of the longest paths in a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We have chosen to
emphasize the ﬁrst algorithm, as it is very eﬃcient, simply programmed, and
widely used (Papadimitriou and Steigleitz, 1998). Although the Floyd algo-
rithm is outperformed by the DAG longest path algorithm in running time,
its pedagogical beneﬁts outweigh its drawbacks. The other advantage of the
DAG longest path algorithm is that it takes into account the number of both
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vertices and edges as parameters for characterizing algorithmic complexity.
This assumption is very important as the number of edges may vary greatly
with changes of transaction costs, making the graph dense (c  0) or sparse
(c 1).
5.4.1 Floyd algorithm approach
In the Floyd algorithm for the shortest-path problem, most steps consist of
pairwise comparisons and additions of integers. When the Floyd algorithm
is performed with a maximization instead of a minimization procedure, it
produces themaximum longest path that corresponds, in our formalism, to S∗.
However, we must consider that the absence of an edge between two vertices
must be interpreted as a length −∞, whereas in the shortest-path problem
this absence is interpreted as a length of +∞. To simplify the algorithm,
we can convert a multisource problem into a single-source problem by adding
zero-weight edges between the ﬁrst vertex from subset
−−→
fpB and other elements
in this subset. This convention is needed to ﬁnd the longest path, not between
every pair of vertices in the graph, but between the ﬁrst vertex in
−−→
fpB and
every other vertex. The other modiﬁcation introduced is the prohibition of
backward loops in the network (see Annex 1 for a numerical illustration). The
pseudo-code of the S ∗ −determination algorithm is presented in Algorithm
5.
for k = 1 to n do
for j = k to n do
path[0][j] = max(path[0][j], path[0][k] + path[k][j])
end
end
Algorithm 5: S∗−determination algorithm: Floyd algorithm approach
The complexity of the S ∗−determination with modiﬁed Floyd algorithm
must now be established. The longest path from vertex 1 to every other
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vertex is searched. During the ﬁrst iteration one must go over n− 1 vertices.
Hence, n−1 additions and n−1 minimizations have to be processed; the ﬁrst
iteration consists of 2(n− 1) operations. Similarly, it is possible to show that
the second iteration consists of 2(n− 2) operations, the third 2(n− 3), and so
on. The following formula deﬁnes the total number of operations carried out
by the S ∗ −determination algorithm:
i=n∑
i=1
2(n− i) = n(n− 1) (5.20)
Thus the S ∗ −determination algorithm based on Floyd has a O(n2) run-
ning time and belongs to the PSPACE group (algorithms necessitating a
memory of polynomial space). Note that the complexity of the classical formu-
lation of the Floyd algorithm for the shortest-path problem comprises O(n3)
arithmetic operations. As there is no reverse in the graph studied in this re-
search, the main loop of the Floyd can be ignored, decreasing complexity to
a level of O(n2).
We can build other longest-path algorithms able to take into account the
sort of constraints presented by the solutions proposed by Dantzig (1966) and
Shier (1973). The ﬁrst solution resembles Floyd (1969), although the order
in which the calculations are performed is diﬀerent. The second algorithm,
known as the double-sweep algorithm, ﬁnds the k shortest path lengths be-
tween a speciﬁed vertex and all other vertices in the graph and can be applied
to our problem. The longest path in a directed acyclic network can be easily
found using a suitable modiﬁcation of the Dijkstra shortest-path algorithm
(Dijkstra, 1959).
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5.4.2 DAG longest path algorithm
In this subsection, we consider S ∗ −determination as a longest-paths prob-
lem in a directed weighted acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E), V = fpB ∪ fpS.
We then apply the linear-time DAG longest path algorithm (Sedgewick and
Wayne, 2011) to solve this problem. The ﬁrst task is to conﬁrm that a given
DAG has no directed cycles. A depth-ﬁrst search can be used to formally
analyze cycle existence. If a directed graph has a cycle, then a back edge will
always be encountered in any depth-ﬁrst search of the graph. Since the consid-
ered graph has no back edges, cycles are excluded by the graph construction
assumptions.
The key element for eﬀective solution of the longest-paths problem in DAG
is topological ordering, which allows us compute the longest path for each
vertex without having to revisit any decisions. We pass just once over the
vertices in topologically sorted order. As we process each vertex, we relax
each edge that leaves the vertex. By relaxing the edges of a weighted DAG
G = (V,E), according to a topological ordering of its vertices, we can compute
the longest paths from a single source in O(|V | + |E|) time (Sedgewick and
Wayne, 2011).
In line with the assumptions described, we also consider the single source
longest path problem. We add a dummy source vertex s plus a dummy sink
vertex t, such that for all i ∈
−−→
fpB, (s, i) ∈ E and the weight R(s, i) is zero;
and for all j ∈
−−→
fpS, (j, t) ∈ E, R(j, t) = 0. Hence, the S ∗ −determination
problem can be deﬁned as longest path from s to t in G(V,E). Vertices
must be numbered in such a way that an edge (i, j) is always directed from
a vertex numbered i to a higher numbered vertex j. The source s is then
numbered 0 and the sink t numbered n+ 1. Vertex j is associated with l(j),
the longest path from 0 to j, where l(j) = maxi:(i,j)∈E[l(i) + R(i, j)]. Vertex
j + 1 can be labeled using the same equation, and so on until the ﬁnal vertex
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n + 1 is labeled with l(n + 1). Initially l(0) is set to zero. The label l(n + 1)
represents the length of the longest path from 0 to n + 1. The algorithm 6
shows the pseudocode of this algorithm. This method requires the vertices to
be processed in topological order. Thus, any topological ordering algorithm
can be adapted to solve the longest path problem in DAGs.
// topologically sort the vertices of G
l[s] = 0
forall the j ∈ V \ {s} do
l[j] = −∞
end
foreach i ∈ V \ {s} do
// in topological order
foreach j : (i, j) ∈ E do
if l[i] +R(i, j) > l[j] then
// relax each outgoing edge from i
l[j] = l[i] +R(i, j)
end
end
end
Algorithm 6: S ∗ −determination algorithm: DAG longest path.
The running time of this algorithm is easy to analyze. Assuming that
the DAG is represented using an adjacency list, we can process each vertex
in constant time, with an additional time proportional to the number of its
outgoing edges. The topological ordering of the vertices in G can be carried
out in O(|V |+ |E|) time. Thus, the entire algorithm runs in O(|V |+ |E|) time.
DAG longest path algorithm is faster than Dijkstra algorithm by a factor
proportional to the cost of priority-queue operations in Dijkstra algorithm
(Sedgewick and Wayne, 2011).
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5.4.3 Extension of the S ∗ −determination problem
Risk-free rate
Let's now consider a (more realistic) situation where the investor retains cash
because the potential buy positions all lead to negative or zero proﬁts. This
investor is oﬀered an opportunity to invest his cash in a risk-free asset (such
as short-term US Treasury Bills) delivering interests at the rate r between t
and t+ 1. When Remain Unchanged is chosen after a Sell action, for a given
timeframe ranging between t and t+ k, his wealth increases according to the
following formula:
△W = Wt+k −Wt = Wt(1 + r)
k −Wt (5.21)
This new cash reinvestment rule substantially modiﬁes the graph construction.
Graph modiﬁcations First of all, edge selection should be adapted; ac-
cording to Lemma 1, all situations where R(x, y) < 0 are ignored. But when
the risk-free rate is available, the condition of Lemma 1 is no longer relevant.
Each trade must provide higher proﬁts in relation to the one-step, risk-free
interest r. Consequently, only situations with
y(1− c)− x(1 + c)
x(1 + c)
> r (5.22)
are accepted. In this formula, x denotes the price at which one buys and y 
the price at which one sells. After such modiﬁcations, the S ∗−determination
approach provides the same kind of information as in its initial formulation
(without a risk-free rate): when to enter the market and when to leave it.
According to this new reinvestment rule, the forward edges (deﬁned above),
leading from
−−→
fpS to
−−→
fpB, will no longer be zero-weighted. Weights for such
edges must be calculated according to the formula 5.21.
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Short selling
The S ∗ −determination problem can be also extended to short selling by
modifying the graph structure. Since in our framework price series are per-
fectly known, one can identify future decreases in the price of the ﬁnancial
asset, and beyond selling the current asset holdings, one can additionally sell
Bt assets that may be borrowed from a third party (i.e. short selling). When
the price drops, the investor should repurchase Bt assets to settle short po-
sitions in the market, but at a lower price. The lender can thus recover his
initial holdings.
In the graph theory terminology, short selling and borrowing mean that
negative-weight edges are allowed in the graph. Since the graph construc-
tion rules exclude any cycle, the DAG algorithm can easily ﬁnd the path
delivering the maximum proﬁts while containing negative-weight edges.
To tackle this particular case, we ﬁrst modify the "elements of the game" (see
section 5.2). The investor must decide for each t ∈ (1, n) one speciﬁc action
with respect to the current composition of his portfolio. The investor sells all
his shares At−1 bought in t − 1, converting his position into cash. Addition-
ally, he sells Bt borrowed shares. His total cash and wealth ain t is deﬁned as
follows:
Ct =(At−1 +Bt)× pt × (1− c)
At =− Bt
Wt =Ct + At × pt
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If the investor decides to buy at date t + 1, he converts all cash into assets.
The trader returns the borrowed stocks to the lender.
At+1 =
Ct
pt+1 × (1 + c)
− Bt
Ct+1 =0
Wt+1 =Ct+1 + At+1 × pt+1
Additionally, we have to modify the graph construction rules. The weight
for a trading edge between two vertices i ∈
−→
fpB and j ∈
−→
fpS is deﬁned as
follows :
Ri,j = pj(1− (1 + β)c)− pi(1 + c) (5.23)
In equation 5.23, j > i, and β = Bt
At
is the fraction of short selling in the
total volume. For simplicity sake, we assume that this parameter is constant.
The forward edges, connecting
−−→
fpS to
−−→
fpB, are no longer zero-weighted. The
weight of the forward edge from vertex j ∈
−→
fpS to i ∈
−→
fpB (i > j), is a positive
value Rj,i = |pi(1 + (1 + β)c)− pj(1− (1 + β)c)|
Short selling incurs some costs, such as a fee for borrowing and repayment
of any dividends that may be obtained from the borrowed assets. Thus, the
proﬁts from transaction Rj,i must be corrected by the amount of these costs.
5.5 Numerical Illustrations
A simple example
We consider again the basic price series
{100, 120, 90, 160, 126, 150, 140, 160, 110, 170, 168, 180} and c = 10% transac-
tion costs (see Table 204). In order to construct the bipartite graph, we ﬁrst
slice −→p in two subsets
−−→
fpB and
−−→
fpS as explained in section 5.3.1 (see also
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Table 5.3).
−−→
fpB{
1 3 5 7 9 11
100 90 126 140 110 168
}
−−→
fpS{
2 4 6 8 10 12
120 160 150 160 170 180
}
Table 5.3: Initial price series sliced in two subsets
We compute the incidence matrix of N with the rules presented above (see
page 213 and Table 5.4). The absence of trading edge between two vertices,
due to the violation of the constraint expressed in equation 5.18 is interpreted
as a weight (or length) of size −∞. In this matrix, the absence of a transition
edge due to the backward interdiction rule is also denoted −∞. Transition
edges between
−−→
fpS and
−−→
fpB systematically receive a weight of 0. The graphical
representation of N
(
E,
−−→
fpB,
−−→
fpS
)
is presented in Figure 5.4.
Plain bold arrows, S∗ = {UUBSBUUSBUUS} with c = 0.1
!"" !#$%"& !'" !!" !$(
!#" !)"!$"& !$" !*" !("
Figure 5.4: Bipartite Network from the incidence matrix B
As mentioned above, the S ∗ −determination problem can be formulated
in graph theory framework. The special distinguishing feature of this graph
is that its nodes can be linearized as shown in Figure 5.5. We can ﬁnd the
longest path from s to t, that represents the optimal solution, by comparing
the paths (algorithm 6):
l(s) = 0
l(100) = −∞
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100 120 90 160 126 150 140 160 110 170 168 180
100 −∞−∞ 0 34 0 25 0 34 0 43 0 52
120 −∞−∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞
90 −∞−∞−∞ 45 0 36 0 45 0 54 0 63
160 −∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞
126 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 5.4 0 14.4 0 23.4
150 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞
140 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞ 0 8
160 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 −∞ 0 −∞
110 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 32 0 41
170 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞ 0 −∞
168 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞
180 −∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞−∞
Table 5.4: Modiﬁed Incidence Matrix of N for the S ∗ −determination with
Floyd modiﬁed algorithm
l(100) = max {l(100), R(s, 100)} = max {−∞, 0} = 0
l(120) = −∞
l(90) = −∞
l(90) = max {l(90), R(s, 90)} = max {−∞, 0} = 0
l(160) = −∞
l(160) = max {l(160), l(100) +R(100, 160), l(90) +R(90, 160)} = max {−∞, 34, 45} = 45
l(126) = −∞
l(126) = max {l(126), R(s, 126), l(160) +R(160, 126)} = {−∞, 0, 45} = 45
.................................................................................
l(t) = −∞
l(t) = max {l(t), l(160) +R(160, t), l(150) +R(150, t), l(160) +R(160, t), l(170) +R(170, t), l(180) +R(180, t)} =
max {−∞, 45, 36, 50.4, 82.4, 91.4} = 91.4
Real-data Example
We now propose one application of the S ∗ −determination method with a
real-world ﬁnancial series consisting in the daily Dow-Jones index. This index
is observed each day at the closing of the New-York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
from Dec., 2nd, 1980 to Feb. 20th 2009 (i.e. 7156 observations). The unpre-
dictability of future price changes, one of the cornerstones of modern ﬁnance,
can be observed from the high randomness of ﬁnancial returns. No one can
seriously defend the idea that one particular economic agent could be able to
predict with accuracy the next 7156 closing prices of the Dow-Jones Index by
Dec., 2nd, 1980. Notice that even if it were possible (which is most improba-
ble), taking advantage of this knowledge under the constraints enumerated in
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Buy
t
180
S
100 120 90 160 126 150 140 160 110 170 168
Positive Weight
Zero Weight
Figure 5.5: A DAG and its topological ordering. Dummy source s and dummy
sink t are separated in order to distinguish them.
section 5.2 would also be extremely diﬃcult if not simply possible without us-
ing the S ∗−determination algorithm. Any additional element of uncertainty
(unpredictable prices for example) simply increases this initial complexity.
Nevertheless, any strategy where a Dow-Jones Index tracker would be
traded in this time window could be matched against the optimal set of actions
that can be identiﬁed with the S ∗ −determination method.
With approaches based on Floyd algorithm (subsection 5.4.1) or DAG-
longest past algorithm (subsection 5.4.2), we determine the best behavior
with transaction costs c respectively at 0% and 5%. The maximum wealth one
should obtain in these two cases is bigger than 1.10E+015 in the ﬁrst case and
bigger than 1.83E+010 in the second case. These ﬁgures seem extraordinarily
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Figure 5.6: Dow Jones Index and its counterpart returns
high: one must keep in mind they are simply impossible to obtain because of
the global unpredictability of the market dynamics at date t with regards to
the available information at this date. In ﬁgure 5.7 we present the evolution
of an investor's wealth that would have found (by chance or skills) the S∗ set
of actions in both contexts.
Nevertheless, on shorter horizons, some agents claim they have skills to
predict future prices with some accuracy or at least detect speciﬁc dates where
it is worth entering the market or shorting their positions. For example, tech-
nical traders claim they can detect signals in past prices (based on patterns)
associated with potential market reversals. If the perceived signals indicate at
date t a further increase in stock prices, these investors will try to buy stocks
immediately until they receive a new signal, in date t + T , associated with a
next decrease in prices. Then technical traders will short their positions to
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Figure 5.7: S∗ with resp. c = 0% and c = 0.5% and Dow-Jones Index (y axis
in log scale)
avoid losses.
Among others, one popular model for technical traders consists in comparing
two moving averages based on past prices. The moving average with i lags
MMi is equal to (1/i)
∑
i(p(t−i+1)). One is computed over a long range period
L, the other on a short time window s. If MMs crosses MML from the top to
the bottom, technical traders would predict a further decrease in stock prices
and try to sell immediately their holdings. On the contrary, if these moving
average cross from the bottom to the top, the signal will be interpreted as
buy signal.
In Figures 5.8 we generated such signals using the same data as previously;
we also computed portfolios managed with respect to the signals. For this
purpose the artiﬁcial investor is endowed with an amount of cash equal to the
Dow-Jones index value at date 1 (974.40). Notice that the moving averages
strategies provide an example of the rules of the game presented in section
5.2. Concerning the signals sub-ﬁgures, we only present a limited time window
for graphical clarity reasons. The portfolio subﬁgures report the evolution of
an investor's wealth using these signals in context of 0% transaction costs.
In Figure 5.8(a), MMs is based on 10 days while MML is based on 90 days.
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With these values we can generate 135 signals in the complete time window,
which delivers the portfolio evolution. In Figure 5.8(c), these moving averages
are respectively based on 5 and 20 trading days which delivers 469 signals.
Notice none of these strategies is interesting in any manner
One can easily rank these strategies in term of overall proﬁtability:
MM10 v.s. MM90 seems to perform better thanMM5 v.s. MM20 in this price
sample since the ﬁrst one bears an overall proﬁtability of +299% (terminal
value of the portfolio = 3886.36) against +70% for the second (terminal value:
1657.18). In any case, one can also measure how far these two strategies are
from the optimum S∗. In other terms, whatever the relative performance of
any trading strategy, S∗ can be used to gauge its absolute performance. In
our example, both MM10 v.s. MM90 and MM5 v.s. MM20 were poor per-
forming strategies. A simple Buy and Hold behavior buying the market at
date 1 and selling it at date 7156 performs far better than these two moving
average techniques. Nevertheless, one can suppose some automatic trading
strategies could outperform this B&H strategy, especially in the context of
high frequency data.
In a similar manner, an important literature dealing with the forecasting of
future market trends (for example with Neural Networks, see Motiwalla and
Wahab (2000), Chen, Leung and Daouk (2003), Chen and Leung (2004), or
with Support Vector Machines, see Huang, Nakamori and Wang (2005)) is
geared at delivering investment tools that can directly be assessed adopting
the same steps.
Resolving the S ∗−determination problem does not give insights on the kind
of signals one should feed automatic trading systems with, nor indicate a plau-
sible behavior for any real-world investor. It simply establishes a boundary
that was, to the best of our knowledge, largely unknown, and proposes a ref-
erence in terms of maximum-proﬁt trajectory against which any population
of investment trajectories can be gauged.
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Figure 5.8: Two investment strategies based on moving averages techniques
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter oﬀers a rather diﬀerent approach compared to the others. While
a large part of this thesis is devoted to the application of agent-based ap-
proaches for investigating classical ﬁnancial questions, this chapter oﬀers an
algorithmic approach for determining the upper bound for the proﬁts of any
investment strategy. Knowing this upper bound may be used to gauge the
absolute performance of an artiﬁcial agent within a population, not only to
verify if it outperforms the others but also to evaluate how far it is from the
optimum. We thus propose a method for determining the ex-post optimal
strategy S∗ that actually delivers the ex-post evaluation of a wide range of
trading strategies. We have embedded this question in a graph theory frame-
work and proposed the linear-time solution.

General Conclusion
This chapter brings the thesis to a conclusion. We begin by summarizing the
key points of this work, what guided us in the direction and what can be
learned from our models and experiments. We then review our contributions,
academic achievements, and future work.
In this thesis, various ﬁnancial issues have been studied using compu-
tational approaches. Unlike traditional methods in economic modeling, the
approaches applied in this thesis do not rely on the assumptions on agents'
rationality and homogeneity. Traditionally, economic models are mostly of a
static nature and have a strong focus on deriving equilibrium. Such models
are solved analytically. Relaxing of these assumptions provides a new way
in which economic reality is modeled. In models of bounded rationality, dy-
namic elements play a much more prominent role and such models do not put
particular emphasis on equilibrium. These models are analyzed via extensive
computational simulations. Initially, these models were built for the purpose
of studying agent's behavior, price discovery mechanisms, the inﬂuence of
market microstructure on price dynamics, or the understanding of the nature
of stylized facts.
To explain the general interest in using agent-based simulations for ﬁ-
nancial research questions, we have devoted Chapter 1 to discussing some
alternative methodologies that can be used for studying ﬁnancial topics. By
confronting diﬀerent approaches, we focused attention on the advantages of
agent-based models in ﬁnance, and we also pointed out some weaknesses of
this approach.
Our results fall into a number of diﬀerent areas. First, in order to con-
tribute to the recent advances in the ﬁeld of computational ﬁnance, we have
developed an agent-based artiﬁcial stock market, ATOM, implementing a re-
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alistic double auction mechanism. This model has been introduced in Chapter
2. Special attention was paid to the design of the market architecture and
to model validation. This research has pursued multiple aims and objectives
for artiﬁcial stock market application: ﬁrstly, to verify diﬀerent behaviors and
the environment's calibration ability to recover qualitatively and quantita-
tively the main stylized facts exhibited by real markets; secondly, to implement
classical model of mean-variance portfolio optimization and to investigate how
individual investors allocate their portfolios under heterogeneous preferences.
Chapter 3 studied market dynamics as emergent properties of individ-
ual agent tradings. An agent-based approach provided more ﬂexibility than
standard analytical models. By ﬂexibility we refer here to the possibility to
gradually include parameters (or calibration settings) the eﬀect of which we
have studied. Further, the computational aspect of the approach enabled us
to observe explicitly the eﬀect of the agents' decision on prices. We have pro-
gressively modiﬁed agents' behavior and observed the appearance of stylized
facts close to the real ones. Since the behavior of the agents is completely un-
der our control, such model helps us relate experiment parameters to observed
phenomena. Hence the contribution of Chapter 3 consists of pointing out the
importance of proportion between limit, market and cancel orders, as well as
order volume via Big Fishes/Small Fishes proportion on the appearance of
realistic quantitative and qualitative stylized facts.
We next explored the topics of modern portfolio theory. For this pur-
pose we have implemented heterogeneous artiﬁcial agents characterized by
mean-variance optimization rules. We have established the relationship be-
tween investors' individual preferences (risk aversion, rebalancing frequency,
optimization methods) and their performance in a long run. The agent's het-
erogeneity helps us identify a dominant strategy.
We have carried out a study of relative performance of diﬀerent invest-
ment strategies, from naive diversiﬁcation to some extensions of mean-variance
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portfolio optimization designed to reduce estimation errors. Our ﬁndings were
consistent with those of Tu and Zhou (2011) and Levy and Ritov (2011). The
performance of unrestricted portfolio strategies outperforms the long-only and
naive strategies with respect to the Sharpe ratio and wealth. Thus, our re-
sult has showed that naively diversiﬁed portfolios are sub-optimal.The reason
behind this performance can be at least partly attributed to the predictive
power of mean-variance agents and higher stability of their portfolios, result-
ing in less trading costs. Our analysis has also suggested that even though the
ex-ante parameter estimation of moments and co-moments involves estima-
tion errors due to the small size of sample, the combination of mean-variance
sophisticated rules and naive rules can improve the performance of their indi-
vidual counterparts.
We have also conducted the extensive simulations to ﬁnd out the impor-
tance of individual agents' preferences for degree of risk aversion and rebal-
ancing frequency on their performance. We have shown the strong correlation
between risk aversion degree and survivability in a long run. Our extensive
simulations demonstrated that in case of allowed short selling, the risk lovers
compete others on the wealth basis, on the other hand, they quickly run out of
the market in the competitions based on the Sharpe ratio. In case of long-only
constrained portfolio, the highest as well as lower risk aversion do not guar-
antee the highest earning. Aggressive and strongly conservative traders drive
quickly out of competition for wealth. However, conservative traders beat the
aggressive traders in the competition for risk adjusted return of portfolios.
The extensive simulations have basically pointed out the optimal type of port-
folio rebalancing in low- and high-volatility market. Our simulation results
conﬁrm the suggestions of Masters (2003) that the halfway back rebalancing
is the compromise between small repeated tradings and large costs for high
volume rebalancing of largely declining portfolio from its targets.
The conducted experiments have suggested that despite the critique mean-
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variance optimization has received, it still is an attractive choice over a simple
allocation strategy. However, the varying traders behaviors and market con-
ditions imply that a universal model or an optimal combination of parameters
that perform the best in all situations might not exist.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we proposed a new algorithm to construct a unique
absolute optimal strategy, moreover we used this technique to estimate tech-
nical trading rules performance in the experimental parts. We introduced a
new method for the determination of the upper-bound in terms of maximum
proﬁt for any investment strategy applied in a given time window. We ﬁrst
described this problem using a linear programming framework. Thereafter,
we proposed to embed this question in a graph theory framework as an opti-
mal path problem in an oriented, weighted, bipartite network or in a weighted
directed acyclic graph.
In this thesis we have conﬁrmed the added value of agent-based artiﬁcial
market models in studying the ﬁnancial topics. The usefulness of agent-based
simulations stems from their ability to integrate the evolving heterogeneous
population of bounded rational agents, to relate individual traders strate-
gies with aggregate market dynamics. In such a way price ﬁxing depends
directly on trading strategies of market participants, at the same time, agents
can change their behavior according to market conditions. We showed that
agent-based research methodology should be seen as a complementary to other
approaches, such as experiments and empirical research, for studying portfolio
optimization or market microstructure topics.
Future Work
There are several directions for agent-based computational model application.
First, data simulated in agent-based artiﬁcial stock market can be a good sup-
plementary to real data, when there is no enough empirical results or statistics,
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for instance, about investors individual preferences or hedge-funds managers'
strategies. In order to get this information, researchers usually rely mostly
on experiments, and there are many studies in which subjects participated in
various investment tasks. One of the common critiques of these experimental
studies is that they are often conducted only with student participants, rather
than actual traders and investors. In contrast, to laboratory experiments with
humans, in pure computational experiments, the simulated behavior of artiﬁ-
cial traders is completely observable. The reasoning behind decision making,
the relation between cause and eﬀect is easily tractable. Agent-based artiﬁ-
cial stock markets can facilitate the understanding of the relationship between
individual investor strategy and aggregated market phenomena, by allowing
the modeler to specify the investor behavior, to implement diﬀerent market
microstructure, and to analyze the resulting asset prices. In such a way, the
artiﬁcial stock market can help investigate the scenarios for which empirical
data do not exist, or are diﬃcult to obtain.
The other important and often not easily obtained data are an order ﬂow
of intraday trading. When the bids and asks are available. Some traders
make their proﬁts by buying and selling within the same day. That is intra-
day trading. When the bids and asks are available, they should help improve
forecasting accuracy and to make intraday trading more proﬁtable. Data
about orders ﬂow provide the analysis with information that the available
prices alone do not. For example, the analysis of millions of tick-by-tick data
points uncovered dynamics of price, volume, volatility, order book dynamics
(Mantegna and Stanley, 1999; Bouchaud and Potter, 2000; Dacorogna, Gen-
cay, Muller, Olsen and Pictet, 2001). Agent-based artiﬁcial stock markets give
insight into such topics, by providing the order ﬂows from diﬀerent scenarios.
Another ﬁeld that could beneﬁt greatly from using advanced computa-
tional agent-based modeling is the study of Market Microstructure. Some-
times it is desirable to compare diﬀerent trading mechanisms, for example,
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it is interesting to compare price formation of the continuous double auction
with Walrasian equilibrium price ﬁxing. The role played by the market mak-
ers or specialists in price formation can be also investigated using agent-based
modeling.
In such a way, there are some possible extensions of our work: scenario
investigation, risk analysis, macroscopic phenomena explanation.
We actually have several projects in progress. First, we extended the
results in Chapter 3 to minimal market calibrations for realistic extraday price
dynamics. The simulated time series that are results of agents trading and
not returns from a given distribution, are a good supplement for real market
data for model risk analysis Henaﬀ and Martini (2011).
The other challenging direction for our future research is inspired from
Mathieu and Brandouy (2011), investigating an optimal order ﬂow between
brokers and clients or order cost of execution. Brokers hold a central position
where they have the possibility to inﬂuence price dynamics in ordering the
ﬂow of orders received from their clients. They can arrange the pending orders
from their client in order to realize maximum beneﬁts for themselves. Thus,
the possible scenarios of orders posting and their aﬀection of price should be
tested before sending the orders to the markets. This problem can be solved
only using an agent-based decision support systems.
As it has been shown, the diﬀerent types of price ﬁxing mechanisms, a
large variety of learning mechanisms and agents' strategies, possible to be
implemented, suggest a rich ﬁeld of research using artiﬁcial stock markets.
The number of research opportunities to explore is countless.
Appendix A
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A.1 NYSE Euronext Stock Exchange Overview
Below is a brief overview of the NYSE Euronext microstructure that aims
to provide a description of the market features that we implement in our
platform. For a more comprehensive overview, one can refer to the oﬃcial
website http://www.euronext.com, which provides a signiﬁcant amount of
information on the recent changes.
In 2000, the Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris exchanges (later Portuguese
Stock Exchange as well) become Euronext, the ﬁrst pan-European stock ex-
change. The main characteristic of Euronext is to be a pure electronic order-
driven trading system. The order driven speciﬁcation means that traders
send their orders directly to an order book. A single order book for each
security or ﬁnancial product is introduced in Euronext for greater trans-
parency and liquidity. All products are traded electronically on the NSC
system adopted by all of the Euronext members. Transactions are cleared
through LCH.Clearnet 1 , acting as the central counterparts and thus guar-
anteeing payment and delivery for all market transactions.
Traders send instructions (orders) to exchanges that arrange their trades.
Orders explain how agents want their trades to be arranged. There are diﬀer-
ent types of orders introduced on the NYSE Euronext stock exchange. Traders
choose orders that have properties that allow them to reach trading targets.
Limit orders indicate the price that an investor wants to pay or receive for
buying or selling shares. The trade will not take place until the limit price is
reached. The limit order is considered as conditional because it is executed
only if the limit price or a better price can be obtained. A buy limit order
indicates that a stock can be purchased only at a speciﬁc price or lower. A sell
limit order authorizes the stock to be sold at a speciﬁc price or higher. The
1The world's leading independent clearing house based in Europe that serves major
international exchanges and platforms
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danger of a limit order is that there is no guarantee that the order will ever be
executed. The set of unexecuted limit orders held by the system constitutes
the book. Limit orders can be canceled or modiﬁed at any time  hence, the
book is dynamic.
Market orders are executed at the best available price on the market. A
market order simply means buying or selling at the current market price.
Market orders have priority on the trading ﬂoor and thus ensure maximum
immediacy.
Security markets are sometimes characterized by their liquidity. In a liquid
market, a small shift in demand or supply does not result in a large price
change. On the Euronext stock exchange, limit orders are regarded as a
source of liquidity in the market as they provide the necessary pools of supply
and demand. Market orders consume the liquidity, because they get executed
when they arrive.
Stop Orders. A stop order is considered conditional because it speciﬁes
that a trade will not be executed until the market moves to a designated
price. At that time, the order becomes a market order.
Hidden or iceberg orders are limit orders specifying a disclosed quantity
which refers to the number of shares the trader wishes to be displayed on the
market screens. The diﬀerence between the disclosed quantity and the total
order size represents the hidden part of the order. If the displayed quantity is
executed, it is refreshed from the reserve quantity. The procedure mimics a
human trader who might execute a large order by splitting it up into smaller
quantities.
The order of execution is determined by two factors:
 A limit buy order is sorted before all others with lower limits and a limit
sale order is sorted before all others with higher limits. This procedure
determines the best bid and best ask prices. Traders cannot accept bids
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or asks at any inferior price. Buyers can accept only the lowest priced
asks and sellers can accept only the highest priced bids.
 Orders of the same kind and at the same limit are ﬁlled in the same
order as they were entered into the order book.
Trading takes place in several stages:
 Pre-opening from 7:15 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.: orders are sent to the central
order book without any transaction taking place.
 Opening at 9:00 a.m.: on the basis of all orders recorded in the book,
the central computer automatically calculates the opening price or call
auction price that allows to match the largest number of bids and asks.
Orders that are not compatible with opening price remain in the book,
pending for a possible future matching against new opposite orders.
 Continuous trading from 9:10 a.m. to 5:25 p.m.: the arrival of a new
order immediately triggers one or several transactions if the central or-
der book contains an order or several orders at the opposite side at a
compatible price. If there are no such orders, the incoming order is
recorded, remaining on the order book at the speciﬁed limit.
 Pre-closing from 5:25 p.m to 5:30 p.m.: as with the pre-opening, orders
are entered without any transactions taking place.
 Closing call auction at 5:30 p.m.: all remaining orders are compared and
trades executed where possible.
 Last, trading from 5:30 p.m. to 5:40 p.m.: trading members may enter
orders at the closing price, which is the price set at the closing call
auction except in exceptional cases.
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For a normal double-auction market, the best (highest) bid price is always
less than the best (lowest) ask price. The diﬀerence between the two is called
the spread of the market.
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A.2 Minimal intelligence calibration. Algo-
rithms
Data: Pmin, Pmax; Vmin, Vmax
Result: Order
/* initialisation */
Λ ∼ D(0, 1)
/* equal possibilities to buy or sell */
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
else
Direction = ”Bid”
end
/* price and quantity definition */
P ∼ D(Pmin, Pmax)
Q ∼ D(Vmin, Vmax)
return (Direction, P,Q)
Algorithm 7: Uniform price distribution UZITU
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Data: Pmean, Psd; Vmin, Vmax
Result: Order
/* initialisation */
Λ = D(0, 1)
/* equal possibilities to buy or sell */
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
else
Direction = ”Bid”
end
/* price and quantity definition */
P ∼ N(Pmean, Psd)
Q ∼ D(Vmin, Vmax)
return (Direction, P,Q)
Algorithm 8: Normal price distribution UZITN
Data: amin = Pmin, amax, bmin, bmax = Pmax; Vmin, Vmax
Result: Order
/* initialisation */
Λ ∼ D(0, 1)
/* equal possibilities to buy or sell */
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
P ∼ D(amin, amax)
else
Direction = ”Bid”
P ∼ D(bmin, bmax)
end
/* quantity definition */
Q ∼ D(Vmin, Vmax)
return (Direction, P,Q)
Algorithm 9: Statistically calibrated SZITU
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Data: {P kmin, P kmax}Nk=0; Vmin, Vmax; Nfix is number of total ﬁxed
prices, N is number of foreseen frames, N < Nfix
Result: Order
△ = [Pmax−Pmin]N
Nfix
Φ[0] = 0
∀t ∈ [1;
Nfix
N
]
Λ ∼ U(0, 1)
/* equal possibilities to buy or sell */
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
else
Direction = ”Bid”
end
/* price and quantity definition */
δt ∼ logN(0, 1)
γt = Φ[t− 1] +△
Pt = P
k
min + (P
k
max − P
k
min)× γt × δt
Qt ∼ U(Vmin, Vmax)
Φ[t] = γt
return (Direction, Pt, Qt)
Algorithm 10: Trend calibrated agent TZITN
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Data: Agent indicator = {Patient, Impatient}; amin, amax, bmin, bmax;
Vmin, Vmax
Result: Order
/* initialisation */
Λ ∼ D(0, 1)
if Patient then
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
log(P ) ∼ D(bmax,∞)
else
Direction = ”Bid”
log(P ) ∼ D(0, amin)
end
Q ∼ D(Vmin, Vmax)
return (Limit,Direction, P,Q)
else if Impatient then
if Λ > 0.5 then
Direction = ”Ask”
else
Direction = ”Bid”
end
Q ∼ D(Vmin, Vmax)
return (Marekt,Direction,Q)
end
Algorithm 11: Patient and Impatient Agressive calibrated agent AZIT
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A.3 Mathematics of the mean-variance model
The goal of portfolio analysis is ﬁnding the eﬃcient set of portfolios in the
mean-variance framework with minimal variance and some constraints on
portfolio weights and desired return. The mathematics of mean-variance prob-
lem is the trade oﬀ between desired return and level of risk reached using prob-
ability theory and optimization theory. Let consider application of diﬀerent
utility functions in the single-period mean-variance optimisation framework.
Let deﬁne α is the part of initial wealth W0 invested in the single risky asset
with expected return R, other part 1−α is invested in the risk-free asset with
return r. The expected wealth is W1 = (αW0)(1 + R) + [(1 − α)W0](1 + r).
In such way we can deﬁne the return and variance of such portfolio: Rp =
W1−W0
W0
= α(R− r) + r, σp = ασR. The investor tries to maximise
ERp −
c
2
σ2p
α
−→ max
, where c is a measure of risk aversion. Hence utility function is:
f(α) = α(R− r) + r − c
2
α2σ2R
f ′(α) = R− r − cασ2R = 0
α∗ = R−r
cσ2R
where α∗ is the optimal part invested to the risky asset. The absolute amount
invested in the risky asset is A0 = α∗W0.
A0
W0
=
R− r
cσ2R
absolute amount is proportional to initial wealth A0 ∼ W0, and inversely
related to the risk aversion coeﬃcient A0 ∼ c and to volatility of risky asset
A0 ∼ σ
2
R
If an investor maximises expected utility of end-of-period portfolio wealth,
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then it can be shown that this is equivalent to maximising a function of
expected portfolio returns and portfolio variance providing: a) either utility
is quadratic or b) portfolio returns are normally distributed.
If initial wealth is W0, Rp is portfolio return, R is the return of risky asset,
r risk-free return, then the end-of-period wealth and utility are
W = W0(1 +Rp)
W = αW0(1 +R) + [(1− α)W0](1 + r)
U(W ) = U [W0(1 +Rp)]
Expanding U(Rp) in a Taylor series around the mean of Rp(= µp) gives
U(Rp) = U(µp) + (Rp−µp)U
′(µp) +
(Rp − µp)
2
2
U ′′(µp) +
(Rp − µp)
3
6
U ′′′(µp)...
since E(Rp − µp) = 0 and E(Rp − µp)2 = σ2p
E[U(Rp)] = U(µp) +
1
2
σ2pU
′′(µp) + ...
If utility is quadratic, then higher-order terms other than U ′′ are zero. If
return are normally distributed, then E[(Rp − µp)n] = 0 for n odd, and
E[(Rp − µp)
n] for n is a function only of the variance σ2p. Hence for cases
(a) and (b), E[U(Rp)] is a function of onlly the mean µp and the variance
σ2p. These results will help us to show that indiﬀerence curves in (µp, σp) are
convex. The deﬁnition of optimal weights (with short selling) is a standard
quadratic programming problem with an analytic solution. If we want to
solve the portfolio allocation problem with constraints (wi > 0), then, there
is no analytic solution and a numerical optimisation routine is needed. In this
section mean-variance model is deﬁned in the terms of nonlinear optimisation
problem. Let
I is number of assets
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̟i is proportion of portfolio invested in assets i, 1 ≤ i ≤ I
̟ is column vector of proportions wi
Ri expected return of asset i, 1 ≤ i ≤ I
R is column vector of expected returns αR, R = [R1, ...RI ]T
σi is standard deviation of the return of asset i
ρij is correlation coeﬃcient of the returns of assets i and j
pij is covariance of asset i with j, 1 ≤ i ≤ I and 1 ≤ j ≤ I, pii = σ2i ,
pij = ρijσiσj for i 6= j
V = I × I is matrix of covariances pi,j
RP is expected return of portfolio
σP is standard deviation of portfolio
A denotes coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion The problem is to maximize
f(w):
f(̟) = RP −
1
2
Aσ2P
= ̟TR−
1
2
A̟TV ̟
=
I∑
i=1
̟iRi −
1
2
A
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
wiwjpij
subject to the constraint:
I∑
i=1
̟i = 1
To deal with the such constraint, we use Lagrange multiplier λ and new ob-
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jective function fˆ
fˆ(w, λ) = f(̟) + λ(1−
I∑
i=1
̟i)
= wTx−
1
2
A̟TV ̟ + λ(1−
I∑
i=1
̟i)
=
I∑
i=1
̟iRi
1
2
A
I∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
̟i̟jpij + λ(1−
I∑
i=1
̟i)
To solve such problem, we should take the n + 1 partial derivatives of fˆ and
send them equal to 0.
∂fˆ
∂̟i
= Ri − A
I∑
j=1
pij̟j − λ = 0 (A.1)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n (A.2)
∂fˆ
∂λ
= 1−
I∑
i=1
̟i = 0 (A.3)
Rewrite these equations as:
I∑
j=1
pij̟j −
λ
A
=
αi
A
(A.4)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ I (A.5)
I∑
i=1
̟i = 1 (A.6)
This system of equations we can solve using linear algebra. Deﬁne vectors
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and matrices as follows:
Vˆ =


ρ11 . . . ρ1n 1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρn1 . . . ρnn 1
1 . . . 1 0


ˆ̟ =


̟1
. . .
. . .
̟n
λ/A


xˆ =


R1
. . .
. . .
RI
0


yˆ =


0
. . .
. . .
0
1


We can rewrite equations A.3 in the terms of matrices.
Vˆ ˆ̟ =
1
A
xˆ+ yˆ
We assume for the moment that the matrix Vˆ is non-singular and hence has
an inverse. In this case the solution of this problem is:
ˆ̟ =
1
A
Vˆ −1xˆ+ Vˆ −1yˆ (A.7)
For an inﬁnitely risk-averse investor A = ∞, the solution becomes simply
̟i = Vˆij yˆi, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Lagrange multiplier deals with only the budget constraint which says that
the sum of the asset proportion must equal 1, hence all all values for the asset
proportions are permitted, even those outside the range [0, 1], that allows the
short-selling. In case of no short sales the optimisation problem is exactly
the same but with an additional constraint ̟i ≥ 0(i = 1, 2 . . . I), in this
case we should also introduce additional Kuhn-Tucker conditions. In the next
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subsection we work out all the mathematical details of constraint problem
with the Lagrange multiplier approach to deal with that constraint.
One riskless asset Denote by Rf the risk free return. Rf < Rmin, where
Rmin is the return of portfolio with minimal variance of risky assets. That is
natural since the risky portfolio has a positive risk associated with it while
the riskless asset does not. The proportion of wealth invested in riskfree asset
is ̟0.
̟0 = 1−̟
where w is the vector of weights of risky assets in optimal portfolio. Then,
the portfolio return and variance are deﬁned as follow:
αP = ̟α + (1−̟)Rf (A.8)
σP = ̟σ (A.9)
By deﬁnition, a risk-free asset has standard deviation of 0, a variance of 0
and covariance of 0 with all other assets, hence it does not contribute to the
portfolio general risk. Correlation matrix should be enhanced by column and
low of 0.
Therefore, the new optimization program is:
f(̟) = RP −
1
2
Aσ2P = (A.10)
= ̟α + (1−̟)Rf −
1
2
A̟2σ2 (A.11)
using the same notions as deﬁned above ˆ̟ = 1
A
cˆ+Vˆ −1yˆ. Let put dˆ = Vˆ −1yˆ
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Vˆ dˆ =


0 0 . . . 0 1
0 ρ22 . . . ρ2n 1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 ρn2 . . . ρnn 1
1 1 . . . 1 0




d1
d2
. . .
. . .
dn
dn+1


=


0
0
. . .
. . .
0
1


= yˆ
The solution of optimal weights: ̟1 = 1AV
−1x1 +1 for risk free asset, and
̟i =
1
A
V −1xi (2 ≤ i ≤ I) for risky assets.
The eﬃcient frontier is a straight line that contains the risk-free asset and
the optimal risky portfolio.
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A.4 Predictive power of mean-variance traders
In this section we test the ability of artiﬁcial mean-variance traders to gen-
erate stock returns in accordance with the expected moments they receive at
the beginning of a simulation. In this experiment, the agents follow the trad-
ing rules described in section 4.1.1. We use diﬀerent combinations of stocks
listed on the CAC40 index form January 2005 to July 2008, for model cali-
bration. To simple demonstrate the test, we relay on daily data of 3 stocks
from January 3, 2005 to July 30, 2008 (900 observations per stock), as this
result is typical output of test. The whole series is divided in 3 sub-sets of 300
daily observations. For each of these subsets, we calculate R¯n, σ2n and Corrn,
n =
−→
1, 3. We use these statistics as proxies for the assets expected moments.
The agents trade over 300 days using these proxies. Then this information
is updated every 300 days (a new set of expected moments is used). Hence
we propose a sliding-window adaptation scheme to approximate the bench-
mark dynamics in artiﬁcial stock market. In other words, throughout the
investment period, the agents rebalance their portfolios at speciﬁc intervals
to update old portfolio weights to new ones calculated from data in the new
estimation window.
We run 1000 times the process described above to check if the artiﬁcial
agents generate prices in accordance to their expectations. Figure A.2 com-
pares the distribution of statistics generated using the 1000 runs and the
benchmark price series (in that case, we only use the "Carrefour" stock 
ticker, CA.PA is time series from January 3, 2005 to July 30, 2008). Figures
A.2(b) and A.2(d) succeed in reproducing the second (standard deviation)
and fourth (kurtosis) statistical moments. However, they produce mean val-
ues higher than imposed values of real time series (see A.2(a)). The third
moments (skewness), on average, are also higher than those of real price se-
ries.
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(b) One of the possible outputs generated by ATOM with real data initialisation
Figure A.1: Real CAC40 stocks Vs. ATOM simulated series over 900 days.
The exogenous information is imposed every 250 days. A sliding-window
adaptation scheme to approximate the original dynamics is used. Prices are
generated by 1000 mean-variance optimizers, heterogeneous with respect to
their risk aversion A ∼ U(0.1, 10), and trading frequency θ ∼ U(1, 10000)
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Next, we measure similarity between distributions of generated and bench-
mark price series. A measure of similarity between P (X) andQ(X) is provided
by the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951), which
is deﬁned as:
D(Q|P ) = EQ
(
ln
(
dQ
dP
))
=EP
(
dQ
dP
ln
(
dQ
dP
))
where X is a vector of random variables generated by the stochastic processes,
P (X) and Q(X) are probability distributions. This divergence is expressed
non-parametrically, making no assumptions, and directly from the samples,
without explicit estimation of the underlying probability density functions.
Using this approach, we can identify the list of series that are within certain
"distance" of the benchmark series. According to KL-divergence measure
(k = 40, θ = 0.01), we select 360 ATOM generated price series out of 1000
with CA.PA daily data as a benchmark. We repeat the same procedure with
BNP.PA and AC.PA as benchmark, and select respectively 308 and 432 ATOM
generated price series.
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Figure A.2: Histogram exhibits the distribution of 1000 statistics generated
by artiﬁcial mena-variance traders, the red line corresponds to the moment of
CA.PA from January 3, 2005 to July 30, 2008.
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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of market dynamics and the decision making
of investors by extending an agent-based computational approach. Agent-based modeling (ABM) studies
stock market as complex evolving system by representing each of the microscopic elements individually and
by simulating the behavior of the entire system, keeping track of all the individual elements. We, ﬁrst, ex-
plore the framework of zero-intelligence traders (ZITs), that puts forward the role of market microstructure,
for understanding at coarse grain what drives the main qualitative and quantitative stylized facts in price
dynamics and patterns in order submissions. The results of extensive simulations indicate that realistic
price dynamics are out-of-reach within the pure ZIT's framework, only the elements of strategic behavior
and strong calibration improve this situation.
Next, this research focuses on the questions on rationality in the corpus of modern portfolio theory. Sci-
entists still debate about ability of naive strategies to outperform the more complex models. The current
research sheds new light on the topic. We test the investors' performance, each of them following a speciﬁc
strategy, scrutinizing their behavior in ecological competitions. Some investment strategies considered in
this thesis are based on diﬀerent extensions of canonical modern Markowitz portfolio theory, others on the
naive diversiﬁcation principles, and others on combinations of sophisticated rational and naive strategies.
Furthermore, we perform closer examination of the eﬀects of rebalancing frequency and investor's attitude
toward risk on portfolio performance in order to identify clearly what matters the most.
Finally, we explorer the computational tools for algorithmic determination of an absolute performance mea-
sure geared towards the ex-post evaluation of a wide range of trading strategies of investors (agents in our
case).
Experimental results conﬁrm a real added value of agent-based artiﬁcial market models for studying var-
ious ﬁnancial topics. Notably, ABM allows to go beyond traditional approaches which may suﬀer from
implementation drawbacks or absence of tractable result in some cases.
Résumé
Cette thèse apporte une contribution à la compréhension des dynamiques de marché et à la prise de décision
des traders à l'aide d'une plateforme de simulation de marchés multi-agents. La modélisation multi-agents
permet notamment d'étudier le système boursier comme un système complexe évolutif dans lequel chaque
trader artiﬁciel possède son propre comportement et qui, par ses prises de décision, inﬂuence l'ensemble
des autres acteurs du système. Dans une première partie, nous mettons en évidence à l'aide de traders à
intelligence zéro (ZIT), le rôle de la microstructure pour comprendre la nature des principaux faits stylisés
de l'évolution des prix. Les résultats issus de nombreuses simulations, indiquent que l'usage des ZIT n'est
pas suﬃsant pour reproduire de façon convaincante les évolutions de prix réels, car ceux-ci doivent être
appréhendés à la fois de manière qualitative mais aussi quantitative. Nous montrons que seuls des éléments
de stratégies de trading et une forte calibration peuvent améliorer cette réplication par simulation, suggérant
que les aspects comportementaux importent tout autant que les aspects microstructurels.
Dans une seconde partie, nous concentrons notre recherche sur la problématique de la rationalité dans
le corpus de la théorie moderne du portefeuille. Le marché artiﬁciel nous permet de tester si des straté-
gies naïves peuvent surpasser, en terme de performance, des modèles plus complexes. Diverses stratégies
d'investissement sont implémentées dans le système artiﬁciel et mises en interaction aﬁn d'observer leur
survie dans des compétitions écologiques basées sur leurs performances relatives. Certaines de ces straté-
gies d'investissements sont fondées sur des variations du modèle canonique de la théorie de portefeuilles de
Markowitz, d'autres suivent des principes de diversiﬁcation naïfs, d'autres encore obéissent à des combi-
naisons de stratégies rationnelles sophistiquées et de stratégies naïves.
Enﬁn, de manière à mieux saisir les facteurs qui inﬂuent sur la performance du portefeuille, nous
montrons les eﬀets de la fréquence de pondération et des préférences pour le risque des investisseurs sur
l'issue de ces compétitions.
Pour ﬁnir, aﬁn de fournir une mesure de performance absolue orientée vers l'évaluation ex-post d'un
large éventail de stratégies de trading des investisseurs (agents dans notre cas) nous proposons un nouvel
algorithme de complexité polynomiale permettant de déterminer la borne supérieure absolue des proﬁts
atteignables pour n'importe quelle stratégie sur une période de temps donnée. Cet algorithme met en
contact deux champs a priori éloignés: la théorie des graphes d'une part et la ﬁnance computationnelle
d'autre part.
